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Sonic Sovereignty: Hopi Song and Indigenous Authority in an Era of Settler Colonialism 
Trevor Reed 
Hopi traditional songs or taatawi are more than aesthetic objects; they are sound-based 
expressions of Hopi authority.  As I argue in this dissertation,  creating, performing, circulating, 
and remembering taatawi are what we might call acts of sonic sovereignty: a mode of authority 
articulated within ongoing, sound-based networks that include Hopi people, plants, weather 
systems, land, and other living things within Hopi territories.   
I begin by exploring the generative process through which taatawi do their connective 
work, which includes long-term collaborations between yeeyewat (composers) and 
environmental actors that establish a collective vision of prosperity that is realized when these 
songs are performed.  Hopi composer Clark Tenakhongva’s taatawi performances during Grand 
Canyon National Park’s Centennial (a Hopi sacred space currently controlled by settler 
governments) exemplify the ways Hopi people are actively using taatawi to (re)assert Hopi 
relations to colonized territories. 
Because taatawi are closely tied to Hopi relations to one another and the land, and 
sometimes contain specialized forms of knowledge held closely by Hopi clans and ceremonial 
societies, their ownership and circulation remains of vital concern to Hopi people.  Laura 
Boulton’s recording of Hopi singers Dan Qötshongva, Thomas Bahnaqya and David Monongye 
in the Summer of 1940, and the travels of those recordings afterwards, show us the complex 
politics of Hopi song circulation in the early Twentieth Century up through the present, and how 
settler cultural and intellectual property laws provide only limited possibilities for indigenous 
groups seeking to bring their ancestors’ voices back under their control.  And even if tribes could 
  
	
reclaim taatawi under settler property laws, these laws require physical and conceptual 
transformations that effectively sever them from the networks of relations from which they were 
created.   
 To better support Hopi sonic sovereignty going forward, I offer brief sketches for three 
potential interventions: (1) an indigenous works amendment to the United States Copyright Act; 
(2) the use of indigenized licensing frameworks to embed indigenous protocols into the 
governance and circulation of indigenous creative works both on and off indigenous lands; and 
(3) establishing a right to indigenous care, similar to Europe’s right to forget, whereby our 
ancestors’ voices can be subject to indigenous care rather than preserved anonymously and 
perpetually as archival objects.  My hope is that these will allow indigenous communities to 
better assert and maintain control over their modes of sonic sovereignty despite the increasing 
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Chapter 1:  
Introduction 
 
“No one just sings out here.” 
Wilton’s answer to my question about how Hopi songs work took me aback.  As a musician, 
I had always admired Hopi song as an art form.  Hopi songs contain sophisticated poetry and 
complex melodic shapes coupled with driving, yet seemingly unpredictable rhythms.   But after 
several years of working with members of the Hopi community, including several Hopi 
ceremonial composers, I was beginning to sense that songs were doing more work on Hopi lands 
than simply giving people on the Hopi Reservation a personal sense of enjoyment or aesthetic 
satisfaction. Wilton’s response seemed to confirm that. 
Wilton and I often had deep conversations about music during the eight years that I knew 
him. Songs from recent ceremonies seemed to be regular parts of our conversations, but there 
were also other topics that seemed to always come up as well--topics like traditional farming (an 
area in which I often struggled), histories of the peoples of the Southwestern United States, the 
rate of change in Hopi life (which Wilton often thought was accelerating), and politics (both 
local and national).  Wilton, nearly 80 years old, was an active yeewa (ceremonial composer) 
who regularly composed songs for our village’s ceremonial dances.  He lived most of his later 
years alone in a secluded field house in the valley below Third Mesa on the Hopi Reservation 
(present-day Northeastern Arizona), but he seemed to know everyone in the villages—he even 
knew who I was, though my family had been absent from Hopi lands for decades.  As I would 
come to realize later in our conversations, Wilton was an important leader in our village, though 
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no one ever said anything about it, and neither did he.  He didn’t need any recognition; in fact he 
avoided it.  But at the same time, he made it a point to speak his mind, and most everyone would 
listen.   
Wilton explained to me in an interview in 2014 that singing has always been part of Hopi life 
ever since we emerged into this world and even well before then—“many, many million years 
go” he said.  From the beginning, rehearsing songs has been one of the ways Hopi people carry 
knowledge (navoti) with us about the world and the migrations of our many Hopi clans—
knowledge that gives each clan its identity and legitimacy.   Songs also power the ceremonies 
and dances that occur in our villages that bring about much needed precipitation and good 
harvests.  “Our religion has never been changed,” Wilton tells me.  “It was so effective to 
anything that---their knowledges were strong. . . their [religious] songs are still in place right 
now.”  Over his lifetime, Wilton had learned and embodied probably thousands of songs.  He 
seemed only to be waiting for the moment to come when people who were fully prepared could 
hear them and remember them.  
In twenty-first century Hopi life, taatawi (Hopi traditional songs; tawi in the singular) 
continue to have significance and power despite the longevity of their form.  They seem to 
always be present.  Taatawi are a mode of composed relation with the world that is distinct in 
fundamental ways from the wide range of musical forms that are created and circulated on Hopi 
lands today.  On any given day driving down State Route 264, which now connects the Hopi 
villages, you might hear the Cajun Queen giving her Cajun and Zydeco show on KUYI Hopi 
Radio 88.1, pass by a country dance with local bands like the Hopi Clansmen happening at 
Köötka Hall in the village of Polacca, or hear a rock or reggae concert with Ed Kabotie or Casper 
Lomayesva at the Moenkopi Legacy Inn.  But the biggest crowds always seem to come for the 
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performances of Hopi taatawi during a tiikive (ceremonial dance day) in the 12 Hopi villages.  
While many non-Hopis (and admittedly some Hopi people) come for what they likely consider to 
be exotic cultural performances, taatawi are always in the foreground, actively doing something 
in those spaces. As I argue in this dissertation, taatawi function as a vital link between Hopi 
people, and between Hopi people and other living things in the cosmos.  Creating, performing, 
circulating, and remembering taatawi are what we might call acts of sonic sovereignty: a mode 
of authority drawn from ongoing relations between Hopi people, the land, and other key actors in 
the world and beyond, that have real effects on the world.  As such, they and other similar 
expressions of indigenous sovereignty have a distinct ontology, one that I believe merits more 
complete articulation in contemporary legal and political discourses.  
The perpetuation of taatawi has taken on a new urgency at Hopi given the lasting effects of 
colonization.  Widespread fears over language and cultural loss have brought renewed emphasis 
on song learning and performance: as fewer people speak hopilavayi (Hopi language), taatawi 
become a kind of lifeline that connects people to the Hopi community and to Hopi lands despite 
the imposition of settler-colonial political and social structures on Hopi lands.1   Given their 
power, the performance of meaningful taatawi have also historically functioned as a means of 
moving the Hopi community to action and bringing attention to core social and political issues.   
Tiffany Bahnimptewa, who was crowned Miss Hopi in 2006, memorably demonstrated how 
taatawi exist as something more than a mode of artistic or cultural expression.  Miss Hopi is an 
important figure within the Hopi community.  Given the central role of women in Hopi society, 
                                                
1. See Sheilah E. Nicholas, I Live Hopi, I Just Don’t Speak It’—The Critical Intersection of Language, Culture, and 
Identity in the Lives of Contemporary Hopi Youth. 8 J. LANGUAGE, IDENTITY & ED. 321, 331-32 (2009) (discussing 
the role Hopi song plays for teens who are not fluent in the Hopi language.); see also MESA MEDIA official website 
(last visited on Mar. 28, 2018), http://www.mesamedia.org (describing the efforts of Anita Poleahla to teach Hopi 
language and culture through songs, spoken word and other formats).  
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Miss Hopi gives voice to important community issues, and has considerable influence on social 
policy.  During the 2006 competition, Bahnimptewa was asked to perform a cultural talent and 
then give a speech to the public on an issue of importance to the community.  In the time she was 
allotted to give her speech, Bahnimptewa chose to perform a tawi she had learned from her taaha 
(maternal uncle) as a means of advancing her platform of reducing substance abuse.  Her tawi 
talked about the value of family, and how important the role of the taaha is in a young woman’s 
life.  Using a Powerpoint presentation, she showed images of corn grinding as a girl grows into a 
woman.2  The song was particularly emotional as many Hopi girls today lack the support of their 
maternal uncle—the one who is supposed to be one of their strongest advocates in life—due to 
the effects of substance abuse.  As she explained, 
Back then I knew what the song was about, and every time I sang it, I would 
see a lot of people crying, because it was a very heartfelt song, and a good 
reminder of many of our cultural values which aren’t really being talked about 
or shared as much any more. 
For Bahnimptewa, singing has a way of reaching audiences in a more complete way.  “You can 
say a lot through speaking, but Hopi song is a whole other language. . . . Hopi song language is 
more poetic.  It brings more meaning, brings more character, more fullness to it . . .  It’s going to 
another level.”   
 Bahnimptewa’s choice to sing as a form of political speech, rather than as a “cultural 
talent” demonstrates the notion that “no one just sings” at Hopi.   Tawi does not necessarily exist 
to showcase “talent” or function as an object of “culture.”  Rather, it is a mode of collective 
action, an assertion of sovereignty that moves beyond settler political frameworks.  It is an 
                                                
2.  See Tiffany Bahnimptewa begins her reign as Miss Hopi 2006-07, Navajo-Hopi Observer (Jul. 27, 2006), 
available at https://www.nhonews.com/news/2006/jul/27/tiffany-bahnimptewa-begins-her-reign-as-miss-hopi/. 
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example of the many ways indigenous peoples continue to generate social, environmental, and 
political networks of sound-based relations to accomplish change in the contemporary world. 
Indigenous Ethnomusicology 
Like Ty Tengan (2005, 2008), Jessica Bissett-Perea (2011), Tevita Ka’ili (2017) and 
other indigenous anthropologists working by, for, and with the communities they study, I 
approach ethnography of ‘my people’ self-consciously, but also with an understanding of my 
connections within the community and territory that animate my work. I am keenly aware that 
seemingly every aspect of Hopi “traditional” life has been thoroughly documented by many of 
the great anthropological minds (see Laird 1977)—what else could I bring to such an established 
canon?  I also recognize that by identifying as a member of the Hopi community I run the risk of 
appearing as if I were somehow a cultural expert or a representative of itaahopisinom (our Hopi 
people).  I acknowledge from the outset that I do not represent the Hopi people—as I explore 
here, that is not my place.  Rather, I write from a point of view arising from relationships I have 
with members of the Hopi community, particularly people from my home village of Hotevilla, 
who have generously extended to me their time and thinking. But I also acknowledge that, unlike 
many who have studied aspects of Hopi life before, I (like most Hopi scholars today) am under 
obligations to the Hopi people arising out of our relations to Hopi land and community that make 
the work I do worthwhile even beyond limited scope of scholarship. And the Hopi Tribe, for its 
part, has required those of us who do research at Hopi to enter into legal agreements codifying 
many of these obligations and establishing shared research goals.3 
                                                
3. See Hopi Cultural Preservation Office, Protocol for Research, Publication and Recordings: Motion, Visual, 




Linda Tuhiwai-Smith has argued that impactful and decolonizing research in indigenous 
communities requires not only constant personal reflexivity, but also working toward achieving 
community goals (Smith 1999).  Tengan (2005) and Ka’ili (2008) have identified several 
methods specific to indigenous anthropology which I think are useful in identifying and 
achieving these kinds of shared goals: (1) building relationships with informants through shared 
genealogies, (2) emplacement (time and space) of the researcher in locally meaningful ways over 
an extended period of time, (3) taking on obligations of reciprocity associated with discussing 
and acquiring local/indigenous knowledge, and (4) commitment to working through subjective 
differences with collaborators as a means of producing unifying (not divisive) knowledge.  
Building on these insights from indigenous anthropology in the Pacific, my research 
methodology has drawn upon a diversity of observational and applied methods in order to gather 
the necessary descriptive and discursive data that I use in the chapters that follow.  These 
methods included near “complete participation” within Hopi village life (Spradley 1980) during 
certain periods, pilgrimage, repatriation of Hopi archival recordings to community members, 
production and documentation of a series of live Hopi Radio talk shows, co-composition work 
with Hopi ceremonial composers, and informant interviews and focus groups. 
Participant-Observation  
In order to experience and document how Hopi song is created, performed and circulated 
among various networks of actors, I often took part in or observed song creation and 
performance at a variety of events and within daily life at Hopi, recording (as permitted) what I 
thought were some of the core features of Hopi song practices through field notes and audio 
recordings.  I attended community events involving Hopi taatawi throughout my time 
researching taatawi production, including village-based ceremonies and rehearsals, celebrations 
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and symposia, non-traditional performances by Native and Non-Native groups in local 
performance venues, and performances by Hopis outside of the reservation (including the 
diasporic Hopi community in Flagstaff). In my work to document song performance practices, I 
paid attention to the ways people and environmental actors became involved in the performance 
of songs in certain spaces; their modes of inflecting speech or song to give voice to certain 
perspectives during song performances; norms surrounding the creation, performance and 
circulation of Hopi song; and the ways people would approach listening to songs.  
Collaborative Composition   
One mode of participant-observation that ended up being particularly helpful for me was 
co-composition.  Over a period of about 5 years I worked with Hopi traditional singer/composer 
Clark Tenakhongva to create and perform a work we called Puhutawi (new traditional song) that 
was performed by both Hopi- and classically trained musicians at the Grand Canyon Music 
Festival in 2016.  Our work together helped me to see how Tenakhongva created taatawi in real-
time, and how he conceptualized their circulation into new sonic spaces, with both Hopi and 
non-Hopi performers and audiences in mind.  In a way similar to what Kristina Jacobsen 
describes in her ethnographic songwriting work with Navajo youth, composing and orchestrating 
songs using Hopi creative practices also helped me to think through the ways taatawi connect 
people, and understand how they function in relation to Hopitutskwa, our Hopi lands.4  Finally, 
as Steven Feld discovered through collaborative editing with his interlocutors in Bosavi (Feld 
                                                
4 As Jakobsen (2017) explains, songwriting allows the creator to use herself as an instrument of knowing—in a way 
similar to ethnographic writing.  For Jakobsen, the focus of songwriting is to tell “an emotionally authentic story” 
that “humanize their subject” and “take the particular and make it universal” (117).  Song-making is intended for an 
audience, which means the songwriter’s efforts must “allow listeners to connect back to their own humanity and to 
connect to each other, as well.”  A songwriter also takes the particular and makes it universal, “allowing others to 
latch on at whatever entry point they’re able,” which requiring the songwriter to show rather than tell (117-18). 
Songwriting, perhaps to a greater extent than traditional ethnography, is a mode of creative storytelling that has the 
potential to foster human empathy and connection “across racial, socioeconomic, and cultural divides” (125).    
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[1990] 2012:241-42), co-composition allowed Tenakhongva to assess my understanding of the 
songs he had composed, and to evaluate whether or not I had grasped the aesthetic components 
well enough to translate the concepts and functions of his songs for non-Hopi audiences.  In the 
initial phases of our work, Tenakhongva would often tell me something sounded to Disney-like, 
“Asian,” or “old West.”  And at other times, these were the kinds of effects he wanted 
embedded.  He would also point out relationships between cosmological entities that I didn’t 
fully understand.  During one rehearsal of Puhutawi, for example, Gary Strautsos, a jazz 
musician performing with us who had learned to play what we believed were ancestral Hopi 
flutes, had attempted to introduce a wind-producing instrument into the mix during a sequence 
depicting thunder, lightening and rain.  Clark quickly corrected Gary, telling him that wind never 
happens at the same time as thunder and lightening.  It was an organizing principle I had never 
considered, but one that was key to a Hopi sonic sensibility and senses of place (see Chapter 2). 
Public Discourse   
There is a covertness involved in doing anthropology that I have never been entirely 
comfortable with—the ability of anthropologists to have experiences in a community that seem 
sincere, only to have them lose that sincerity when they return to their “everyday” lives in their 
“home” world.5 Wilton, who worked with anthropologists for decades, identified this attitude as 
characteristic of a “forked-tongued pahana (white settlers),” someone who does the dark work of 
reconstituting people (and theorizing their motives and relationships) away from the oversight of 
                                                
5  A significant body of work has tackled this issue in much great depth than I can here.  The reflexive turn in 
Anthropology of the late 1980s and early 1990s revealed the privilege of the anthropological gaze, and how it 
skewed the way ethnography represented “other” cultures.  See, e.g., James Clifford and George Marcus, WRITING 
CULTURE: THE POETICS AND POLITICS OF ETHNOGRAPHY (1988).  Indigenous critiques of the anthropological gaze 
have been a potent counternarrative to ethnographic writing at least since the 1960s.  See, e.g., Vine Deloria, Jr., 
CUSTER DIED FOR YOUR SINS: AN INDIAN MANIFESTO (1969).  As mentioned earlier, indigenous scholars in the 
Pacific (Tuhiwai-Smith, Tengan, Ka’ili, etc.) have emphasized the necessity of maintaining obligations of 
reciprocity to communities.  In addition to asserting the necessity of maintaining these critiques in the construction 
of research methodologies, I argue that our field must also begin to work notions of sincerity into anthropological 
fieldwork to further address problems of authority inherent in the production of ethnography.   
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the community.  In my research, I have tried my best to do most of the behind-the-scenes 
theoretical work in an open way, helping to organize public events to talk about the issues 
included here (particularly the Natwani Coalition 2014 Hopi Food and Agriculture Symposium), 
collaborating with KUYI Hopi Radio on broadcasts addressing some of the key concepts (“Farm 
Talk,” and various programs and interviews organized), and presenting my work to Tribal 
representatives, relatives, or groups tribal members in various settings.  I wasn’t perfect at it by 
any means, but doing these events helped me to be more accountable to people for my research 
and allowed community members to ask sometimes pointed questions.  As a byproduct, these 
public-facing events I think benefitted everyone who participated, and at the very least generated 
an archive of Hopi public discourse aimed at understanding the relationships of taatawi to Hopi 
lives. 
Interviews/Focus Groups  
While in some contexts formal interviews are not ideal for anthropological data-
gathering, as they happen out of the context of everyday life and may reduce spontaneity, oral 
interviews have seemed to be a preferred mode of conveying insights and information at Hopi.  
Interviews work, I think, because most Hopis I know are deeply self-reflexive and socially 
conscious already.  I also think most people out home learn early on that different people in Hopi 
society know different things, and that knowledge is valuable.  Orally elaborating knowledge, 
especially when the one seeking knowledge brings a gift for the one being interviewed, is a 
normal way of learning: the speaker has control over his or her words and can ensure that the 
listener understands each concept--or ensures that the conversation ends.  
 As I will explain later in this dissertation, person-to-person exchange of information 
allows knowledge to be disclosed within embodied relations. Thus, interviews and dialogue have 
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become vitally important in the recent work of Hopi scholars.  Sheridan, et al. (2015) put into 
conversation Spanish historical records, roundtable events with Hopi elders, and interviews 
conducted by Hopis with Hopis to draw out memories of our traumatic colonial encounters with 
the Spanish, and present-day relations to them.  Nicholas (2009) includes interview segments in 
her work in a way that demonstrates her relationships to her Hopi informants, and also connects 
readers with her interlocutors’ voices.  Finally, Colwell and Koyiymptewa (2015) and many 
other recent interviews between Hopi intellectuals and non-Hopi researchers, have been 
published in conversation format to show the importance of orally conveyed information and 
dialogic learning.  
Focus groups also played an important role in this project.  These included meetings with 
government entities (Hopi Cultural Preservation Office, Cultural Resources Advisory Task 
Team, Hopi Education Department, Office of Aging & Adult Services), junior and senior high 
school students, nonprofit organizations (Hopi Foundation, Natwani Coalition), groups from 
other tribes (Zuni Cultural Resources Enterprise), and groups of family members, clans or 
ceremonial society leaders.  Sometimes these conversations were formally structured, and other 
times they were spontaneously organized as people walked into the room while I was playing a 
recording for someone. 
Community-Partnered Repatriation  
 Reciprocity is an important feature of doing decolonizing fieldwork anywhere, but it is 
particularly important in the Hopi community.  From the outset of this project, one of the goals I 
shared with others in the Hopi community was to return our ancestors’ voices from institutional 
archives back to our people in a meaningful way.  I did this initially by working to return 121 
recordings from the Laura Boulton collection currently held by Columbia University’s Center for 
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Ethnomusicology back to the appropriate villages, ceremonial societies, or the Hopi Tribe.  
However, this project has continued to expand and develop to include other collections at other 
institutions. By doing repatriation work, I learned about the ways songs circulate at Hopi and 
beyond, both ideally and in practice, and how songs are classified and sometimes restricted to 
certain people or certain uses.  Much of the repatriation work is ongoing because of the 
complexities and ambiguities of the law, as will be discussed in the following chapters.  
However, repatriation has provided fertile ground for discussions about issues of creativity, 
ownership, and circulation, which might not have come about outside of the repatriation context. 
Theoretical Goals and Frameworks 
This project’s theoretical goal is to further destabilize the static, universal notion of musical 
creativity as presently defined by global intellectual property regimes.  As anthropologists in 
Papua New Guinea have recently asserted, the way indigenous creativity is defined and 
celebrated by colonizing states—often in terms of “property”—may have serious side effects for 
indigenous peoples.  Imposing settler property law on indigenous creativity runs the risk of 
limiting the circulation of indigenous creativity (Brown 2003); but, as Leach (2007) argues, it 
may also flatten or diminish the subjecthoods at play in the creation and ownership of creative 
phenomena by framing them within misleading nature/culture binaries (Strathern 2003; Leach 
2007).  Further, as creativity is quickly becoming homogenized into discrete categories for the 
sake of faster, more efficient transmission and commodification (“music,” “books,” “film”), the 
wider value and benefits of indigenous creativity may never fully be accounted for within these 
kinds of categories (Leach 2012).  Rather than considering Hopi taatawi as “music” or 
“property” at the outset, I want to start at a more fundamental, ontological level of inquiry—what 
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is taatawi?  What networks of relationships does it have within a Hopi worldview?  What does it 
do in the world?  
Examining the ontology of music is a complex task, but one that has been important to music 
scholarship in recent years. Bohlman (1999) identifies at least four ontological modes of 
existence for music: as an object (e.g. score or recording), as a process (performance), as 
embedded within other social phenomena (dance-music), or in negated form when it cannot or 
should not exist (deaf conceptualizations of music). For Bohlman, musicological analysis has 
historically lacked the necessary frameworks to allow a reader to “step into and analyze 
ontologies of music other than his or her own” (18). While musicology may have been so limited 
at the time Bohlman was writing, the ontological turn in anthropology has shown that there may 
be ways music scholars can relate one ontology to another if the researcher has the ability to 
inhabit both cultural worlds and thus to build analogical bridges between them (Wagner 1981; 
Viveiros de Castro 2004).  Bohlman provides a methodological basis for accomplishing this—
what he describes as tracing the “metaphysical routes that connect self to others” (18), 
effectively mapping the networks surrounding music and sound based on an individual’s or 
culture’s worldviews. Among the routes Bohlman identifies as entrypoints are: local conceptions 
of musical ownership, ways identity is generated through music, how universality is perceived in 
music within a culture, and the means through which music comes into existence. Importantly, 
while Bohlman’s routes provide a starting point for ontological analysis when notions of the 
subject are relatively constant between the culture of the musicologist and the music culture 
being studied, for those researching music and sound in contemporary indigenous communities, 
this may not always be the case.  
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For many indigenous communities, song is a powerful heuristic for understanding, 
experiencing and ultimately conveying how entities in the cosmos exist and relate to one another. 
Ethnographic evidence from Amazonian indigenous tribes suggests that ceremonial songs have 
the capacity to redefine and re-order bodies and space in a way that allows groups to establish 
relations with an ancestral past or unseen actors within the cosmos (Seeger 2004). An object that 
is viewed as “nature” within one society may also be an integral part of another’s “culture” 
(Viveiros de Castro 2004), and what some scholars think of as culturally grounded figures or 
metaphors about “nature” in mythical representations may actually depict or describe the 
dynamic relations between different species or environmental entities who purport to be human 
(Viveiros de Castro 1992; Stolze Lima 1996). Depending on one’s point of view, making or 
performing new songs might be understood as “creativity”—an aesthetic re-working of an object 
or idea taken out of its “state of Nature” by human creators (Locke 1689:§27)—whereas to 
others it may be site of “productive explosion,” a means by which matter becomes expressive, 
intensifying and generating sensation as environmental and bodily forces come into productive 
relations to create a new, experiential domain or “territory” (Grosz 2008:2-4).  Under the latter 
philosophical framework, the creation of song emerges not simply as a manipulation of signs to 
evoke feeling or emotion (Turino 1999), but as a means of controlling forces existing within or 
outside of the creator in a way that makes them generate palpable, vibrant sensation perceivable 
to a wide array of human and non-human actors.  
The processes through which indigenous composers generate new songs are undoubtedly 
filtered through social experiences within the composers’ cultures (Blacking 1973).  In Bosavi, 
Papua New Guinea, for example the sonic forces generated by singers, memories and the local 
environment through a waterfall-esque flow of sounds and the repetition of placenames, were 
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understood by Feld to be generating a culturally attuned sensation of place as well as intensified 
emotions within his interlocutors (Feld 1990, 1996).  If the goal of a composer’s music is 
ultimately communication of experience or meaning, the sonic forces captured in the creative act 
must necessarily be molded to forms provided by culture, even if those forms are altered or 
revised in the process (Blacking 1995:52). Especially in the case of indigenous peoples, a 
thorough understanding of local concepts of creativity and creative circulation would need to 
account for the experience of colonization, and the ways creative discourse and creative 
possibilities have been impacted by the logics imposed by colonizing states and their most 
powerful actors (Tuhiwai-Smith 1999).  Changes in how indigenous creators structure their 
creative networks or how they value their creative acts appear to be particularly important to 
gauging shifts in communities’ understanding of their own subjectivity (Yudice 2003; Thrift 
2009). 
Studies of Hopi Sound 
Scholars have heard Hopi song from a variety of vantage points within the humanities 
and social sciences. In particular, two early sets of field recordings and transcriptions of Hopi 
ceremonial and everyday songs, one by ethnologist Jesse Walter Fewkes (1889) and the other by 
composer Natalie Curtis (1903-04), have produced a substantial amount of ethnographic and 
musicological literature and continue to find relevance in the works of contemporary Hopi and 
non-Hopi scholars. Fewkes’s collaborator, Benjamin Ives Gilman, a Harvard-trained philosopher 
of aesthetics, was the first to use recordings to test Hopi song for ‘musicality’—something he 
thought derived from  finding that Hopi song lacked key components of scale integral to Western 
musical practice and theory (Gilman 1908).  Natalie Curtis's (1907) musical ethnography found 
Hopi song to be a primeval American musical genre with scale, musical structure, and to some 
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extent, harmony (though she notes that Hopi harmony is rendered through the counterpoint of the 
sonically rich Hopi environment). Rhodes (1973) and List (1993) employed Fewkes’s, Curtis’s, 
other ethnomusicologists’, and their own field recordings and song transcriptions to speak to the 
musical structures of Hopi songs, Rhodes using the songs to discuss the characteristics of certain 
Hopi song genres, and List exploring diachronic change in song texts and melody constructions 
over nearly a century. The poetic texts of the songs recorded by Fewkes and Curtis have been of 
particular interest to linguistic anthropologists since the 1980s, with Black’s (1984) elucidation 
of Hopi concepts of gender, ethics, and kinship and Sekaquaptewa and Washburn’s (2004) study 
of Hopi cosmology in Hopi kiva murals, drawing heavily from these archival resources and some 
newer field recordings. Other lenses for understanding Hopi song have included Shaul’s (2002) 
study of Hopi song as performed literature, examining the structure and meaning in Hopi song 
texts, and Loftin’s (2003) exploration of Hopi song as prayer.  Building on these studies of 
particular structures and components of Hopi song, I seek to situate taatawi conceptually as a 
connecting link within a vibrant network of diverse actors in the Southwest—a point-of-view 
that treats taatawi as a generative mode of what we might call Hopi sovereignty. 
The Nature of Hopi Song 
 Hopi taatawi are composed and performed as a means of connecting living things to the 
rest of the universe. As Lee Wayne Lomayestewa, a Hopi ceremonial leader from the village of 
Songoopavi, explains, “When the priest does the ceremony…when he sings, it’s not just for us 
Hopis. It’s for all the little insects that crawl the earth, the animals, the plants, the birds, the 
butterflies, all the people that live on the earth…even the stars, the galaxies” (personal interview, 
5 February 2011). Hopi songs are created by a yeewa—someone who has the ability to envision 
natwani (prosperity, wellbeing) and can encode that vision, including the relations and labor that 
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go into it, into sound.  Thus, the term yeewa is also synonymous with concepts like strategic 
planning.  As many Hopi composers explained to me, yeewa requires entering into musical 
relations with human and non-human collaborators over extended periods of time.  These 
collaborators include the generations of more experienced men and women within one’s family, 
clan, kiva, or ceremonial society, but perhaps more importantly, it involves collaboration with 
corn plants, which many Hopi farmers call their “children.”  
 In the following excerpt from a 2009 interview, Hopi composer Leigh Kuwanwisiwma 
describes through his own experience of becoming a composer the kinds of relations involved in 
yeewa. The story begins with Kuwanwisiwma’s dad, a respected ceremonial drummer, praising 
him for his first attempts at composing ritual songs by rearranging songs he had heard from other 
members of his kiva. As his father pointed out, this kind of appropriation—something common 
to contemporary musical composition practices—was not necessarily the way good Hopi songs 
are composed:  
 My dad was sitting there listening like this [arms folded], and I was 
intimidated, and I was stuttering, trying not to lose memory and all of that, 
so I was singing my song staggering through it. Finally I got my song 
together, and then he started tapping his feet. He looked at me, straining 
the eyes, and said: 
 “Is Áli! Good song! But,” he said, “no feeling.” 
 So I said, “What?” 
 “I’ll tell you what. You composed your song here [pointing to his 
head] . . . . You didn’t compose it here [pointing to the heart], the spiritual 
part of you. . . . You need to know that if you really want to get that 
feeling, you’ve got to get it yourself, too, not just the others [meaning 
other members of the kiva]. And the way that the old folks do it, to get it 
in here, so that your kiva group can feel it too, you’ve got to do it like the 
old folks.” 
 And, as a thirty year old, I was slowly shrinking. . . . So he said, 
“you’ve got to do it like the old folks. You’ve got to get up early in the 
morning, every morning. Greet the sun, son. Ask for your spiritual well 
being, physical well being, a good day…that’s one—that’s the discipline. 
Second, if you really want to have these [ceremonial] songs really mean 
something, you’ve got to go sleep in the corn field, be there with your 
	17 
	
children.  Be there and witness . . . the horizon as it comes up in the 
morning. Figure out which birds are the first to chirp, look at the dew on 
the corn plants, and sing down there, and witness once you start singing 
and composing these songs, then these corn plants will start dancing to 
you.” (L. Kuwanwisiwma, personal interview, 2 September 2009). 
 
From this and several other interviews with Hopi composers, it became apparent to me that 
creating the right “feeling” in a Hopi tawi is not just a matter of putting a new spin on existing 
aesthetic tropes. Yeewa isn’t just reworking other people’s creative work or progressively 
building on an established musical genre, though taatawi may sometimes do both of these. Good 
songs have real implications for living things like plants, birds, clouds, and galaxies, which can 
hear and respond to taatawi performances. A composer can only get the appropriate “feeling” of 
a ceremonial song through establishing disciplined relations with those entities and observing 
their response, or learning to hear from someone who does understand those entities. 
 How do Hopi taatawi influence things that we might otherwise think of as either non-
agentive or non-musical—things like insects, plants, water, and clouds—when music is 
presumably a human art form? In her work to understand the subjectivity of non-human actors 
described by the Juruna people of the Amazon, Tania Stolze Lima (1999) argued that relations to 
non-humans in indigenous discourse may not just be metaphorical.  Rather, inter-species 
relations should be examined from the perspectives of the actors themselves, which requires 
making analytical space available for what some might consider to be an “underlying logic of 
apparently irrational propositions” (116).6  In line with Stolze Lima’s suggestion, I agree with 
                                                
6.  In parsing her ethnographic material surrounding the peccary hunt, Stolze Lima (1999) finds that the Juruna 
people of the Amazon always insert linguistic markers denoting perspective (e.g., to the peccary he was X; to me, 
the peccary was a Y), implying that “the world only exists for someone…there is no reality independent of the 
subject” (117). In this way, the Juruna conceptualize the world in such a way that humans are not the only ones with 
a subjective “point of view”—human speech (and, as I will argue for the Hopi context, song) “is a part of the various 
realities for others” including some, but not all, species of animals, plants, and other cosmological entities. The fact 
that Juruna think and exist within the perspectives of other subjects whose temporalities and conceptions of space 
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Hopi linguist Emory Sekaquaptewa’s conceptualization of taatawi as condensations (literally, 
making perceptible that which exists in the “ether”) of lived, culturally attuned beliefs 
(Sekaquaptewa & Washburn 2004). As I will explore in the next chapter, the evocative language 
and melodic contour of Hopi ceremonial songs consists of more than just artful poetics—it is a 
physically perceptible manifestation of Hopi relations with humans and others within a particular 
territory. While taatawi draw from a cultural sensibility or “ethos” based on poetic devices like 
rain metaphors and onomatopoeic environmental sounds (cf. Feld 1990), there are key 
cosmological relations that become activated in the production of Hopi song. While song may be 
performed by humans, its resonance need not be confined solely to the human ear. As 
Kuwanwisiwma and others suggest, Hopi taatawi affect multiple kinds of entities at once by 
speaking/singing to their unique auditory perspectives, which is key to understanding these 
songs’ power within the cosmos.  
Overview of the Chapters 
The chapters of this dissertation tack back and forth between ethnographic, historical, and 
legal analysis, to get at the notion of sonic sovereignty from multiple contexts.  In chapter two I 
argue that Hopi taatawi, like all indigenous expressions of sovereignty, must be respected not 
just for their differences from settler culture, but for the authority they have that arises from the 
land.  For many Hopis, songs are deeply rooted in collaboratively shaped senses of place and our 
relations with other actors in the cosmos.  When songs invoke these sensibilities and relations, 
they perform work in the world that sets entire networks in motion to bring about an envisioned 
benefit for the world.  But colonization of Hopi lands by Spanish, American, and Navajo 
conquest has posed challenges for the assertion of Hopi sonic sovereignty, affecting our 
                                                                                                                                                       




geographies, temporalities, and the way our songs are performed and perceived in the world.  
The performance of taatawi in presently colonized spaces allows us to not only express a diverse 
perspective within a multicultural political environment, but also works to (re)indigenize these 
spaces through sound—working out decolonization and respect for Hopi sovereignty in tandem 
as we learn from and collaborate with settler actors. 
In chapter three I trace the circulation of taatawi both within Hopi ownership structures and 
through settler intellectual property regimes by examining an encounter between early 
ethnomusicologist Laura Boulton and three Hopi singers in August 1940.   The hybridization of 
Hopi sound with settler technologies provided new opportunities for indigenous peoples to assert 
their sovereignty within settler spaces, but it also allowed new opportunities for colonization.  
The circulation of Hopi materials in the music market allowed for Hopi voices to be heard 
around the world in a way that seemed less mediated by politicians, government agents, 
missionaries and anthropologists (among others); but it also meant that Hopi songs would 
circulate outside of the protocols and controls rooted in Hopi networks of relations. Settler 
intellectual and cultural property laws, while powerful instruments for asserting rights because of 
their direct linkage to the coercive mechanisms of the state, were simply not developed with the 
care of indigenous voices in mind. 
   In chapter four, I argue that, rather than being objectifiable property taatawi should 
reside in bodies that are fit to handle them, and should not be severed from the networks of 
relations from which they are generated.  For one, some taatawi are harmful when ingested by 
those whose bodies are not prepared to receive them.  Second, converting taatawi into property 
tends to replace our modes of relation between our bodies, our voices, and our creative networks 
with capitalistic modes preferred by the settler-state and our global intellectual property regimes.  
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Ultimately, placing recorded taatawi on the shelves of settler archives rather than in the care of 
indigenous communities means our ancestors’ voices will likely be cared for anonymously, 
perpetually in the servitude of the settler-state and further eroding indigenous sovereignty, unless 
indigenous interventions are made. 
I conclude this dissertation by articulating three interventions that I think are necessary to 
support indigenous sonic sovereignty going forward.  These include: 
• An indigenous works amendment to the United States Copyright Act 
• The use of indigenized licensing frameworks to embed indigenous protocols into the 
governance and circulation of indigenous creativity both on and off indigenous lands. 
• Establishing a right to indigenous care, similar to Europe’s new right to forget, 
whereby our ancestors’ voices can be subject to indigenous care rather than preserved 
anonymously as archival objects. 
While these are just brief sketches of what I hope will become actual interventions, my hope is 
that these will allow indigenous communities to better assert and maintain control over their 
modes of sonic sovereignty despite the increasing colonization of the sonic world by global 
intellectual property regimes. 
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Chapter 2:  
Sonic Sovereignty:  
Performing Authority in Öngtupqa 
 
Kyapsi (Respect) 
In the evening of August 25, 2016, the Grand Canyon Music Festival held the premiere 
performance of Puhutawi (new traditional song) at the Desert View Watchtower located on the 
edge of the South Rim of Öngtupqa, what is now Grand Canyon National Park. The concert had 
been organized to commemorate the Park’s centennial and that of the United States National 
Parks Service, supported with Parks Service funds as well as funds from the National 
Endowment for the Arts and New Music USA. As a Parks Service press release explained, its 
sponsorship of Puhutawi was aimed at “celebrating the magnificence of America’s national 
cultural treasures through art . . . [b]y connecting art projects with the natural, historic and 
cultural settings of the National Park System and [to] inspire a new generation to discover these 
special places and experience our great heritage.”7  In particular, the Parks Service was interested 
in motivating more Native American visitors to America’s Parks—a population it had apparently 
struggled to attract, particularly at the Grand Canyon. 
The Park’s decision to hold the premiere of the work in the Desert View Watchtower was 
filled with significance.  Designed by Mary Colter in the early 1930s as a tourist venue for 
travelers along the Santa Fe Railroad to engage with indigenous artisans, the circular building 
made of sandstone and steal combined Hopi-influenced architectural style with the functionality 
of a panoptic observatory overlooking the majestic 6,000 foot canyon below. To construct the 
                                                
7. Office of Communications, National Park Service. “More than $1 Million Goes to Fund Arts Projects in National 
Parks.” (May 10, 2016), https://www.nps.gov/orgs/1207/05-10-2016a.htm. 
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building, Colter had traveled throughout the Southwest by plane, and then by car through the 
desert, searching out, studying and sketching lookout towers built by hisat’sinom (Hopi 
ancestors) at Mesa Verde, Canyon de Chelly, Hovenweep, and others.  Colter’s watchtower was 
massive in comparison to those sites, measuring approximately 70 feet tall and 30 feet wide, 
giving “the height we needed for view rooms and telescopes” while maintaining “the character of 
the prehistoric building” by “harmonizing of its lines and color with the terrain” (Colter 1933, in 
Shepherd-Lanier 1996).  Colter also included traditional ceremonial spaces, including a kiva, 
ritual alters, and murals painted by Hopi artist Fed Kabotie in homage to the Hopi clans that had 
migrated up the Colorado river (191).  Today, the ritual alters have been covered to preserve 
their sacred character, and the building now functions as a gift shop. 
Seated or standing on the floor of the Watchtower, 100 or so spectators—including several 
members of the Hopi tribe who had traveled across Navajo Nation lands to attend the 
performance—applauded as Clark Tenakhongva, Hopi composer and singer (and now Tribal 
Vice Chairman), offered a welcome: 
“Thank you, good evening. And I want to welcome all of you here, first of all, to our land.” 
While many in the audience probably did not fully grasp the meaning of Tenakhongva’s 
statement, his claim in both speech and song that the Grand Canyon is “our land” was not made 
in jest, as a historical curiosity, or in the multiculturalist “This Land is Your Land” sense.  It was, 
as I will argue here, a very present performance of Hopi authority within territory—an enactment 
of Hopi sovereignty.8   
                                                
8. Sovereignty is a deeply troubled concept, especially as applied to indigenous peoples.  As Joanne Barker (2005) 
explains, sovereignty originally referred to the divine authority of kings, and later to individual citizens, particularly 
in the exercise of an “inherent right” to make war and to govern domestic affairs in the name of Deity (2).  However, 
as bodies of citizens assumed the role of “sovereign,” a key philosophical tension arose. As Esposito (2010) relates 
through his reading of Thomas Hobbes, European-descended popular sovereignty only became a reality through the 
establishment of a stabilized political structure where the power of the individual to harm was recognized, but also 
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After briefly telling the audience about the emergence of our hisat’sinom from within the 
Grand Canyon, Tenakhongva introduced the first of the eight songs that would make up the 
night’s performance.  Tenakhongva explained to the audience that he had composed the song he 
was about to sing during a 2014 pilgrimage he and I (and several other Hopi men) had 
undertaken down the Colorado River through the bottom of the Grand Canyon. 
The first song is a . . . It’s a personal song. . . . If I say some words that 
offends you, I’m glad you don’t understand. [Everyone laughs.] Because 
[the song] is in Hopi. And to translate it a little bit, it’s just telling, and its 
advising all of you that this is a sacred place for Hopis and other tribes.  
And that we need to look at it in a different view other than this thing is a 
big ol’ canyon, a big hole here. This is a place where we call home.  And it 
needs to be respected.  One of the biggest things that upsetted Trevor, 
Lasso [who also traveled with us], and myself, was people floating down 
the river in these little string bikinis, because that’s not the way we do 
things, and that’s what was happening, and partying along the way.   
 
 After a brief flute prelude, Tenakhongva made out a steady pulse with an egg-shaped 
shaker, and began to sing:9 
Okiwa Okiwa, sinomu 
Yep i’ Öngtupqa pas himu 
 
Pay nu’ yayniwa nìikyango 
Hìisavat nu’ umumi yep lavaytinit yep’e. 
 
 
I pity you, I pity you, people. 
Here this [Grand Canyon] is a very important 
(sacred) place. 
Now, I am just beginning, but 
I have something brief to tell you while I am 
here.  
  
                                                                                                                                                       
immunized against through the organized disassociation of individuals from their prior modes of relation and the 
appointment of a representative to speak with authority (and act coercively) within the territory of the nation’s 
citizens (26-30). While this arrangement may have become the building block of Western sovereignty, Barker 
argues that indigenous sovereignty arose through different means—what she calls “resonant” modes of relation: 
“sovereignty has been solidified within indigenous discourses as an inherent right that emanates from historically 
and politically resonant notions of cultural identity and community affiliation” (20).  It is, for Barker, “more of a 
continued cultural integrity than of political power.”  Bruyneel (2007) similarly finds that sovereignty is an inherent 
right—“the ability of a group of people to make their own decisions and control their own lives”—but he adds that 
this right is always “in relation to the space where they reside and/or that they envision as their own” (23).   
9 I want to thank Daryn Melvin for his assistance in reviewing my translation of this song and providing additional 
insights. This transcription is of the full song composed by Clark Tenakhongva and performed in a subsequent 
performance on August 27, 2016 at the Shrine of the Ages, also located on the South Rim of Grand Canyon National 
Park.  As discussed later in this chapter, this text and the text of the performance at the Watchtower are very similar 
but not identical.   I have included this text here as it corresponds with the version that Tenakhongva intended to be 
made available for public broadcast.   
	24 
	
Okiwa, oheyiye oheiye, Sinomu 
 
 
Pay yep Öngtupqa pas himu 
Yep i’ qatsi yayniwa 
Yep i’ qatsi ahoy tiitso’tiwa 
 
Paas’i10 yep himu, noqw yep uma sinom it 
qa kyaptsi’yyungwa. 
Okiwa, Okiwa sinomu 
 
Oheyi Ohiye, Sinomu 
 
Pay uma yep i’ Öngtupqa  
Qa, qa sòosoyam pas kyaptsi’yyungwni 
sinomu. 
 
I pity you, oh-eyi ohi-ye [a man’s expression of 
regret], people. 
 
This [Grand Canyon] is a very important place. 
This is where this life began. 
This is where life returns when we have finished 
our part. 
You should be careful of what is here; yet, you 
are disrespecting it. 
I pity you, I pity you, people. 
 
Ohe-yi Ohi-ye, people.   
 
You who are present at Öngtupqa 




If this song were spoken in English, it would be hard to imagine a more severe rebuke.  But, 
as I will explain, the fact that this is spoken in Hopilavayi (Hopi language) and comes in the 
form of a tawi (traditional song) is both significant and powerful.  I argue that this song enacts 
Hopi sovereignty. It is a command to refrain from acting in a certain way within a place, backed 
by the authority of powerful, long-term relations existing within that territory.  It is in some ways 
an expression of jurisdiction, which is typically defined as “a government’s general power to 
exercise authority over all persons and things within its territory.”11  And yet, coming in the form 
of a song, it seems fundamentally distinct from legal constructions of authority. In this chapter, I 
ask, what is the nature of the authority whereby Tenakhongva, a 60-year old Hopi man and 
United States Army veteran, could command all present—United States officials, tourists, 
Navajo Nation residents, and Hopis alike—and all those who would hear the performance on 
radio, social media, and physical media, to conform their actions to his voice? 
                                                
10 This word could also be “pas’i,” which would mean “this place is sacred.”  
11 See Jurisdiction, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th Ed. 2014). 
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To begin to answer this question, I explore the notion of sonic sovereignty or the resonance 
of political authority with the performance of indigenous sound.  As discussed in the 
introduction, Hopi yeeyewat (composers) generate taatawi (traditional songs) through their 
collaborations with plants and other living things within a territory over the course of months and 
years.  As Lee Wayne Lomayestewa explained, these songs are “not just for us Hopis.  It’s for all 
the little insects that crawl the earth, the animals, the plants, the birds, the butterflies, all the 
people that live on the earth . . .  even the stars, the galaxies.”12  As I attempt to show, song is a 
vital component of contemporary governance within many indigenous territories; for Hopi 
people, song-based authority has been practiced since our emergence—far longer than the kinds 
of jurisdictional discourse which make up European settler forms of political sovereignty.   
Hopi taatawi have several components that generate authority.  In the sections that follow I 
will discuss how taatawi operate at the level of the linguistic sign, producing a cognitive 
response in listeners who have attuned themselves to the poetics and other sonic structures 
gained through their individual and collective experiences within Hopi territories (Basso 1996; 
Feld 1996). At the same time, Hopi taatawi also operate at the level of sensory perception, 
generating feelings and memories of particular times and places within those who hear them 
(Samuels 2004).  Taatawi also reveal networks of relations between actors in Hopi territories and 
throughout the cosmos, and function as a means of engaging with and encouraging diverse actors 
to come together in productive labor.  As I will argue, in the Hopi context, sovereignty is a 
performed, acoustic reality in addition to being a political or juridical fact—a reality that is not 
necessarily dependent on present-day Euro-American legal forms.13  
                                                
12 See Podcast: Returning Hopi Songs—A Hopi Perspective [Sound Recording], Hopi Music Project (Feb. 5, 2011), 
https://hopimusic.wordpress.com/2011/02/05/podcasting-returning-hopi-songs-a-hopi-perspective/ 
13 See Stephanie Nohelani Teves, Andrea Smith, and Michelle Raheja, eds., Sovereignty In NATIVE STUDIES 
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The voicing of authority through taatawi challenges the territorial sovereignty imagined by 
the settler-state.  It disrupts settler notions of time and place that have been superimposed on 
histories and geographies of the Southwest generally and Hopi lands in particular.   Spanish, 
American, and now Navajo colonization, all of which contributed to the urgency of 
Tenakhongva’s sharp rebuke in the song I just shared, have attempted to superimpose their own 
constructions of sovereignty within Hopi territories, leading in some cases to catastrophic results.  
The negative effects of colonization, and our efforts to open up a “third space” to recognize and 
hopefully overcome these effects, reveal themselves at several moments in Puhutawi, during its 
composition, negotiations with performers, the rehearsals, in its performances and later 
rebroadcast, and in audience responses as questions of musical authority on Hopi lands continue 
to be debated and tested. 
 
What does Indigenous Sovereignty Sound Like?   
Anthropology of indigeneity has long recognized deep connections between sound and place 
within indigenous societies, a linkage which directly contributes to the construction of 
indigenous identities and the definition of territories.  As Steven Feld observed among his 
Kalului collaborators in Papua New Guinea, “the experience of place potentially can always be 
grounded in an acoustic dimension” (Feld 1996:97).  Throughout Feld’s collaborations with 
Kalului, sound was a predominant source of truth; it was a vital component of Kaluli memory 
and key to Kaluli understandings of themselves in space.  The sound of water, for example, was 
a critical basis for locating one’s self in relation to other entities in the Bosavi rain forest.  The 
sound of water was also an essential aspect of Kalului aesthetics and song performance practices, 
                                                                                                                                                       
KEYWORDS 10-12 (2015) (briefly discussing the diversity of ways sovereignty is expressed by indigenous peoples 
which appear to be beyond the conceptual limitations of settler political philosophies). 
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which were reflected in Kaluli social attitudes.   As Feld explained, the vocal practice of “life-up-
over sounding”—in which singers both compete and cooperate in a “tense egalitarianism”—
created an “interlocked and seamless” ground against which “there are no single discrete sounds 
to be heard.” (100).  Kaluli knew how to sense and make sense of their territory: the cognitive 
interdependence of Kaluli society and the local environment (what Feld called 
“accoustemology”) is clearly manifest in the kind of “sonic epistemology of emplacement” 
Kaluli practiced in many aspects of everyday life (105). 
In addition to connecting knowledge and truth to place, indigenous songs also attach people, 
their histories and genealogies to places, both by indexing particular memories individuals have 
had in places, but also by generating a particular feeling or feelings that become iconic of places.  
As these feelings are re-experienced, the person shares the same space as those of an (imagined) 
past. As David Samuels has observed over years spent on the San Carlos Apache reservation,  
“The recurrence of a song played on the radio or on the jukebox at 
Curley’s, on a boom box or by a band at a party, allows a building up and 
layering of experiences and feelings.  These experiences and feelings are 
recoverable by being linked to the repeatability of the mediated 
expression.  Repetition brings these feelings—linked to past experience, 
places, and people—back into the apprehension of the listener, so that 
what once was is again . . . This layering of people, places, events, and 
music is the thickening of experience, the knowledge of what it means and 
how it feels to be from San Carlos.  This thickening becomes historical 
consciousness, for more accurate than saying that music triggers memory 
is to say that music triggers the imagination through the evocation of 
mood.  The feelingful layering of indexicality and iconicity brings 
listeners to the sense that they share that feeling with the past.” 
 
Importantly, the origins of the musical styles themselves do not necessarily determine which 
places and memories will attach to which people, only that the sound and the people are present 
on the land over time. 
What has not been explored as fully is how performances of song might generate authority 
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within a territory.  In other words, how might songs become expressions of sovereignty, 
particularly when other performances of sovereignty seek to compete with or colonize it?  
Making the connection between song and sovereignty may sound somewhat tenuous as 
discourses of sovereignty in the Euro-American legal tradition have taken the near iconic forms 
of constitutions, democratic procedures, enforcement practices, or legal opinions, with only the 
occasional utterance of highly structured oral argumentation.  However, as I will argue, 
performances of song operate on multiple levels to create resonances among actors within a 
territory, which lend them and those who sing them authority—an authority constructed not 
necessarily from human agency and a presumed dominance over other, lesser life forms and 
other inert matter within a territory, but the engagement with the agencies of all actors within a 
relevant space—human and non-human. In this way, whether sound carries authoritative weight 
moves beyond the dimension of human cognition to questions of performativity and political 
power.14   
 In the Euro-American legal sense, expressions (spoken declarations, written documents, etc.) 
seem to become actionable only to the extent that they resonate with the sovereign’s prerogatives 
or laws.  Authority can be expressed by those other than the sovereign, but those expressions 
must be made either within the permissible scope of the sovereign’s power and through a 
delegation of the sovereign’s authority, or be recognized or permitted by the sovereign as within 
                                                
14.  As Austin (1962) noted, there are some utterances that can be termed “performantive” because “(a) they do not 
‘describe’ or ‘report’ or constate anything at all, are not ‘true or false’; and (b) the uttering of the sentence is, or is a 
part of, the doing of an action”—in other words, “the issuing of the utterance is the performing of an action” (5-6).  
As Austin points out, for performative utterances to work there must be an existing convention that gives effect to 
certain words performed in a context (15).  In addition, there often must be intention behind the words (8-9, 15).  As 
Goffman (1981) points out, the crafting of the context (“front”) can be just as important to the effectiveness of the 
utterance as its linguistic content: the setting (spatial layout/organization of the context), appearance (indices of 
social status), and manner (cues in the voice or physical movement that foreshadow the utterance), when understood 
by those who experience the utterance, will be key to what effects if any are achieved by the performance (13-17).   
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an individual actor’s “fundamental” or “natural” rights.15 Ordinary citizens in the United States, 
recognized collectively as the sovereign, are permitted to utter words backed by the coercive 
power of the state, mobilizing the resources and power of the state over people and territory as 
they operate within its parameters. For example, when a jury foreman reads a verdict in a 
criminal trial, that utterance will determine the future of the one charged only to the extent that 
those words are authorized by the sovereign—the foreman speaking for the jurors, the jurors 
speaking for the court, the court speaking for the political subdivision, and the political 
subdivision acting on behalf of the sovereign.  To accomplish the desired work of meting out 
justice, the foreman’s words must be spoken at a particular time and place in which the foreman 
has authority, and it must be done in an actionable form, so that it will resonate with others in 
authority who have knowledge of the forms of different kinds of verdicts, and who are employed 
to ensure the collective work of justice (or whatever other agreed-upon principle) is carried out.  
Once the verdict has been performed, all manner of materials will be mobilized for the sake of 
ensuring the verdict is enforced—shackles will be taken off of the body or the body will become 
imprisoned. The accused’s potential for work, health and/or happiness will be affected, as will 
                                                
15.  The United States, for example, protects certain kinds of expressive authority under the First Amendment of its 
Constitution, which states that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting 
the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to 
assemble, and to petition the government for redress of grievances.”  U.S. Const., amend. I.  James Madison, who 
authored the First Amendment, conceptualized these freedoms as not deriving from the Constitution itself, but as 
prerequisites to it.  Freedom to establish and follow religious authority, which he considered to be a duty owed by all 
individually to the Creator, is a prerequisite to the formation of subordinate civil societies and cannot be subject to 
legislative governance.  See JAMES MADISON, A MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE In VINCENT BLASI, FREEDOM OF 
SPEECH IN THE HISTORY OF IDEAS: LANDMARK CASES, HISTORIC ESSAYS, AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 27 (2d. ed. 
2016).  And freedom of the press is the expression of public opinion, which for Madison “sets bounds to every 
government, and is the real sovereign in every free one.” See James Madison, Public Opinion, THE NATIONAL 
GAZETTE (Dec. 19, 1791) In BLASI, FREEDOM OF SPEECH, at 53.  The question is how indigenous forms of 
expression intersect with these formations.  As I will discuss in the following chapters, for indigenous song to be 
recognized as authoritative by the settler state, it appears that it must contribute to the settler-state’s authority, which 
will necessarily limit its its function to whatever is permitted by the settler-state’s existing categories (religion, 
speech, property), or it must be relegated to a position of otherness within a multiculturalist framework, which 
inevitably marks indigenous expressions of authority as inferior to that of the settler-state. See generally ELIZABETH 




his or her social networks inside and outside of the prison. Each verdict incrementally increases 
or decreases the demand for prison space, for taxpayer funds, for labor and raw materials, and 
the extraction of resources.  The defense attorney will begin celebrating or will begin preparing 
an appeal, impacting the reputation of the attorney’s office, the fees that can be charged to 
clients, and potentially even public opinion surrounding the effectiveness of government. The 
point is, once performed under the totalizing authority of the sovereign, this verdict will begin to 
resonate with entire networks of humans and non-humans, who will be mobilized to accomplish 
its directives and whose lives will be altered in some way by the words performed. 
It is important to point out that the concept of totalizing sovereignty, which animates the 
networks implicated in the performance of jury verdicts, may be entirely foreign to indigenous 
performances of sovereignty. Examining the cultural politics surrounding discourses of 
jurisdiction on Hopitutskwa (Hopi lands), Justin Richland argues that, “rather than replaying 
Euro-American logics of sovereign totalities, Hopi cultural politics orient to the lived practices of 
social power as emergent and contingent, and suggest tradition as the jurisdiction of Hopi 
sovereignty” (Richland 2011:205).  As Richland explains, both in design and in practice, Hopi 
sovereignty is never absolute: “no singular authority is understood as holding the whole of social 
power” (Richland 2011:206; 2005).  While Richland explicitly avoids exploring the traditional 
bases from which Hopi sovereignty derives, he finds that the structure of Hopi sovereignty can 
be readily understood through the way jurisdiction is performed in Hopi courts.  Jurisdiction is, 
literally, the way law “speaks to itself about itself” (2011:206).  As Richland shows, Hopi people 
have often refused to participate in the legal processes that would typically give rise to 
jurisdiction under settler legal frameworks.  His exploration of performances of sovereignty--
Hopi refusals in the drafting of the Hopi constitution and in courtroom proceedings where 
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government-appointed judges sought to identify Hopi “customary law” so they could rule on 
village property disputes—reveal that Hopi sovereignty exists, but that it is in some ways 
incommensurate with settler-imposed sovereignties (208-9).  Hopi sovereign authority is not 
grounded in one particular individual or elected body, but is the result of numerous centers of 
authority (clans, ritual societies, villages, etc.) coming together for the good of all.  The 
performance of refusal by individual Hopi tribal members to act as the authority in settler spaces 
that demand an authority formed in its likeness is an assertion that authority at Hopi is non-
totalizing, and should therefore be expressed within spaces and networks that can realize the 
intentions of the community as a whole and not the demands of a single power holder.  
As I explore here, performances of Hopi taatawi are another way Hopi sovereignty can be 
expressed.  Authoritative taatawi, when performed in ceremony, are not unlike the expressions 
of jurisdiction Richland describes.  This may be because, as Sheridan, et al. (2015) explain, 
“Hopis do not draw a distinction between politics and religion nor do they distinguish between 
natural and supernatural” (27).  When performed, well composed taatawi I have heard carry 
significant authority for listeners—an authority that is, borrowing Richland’s words,  “emergent” 
and “contingent.”  For one, Hopi songs contain “thinking about how life should be lived” and 
“the principles by which the Hopi have organized themselves” (Sekaquaptewa & Washburn 
2004:458).   As Sekaquaptewa & Washburn explain, Hopi katsina songs (songs sung by spirit 
beings) often take the form of admonitions “prompted by their observations of Hopi who are 
straying from the proper way of a life . . .” (2004:468).  By stating community norms and social 
structures, and the potential consequences for compliance or non-compliance with them, taatawi 
can provide a basis from which listeners can make choices about their behavior and gauge the 
actions of others.  Interestingly, these admonitions are almost always made in the form of 
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metaphors, comparing people and their behaviors to the patterns of other phenomena in the 
world. Id.  
In addition to describing social norms, performances of taatawi are understood to be 
authoritative because they tend to produce changes in human and non-human listeners and within 
environments throughout a given territory.  In other words, “[c]eremonies are instrumental as 
well as symbolic” (Sheridan, et. al 2015: 27).  As Peter Whiteley explains, the performance of 
songs in ceremony allow those holding ritual power to channel those forces for the benefit of the 
world, allowing for the production of rain, increased fertility, health and happiness (Whitely 
1998:97).  As Hopi archeologist Lyle Balenquah has explained, 
When a modern Hopi person is involved in ceremonial rites and 
responsibilities, he or she does not simply go through the motions but 
actively engages the spiritual power that was first developed and handed 
down by the ancestors.  In this way a Hopi remains connected to the time 
of the ancestors—many of whom, Hopis believe, still inhabit [Hopi 
ancestral sites].  Indeed, it was in places like these that some Hopi 
ceremonies, such as the Snake Dance, originated.  The ceremonies reflect 
connections that transcend time and set participants among their ancestors 
in the present day. . . . The ancestors play important parts in contemporary 
Hopi ceremonies that ‘bring rain, fertility, and other blessings for the Hopi 
people and their neighbors throughout the world.’”16 
 
In the next section, I describe how taatawi re-connect people with the temporalities and places 
that make up the cosmos by generating images of prosperity or other outcomes through 
collaborations between humans and non-humans.  Performances of taatawi allow for voices of 
the past and present to connect and work together.  By maintaining these connections through 
song and ceremony, those who actively listen become emplaced among our ancestors in the 
present.   These songs are efficacious not because of any implicit or explicit exercise of a single 
authority’s power who exacts compliance with the words sung, but because they resonate with 
                                                
16. Lyle Balenquah, They are Still Here: Wupatki Pueblo and the Meaning of Place in Hisat’sinom: Ancient 
Peoples in a Land without Water 14 (Christian E. Down, ed. 2012) 
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networks of actors with whom the performers have relations within a territory—actors who are 
motivated to work together to bring about the effects being sung into reality. 
 
Sounding the Grand Canyon 
 Performances of taatawi, then, are not necessarily intended for personal edification or 
social entertainment, though they often uplift and inspire people.  Rather, these songs are 
composed to have certain effects within territories to which Hopi people have established 
relations.17  In this section, I explore some of the ways taatawi do this, first as they express a 
localized sensibility through which memories of place and relations to territory can be re-
experienced and felt; and second, as they resonate with human and non-human actors within 
those territories, who are encouraged to work together to produce the desired effects.   
 Lavayi and the articulation of Hopi territory 
In my conversations with yeeyewat (composers), performers, and audiences, nearly everyone 
found Hopi songs to be most meaningful when they “paint a picture” for the listener.  Hopi 
taatawi do their work through a spatialized aesthetics: they are designed to emplace the listener 
within times and spaces and in relation to other actors within a territory.   As David Shaul (2002) 
explains, Hopi, like most Pueblo peoples, “use memory as a library; the narrated word, the sung 
word, the ritual word all have a special, spatial quality.  Each localizes the tradition and relates it 
to those present” (188).  For Shaul, this happens through the layering of sonic symbols in 
performance. When a “song-poem” is performed in context, the words acquire greater meaning 
                                                
17. As Robert Rhodes (1973:19-20) has written, “Since the purpose indicated for Hopi music was not to 
entertain an audience or to communicate a message to an audience, the sound of a song is unimportant and is not 
considered by the Hopi in an analysis of the ‘goodness’ or ‘badness’ of a song.  Instead, the criterion of goodness or 
badness is the effect of the song in bringing rain, or insuring good crops, or perpetuating the ‘Hopi way,’ or doing 
whatever the song is supposed to do.” 
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as they are enveloped with melody and rhythm, localizing the meaning of the song for those 
present. Id. 
For example, the song below that Tenakhongva created for Puhutawi emplaces the listener 
by using imagery, poetics, and structure that grounds him or her on Hopi lands.  The song was 
originally sung to me by Tenakhongva, with a rattle as accompaniment   (* Denotes the rattle, 
Hopi words in italics and () denotes English gloss of the Hopi words.) 
 
*******************   ********************** [Rolled] 
Yoyisiwukiwtani;   Yoyihoyoyoyotani 
That there will be distant, slanted rain; there will be rainclouds moving along 
// 
*           *                 *         *     *******[Rolled] 
Naanan’i vaq pew, Talwiptimakya 
from all directions, with lighting flashing 
// 
*     *    *   *     *    *   *  *  *   *   *    *   *  *  * [even beats] 
Yoi  -    humumumutani;      yoi - tuyuyuyutani 
That there will be distant thunder; it will reverberate through the ground 
// 
          *                *         *                 *         *                  *         *           *             *            *  




To understand what it might feel like to hear Tenakhongva’s song from the perspective of 
someone who has lived at Hopi, it is helpful to know the character and nature of rain clouds in 
the high desert.  During the late summer months, these graceful white clouds, rounded on the top 
and flat on the bottom, cross the sky.  They push through the air over the valleys as they grow in 
size and eventually drop their moisture only on certain places below them.  As they produce their 
moisture they begin yoisiwukiwta, or slanted, long-hair-like rain from the perspective of one who 
is in the desert observing them. 
Clouds often travel in groups, and as more and more come together from different directions, 
they create lightning and thunder, which signal heavy rains. The experience of the arrival of rain 
clouds and thunder is visceral—it is not just a visual and sonic experience, but one with a 
palpable texture, a scent, a taste.  The air cools and thickens, taking on a sweet and earthy flavor.  
Wind begins whirring through seams and cracks in the windows throughout a house or hissing 
through branches of bushes and trees.  As thunder approaches, the wind stops.18  The sound 
rumbles the ground and, as it intensifies, vibrates the body.  The word umumumuta, which is one 
of the root words in yoyihumumutani (literally, “it will rain-thunder”), is an onomatopoeic 
expression of thunder vibration.  Tuyuyuta is also onomatopoeic for the feeling of reverberation.  
Sometimes when Tenakhongva would sing these words, he would stretch the onomatopoeia even 
further, adding additional syllables to these words. 
The form of Tenakhongva’s song Yoisiwukiwtani differs from the AABBA’ form most 
scholars have described as the standard Hopi song form (List 1993:5; Rhodes 1977:15-16).  Hopi 
composers would often explain this form through a mnemonic: composers would hold up their 
hand and point to each of their fingers.  After a short introduction (kuyngwa), Hopi songs 
                                                
18. This observation was given by Clark Tenakhongva. See Chapter 1. 
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generally begin with the “thumb” and “index finger” sections: two verses sung in a lower 
tonality (atkyaqw), which is repeated.  Like the “middle finger” and “ring finger,” a song then 
jumps up in range and intensity into new material (oomi; “upward” portion or “cry”), followed 
by a repeat.  Finally, like the little finger, the song then concludes with a brief coda (tootsi or 
“shoe”) based on the atkyaqw. Often a portion of the atkyaqw is repeated in the oomi, making it 
possible for parts of the song to repeat four or five times.  But in the case of Yoisiwukiwtani, the 
entire song is repeated four times.  This follows the form of other songs I have heard that 
describe clouds, in which the repetitions signal clouds arriving from four of the six cardinal Hopi 
directions (SW, NE, NW, SE, missing only ‘below’, which is expressed in the last line of the 
song, and ‘above’, which is where the listener hopes the clouds will converge).  Songs sung in 
this way emplace the listener within Hopi space, locating them at the center of much-hoped-for 
rain clouds.   
When people would listen to this song, they often would comment on just how perfectly it 
described the feeling of seeing these long-haired cloud formations moving across the sky while 
they stood in a field or observed from the village.  While these cloud formations are not 
necessarily unique to Hopi lands, the singer’s humble, aspirational performance, painting a 
hopeful picture of these clouds moving and converging, surrounding the listener with their sound 
by reproducing onomatopoeically the sensory experience of these clouds, and reminding the 
listener of their own experiences of anticipation as these kinds of clouds approach, all work 
together to create a Hopi sensibility of place and position within the cosmos.    
Tawvö that brings actors together 
Taatawi also have the power to position the listener within networks of relations, particularly 
in the way the tawvö (“sound-path,” melodic contour of the song) is constructed.  The beginning 
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portion of a Hopi song, the kuyngwa, almost always contains a melodic tag that reveals the 
nature of the voice behind the song.  It helps the audience envision the actors being brought into 
collaboration through the song.  
For example, this introduction signifies butterfly dancers (drum using x noteheads): 
 
This introduction signifies a ceremonial clown: 
Musical elements, such as timbre, pitch, and tempo all factor into tawvö, articulating the identity 
of the human or non-human entities whose relationships with the singer and audience are being 
activated through the song.  
Because taatawi are often composed to be danced, the rhythmic style, pauses in the beat, the 
kinds of instruments used, and other elements also help develop the relations activated through 
the song.  Certain kinds of beings spin at regular intervals, and as they dance they or the singers 
who sing for them will shake rattles at the moment of a turn.  Some kinds of beings dance 
quickly and at a higher pitch; others are slow and solemn.  Angkatsintaatawi (long hair katsina 
songs) sound at a much deeper pitch, at a slower pulse, and without a drum, while povoltaatawi 
(butterfly dance songs), are sung at a faster and higher pitch with a drum.  Other kinds of beings 
have specific sounds attached to them—the sounds of turtle shells, sea shells, bells, calls, moans, 
or grunts, which add additional dimensions to songs as their bodies move in response to the song 
and as they express their identities. Almost all Hopi songs consist of a single melodic line; the 
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tawvö gives the song its particular voice or voices, speaking to or from the perspectives of these 
beings.  Importantly, each of these voices often has a specific relationship to one’s own identity 
within a clan and village.   
In sum, Tawvö animates the lavayi, making it not simply an artistic or aesthetic object—a 
“song-poem”—but lending it subjectivity and identity—often giving it a voice of authority. 
Nukngwa/Lolmat Unangwa’yta 
In order to have authority, songs must also be sung with a unified “good heart” (nukngwa 
[female speaker] or lolmat [male speaker] unangwa’yta) to be effective.  Positive thoughts, hope 
and work toward abundant growth (natwani), collective-orientation (nami’nangwa), humility 
(naa’okiwat), are just some of the attributes of those who perform with good hearts.  Hopi 
taatawi are not typically meant to depress people.  Even songs that call out a particular person or 
behavior will often provide within it hope for a prosperous outcome if they change 
(Sekaquaptewa & Washburn 2004:468-470) 
When layered on top of each other, the lavayi (speech), which paints the imagery and 
generates the feel of place, together with the tawvö (melodic contour), which establishes 
relations with voices from other actors within the territory, and nukngwa/lolmat unangwa (good 
hear) position the listener, singer, and other actors within the same time and space and within an 
encouraging, collaborative network of relations.  A tawi that is full of meaning both in its lavayi 
and tawvö, which is performed with a good heart, generates materially the images that were 





I opened this chapter with the text of the first song Clark Tenakhongva performed in 
Puhutawi.  As with many taatawi the text is deeply rooted in a Hopi sensibility of territory, and 
is meant to express an authoritative voice in relation to and in collaboration with actors within 
that territory.   
When Tenakhongva sang that Öngtupqa is “pas himu” (literally “something of high 
importance and status”19) I take him as saying that the Grand Canyon is not only important, but 
also sacred.  As John Loftin (2003) has written, for most Hopis, the substance of life is water, 
moisture, or breath—it is ani’himu (a “great something” or sacred substance) and is sacred.  
Öngtupqa’s rivers are sacred spaces in part because they circulate this water and moisture.   But 
they are also sacred because of the relations Hopi have to places within Öngtupqa: “yep i’qatsi 
yayniwa” (here this life began), Tenakhongva says, and “yep i’qatisi ahoy tiitsotiwa,” (here life 
returns when we have finished our part).  Tenakhongva is talking about the Canyon as the place 
where Hopis emerged into this world (Malotki 2011:35-36).  But depending on how it is sung, 
this phrase may take on additional meaning.  The word “i’qatsi” can mean “this life,” but, sung 
slightly differently as “iquatsi,” it can also mean, simply, “my life.”  Certainly, Öngtupqa 
contains sacred sites where Hopisinom emerged into the present world; but it may not necessarily 
be where everyone in the audience emerged, or where they will return.20  Another reason why 
Tenakhongva might be referring to his life has to do with the pilgrimage to Öngtupqa he, several 
others and I took in 2014, which I will discuss in greater depth in the next section.  As 
Tenakhongva explained to the Watchtower audience, when Hopi men make their pilgrimage 
down into Öngtupqa, 
                                                
19 I thank Stewart Koyiymptewa for this insightful gloss. 
20. Hopi histories depicting the emergence of diverse ethnic groups would not be appropriate here, but it is 
important to note the subtle ways wordplay helps distinguish and define groups and their claims to the Grand 
Canyon.   
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that 13 days on the river changes your life.  For me, going back on it was, 
um—I am a veteran, and I thought that was part of my healing process—
going down the river.” 
 
In making a pilgrimage to places like Öngtupqa, it is possible for someone to emerge again, to 
have his or her “eyes opened” as Tenakhongva put it.  Öngtupqa is a place where one’s life 
begins (again).    
Tenakhongva explains that Öngtupqa is where we ahoy (return, go back to earlier time/place) 
when we have tiitsotiwa (finished).  As Tenakhongva glossed it, the word tiitsotiwa in this 
context means “when we have finished our part.” The root word, tiitso, has among its meanings, 
to finish dancing, to finish planting, the culmination of something’s purpose of being.21  As many 
Hopis believe, when we die, we return to Öngtupqa.  But Tenakhongva reminds us that there is 
an element of reciprocity involved.  When we have finished our part by completing a good life—
including a life of naa’ökiwa (humility) and kyaptsi (respect)—we can return to Öngtupqa.22 
While the lavayi of Tenakhongva’s song is a powerful articulation of Öngtupqa as Hopi, 
there are some important aspects of the tawvö of Tenakhongva’s song, and the context in which 
it was sung, that also make it an articulation of Hopi sovereignty. 
First, the song form is not a typical dance song.  Rather, it is what might be called an 
ökwhantawi (song of admonition).23  These kinds of songs come in many different forms, 
including the genre of “owl songs” in which children are admonished to not fuss, fight or cry or 
else an owl will eat them (see Mesa Media 2010; Black 1973; Rhodes 1973).  Like these songs, 
                                                
21.  See HOPI DICTIONARY (1988). 
22.  As Sekaquaptewa and Washburn (2004) explain, similar reciprocal language can be found in Hopi katsina 
songs. When the katsinam (spirit beings) visit Hopi villages, they often include the phrase uma tùwati (for your 
part), followed by a description of what is required for them to fulfill their part or obligation, and then a promise by 
the katsinam to bring rain, nourish crops, and help sustain a good life (Sekaquaptewa & Washburn 2004:468).   
23. See HOPI DICTIONARY at 360. 
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Tenakhongva’s song flows along in a lulling triple meter, with brief repetitions of key phrases 
voiced by an authoritative being.  But, unlike the owl songs where the owl provides the 
admonition, in Tenakhongva’s song, the words are the sounds of a crying or regretful man, 
which are repeated several times: oheyi, ohiye.   Also, the owl songs and Tenakhongva’s song 
are similar in structure, in which the listener is emplaced in a space painted by the composer in 
sound, which is then rapidly punctuated by a clear prescription of consequences. In both the owl 
songs and Tenakhongva’s song, admonition is through a clear promise or consequence.  In owl 
songs, children are admonished that, if they fuss, the owls will eat them; but if they go to sleep 
without crying, they won’t (Rhodes 1973).  Tenakhongva’s song is a bit more forceful, which 
makes sense as it is admonishing adults. The admonishing lines state “you should be careful of 
what is here; yet, you are disrespecting it” and then, “No, you will not disrespect it, every one of 
you people.”   
Another important aspect of Tenakhongva’s tawi has to do with the actors whose voices are 
referenced in the song, and how the singer places himself in relation to those voices.  In the first 
portion of the song, Tenakhongva sings Hisavat nu umumi yep lavati nit yepeq (I have something 
brief to tell you while I am here).  There is a second-person reference in this sentence that is 
distinctive from the rest of the song in terms of its melodic contour.  As Tenakhongva explained 
at the watchtower, he knew the audience might be offended if they knew how directly he was 
admonishing them. When Tenakhongva sang the word umumi (you [over there]) during the 
watchtower performance, at which mostly Hopis and tourists attended, he inflected tawvö in such 
a way that I didn’t pick up any special meaning around the word “you over there.” He sang each 
syllable in a steady rhythm, quickly passing over the words at a close interval (roughly a major 
second in western pitch relations).  At the performance that was being recorded for National 
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Public Radio to be broadcast throughout the Southwest, however, he sang this word differently, 
which to me revealed his intended audience.  The word umumi during that performance was still 
sung syllabically in a steady rhythm, but this time, the pitches were only microtonally away from 
one another, emphasizing and prolonging the tawvö.  The following transcription gives a rough 
approximation.24   
  
                                                
24 Note also that Tenakhongva changes the word order and rhythmic figuration slightly between the two examples.  




Excerpt from First Performance 
 
Excerpt from Second Performance 
  
This difference is significant, as I will discuss in the sections that follow.  What 
Tenakhongva is singing is, to me, a figure I have heard only in connection with the tasap 
(Navajo) katsina.  In addition to federal officials, tourists, and Hopi people in the audience, the 
song also appears to be addressed to the Navajo Nation. 
In sum, Clark Tenakhongva’s song shows us its deep linkage to a Hopi sonic sensibility of 
place.  The lavayi positions the listener within a Hopi cosmology, and does so by drawing a 
picture of the territory—in this case Öngtupqa—through its lavayi, connecting the audience to 
important places of emergence and return. At the same time, its tawvö tells us that it is an 
admonishing song, one in which a statement of instruction and consequences will be given, and 
identifies both the singer and the listener as within a particular network of relations, particularly 
one in which the singer is authoritative.  In the section that follows, I briefly articulate who 
umumi (you over there) might be in Tenakhongva’s song and why this admonition is an 




The Colonization of Hopi Territory 
The world articulated by Hopi taatawi reflects, affirms, and enacts a temporal and spatial 
reality that contradicts the colonial imagination of Hopi lands.  But importantly, the colonial 
imagination of Hopi lands is multilayered, including Spanish, American, and Navajo time and 
space, which have imposed themselves on Hopi territories and the actors that reside therein.  
While Hopisinom have referred to Hopilands as Hopitutskwa for generations, these lands have 
also, at times, been known as the Province of Tusayan by the Spanish, Arizona by the United 
States, and Naabeehó Bináhásdzo, by the Dine of the Navajo Nation. For periods of time, both 
the Spanish and Americans called Hopi people “Moquis,” a Spanish cognate of the Zuni word 
“A’mook’we’eh” or “clown” or “people who are content.”25 Nuvatukya’ovi, the place-name for 
the homes of some of our Hopi katsinam, has been erased and replaced with the Anglicized 
Spanish name “San Francisco Peaks,” while Toko’navi, an important Hopi place, is now called 
“Navajo Mountain.”  There are hundreds of further examples of ways Hopi geographies have 
become endangered or erased by colonization.  Fortunately, many of these names are being 
actively recovered (Whiteley 2010) and rights to define, access and control these territories are 
continuing to be asserted by Hopis.26 
In addition to colonization of Hopi places, time has also been subject to colonization.  Prior 
to colonization, Hopi time was structured by ceremonial events and agricultural cycles, both of 
which derived from patterns existing in the environment; now the Gregorian calendar and the 
Western work-week impose constraints on Hopi temporalities—a temporality imposed by the 
                                                
25. See Thomas E. Sheridan, et al., MOQUIS AND KASTIILAM: HOPIS, SPANIARDS, AND THE TRAUMA OF HISTORY, 
VOLUME I 13 (2015). 
26.   See Hopi Tribe v. Arizona Snowbowl Resort Limited Partnership, No1 CA-CV 16-0521,  ___ P.3d ___, 2018 
WL 771809 (Feb. 8, 2018) (holding that the Hopi Tribe has standing to bring a public nuisance action against the 
Arizona Snowbowl for generating artificial snow made out of reclaimed sewage and placing it on Nuva’tukya’ovi.) 
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United States through government regulation and compulsory education (the days of the week in 
our contemporary Third Mesa Hopi dialect are ordinal numbers followed by “tutuqaywisa” or 
“schooling,” e.g. “first schooling,” “second schooling,” etc.).  The influence of American time on 
Hopi society, and how Hopi people should respond to it, continue to be debated, particularly in 
the ways villages and families plan ceremonial events, the times when fields are planted and 
tended, and even people’s daily routines.27  
 Because taatawi connect Hopis with places and temporalities, the actors in those places 
and temporalities, and the knowledges that come from our interrelationships with those actors 
and places, taatawi are critical to what we might call the (re)indigenization of time and space for 
Hopi people, reordering the world and reorienting power structures back toward indigenous 
realities. In this way, taatawi give rise to a sovereignty that realizes the relationship between 
Hopitutskwa (Hopi lands) and Hopisinom (Hopi people) despite the conquests of settler states in 
the region. To illustrate, I show how Öngtupqa (Grant Canyon) continues to be a Hopi territory 
through the generative and relational process of pilgrimage, this despite the conquering overlays 
of Spanish, American, and Navajo settlement. 
Relating to Öngtupqa 
 Before it was known as the Grand Canyon, it was known as Öngtupqa. The Hopi place 
Öngtupqa literally means salt canyon, a name given for its replenishing salt deposits along the 
Colorado River near its confluence with the Little Colorado River.  Öngtupqa is for Hopi a 
                                                
27.   In his article with archeologist Chip Colwell, Stewart B. Koyiymptewa elaborated on a cartoon he had seen: 
“there was a dance, a Long Hair [katsina] dance, and there was a Hopi woman that went up there and asked, ‘Can 
you dance during Easter?’ And this Katsina has a question mark on top of its head, thinking, ‘What are you talking 
about?!’ It’s a really good cartoon because it’s where we are headed, all of our ceremonies, especially the Katsina 
dances that fall under other people’s calendar and religion, like Easter, Mother’s Day, Father’s Day, and so on.  
That’s where we’re headed. I take that back, we are already there.” Chip Colwell and Stewart B. Koyiymptewa, 
Translating Time: A Dialogue on Hopi Experiences of the Past in Born in the Blood: On Native American 
Translation 76 (2011). 
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sacred place for a number of reasons, in addition to being the source of valuable salt and other 
minerals.  First, as Tenakhongva explained to those at the performances of Puhutawi, “Hopi calls 
this their place of emergence here.  This is where we made our first entrance into this world . . . ”  
The place of emergence is known as sipapuni,  
“a hole that led [Hopis] from a wold of koyaanisqatsi, where moral 
corruption and imbalance reigned, to the present Fourth World.  Here they 
made a covenant with Màasaw, lord of the Fourth World and guardian of 
the dead, who gave them stewardship over the earth as long as they 
followed hopivötskwani, the Hopi path of life”  (Sheridan, et. al. 2015:4). 
In addition to being the place of emergence, Öngtupqa is the place of return of the spirits of 
the dead.  As Malotki (2011:83) records, “It is Hopi belief that Maski, the ‘Home of the Dead,’ is 
located down in the Grand Canyon.  They say that there is a trail leading to it, along which all 
those who have passed away travel.”    
In 2014, Clark Tenakhongva and I traveled down the Colorado River on a pilgrimage with 
several Hopi men of a wide range of ages and ceremonial experience.  We traveled for nine days 
on a river raft with two guides from Lee’s Ferry, located on the present-day Navajo Nation, to 
Diamond Creek on the Hualapai Reservation.  The trip was funded by the United States Bureau 
of Reclamation, who operates the Glen Canyon Dam near Page, Arizona, which produces 1,320 
Megawatts of electricity for 5.8 million customers.  The government provides funding for these 
trips to allow members of Native American Tribes with cultural affinity to the Grand Canyon to 
monitor changes to their cultural sites, local wildlife, and the environment in the Canyon as dam 
operators make decisions about the flow of water down the Colorado River.  For Hopis, the trip 
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has allowed us to resume ritual pilgrimages to Öngtupqa, which allow us to (re)embody these 
territories and (re)establish relations with actors within these territories, and with one another.28 
We spent each day in often intense work, witnessing the land and its characteristics, learning 
and remembering histories, respectfully harvesting certain minerals and plants, making offerings, 
and singing songs.   On the second day of our journey, for example, we arrived at a region in the 
early stages of the Grand Canyon known as Vasey’s Paradise, a lush oasis at a bend in the 
Colorado River where a spring that we call Yam’taqa spews fresh water.  Just before reaching 
the spring, we climbed the canyon wall to a dwelling where some of our ancestors had lived.  
Near the dwelling was a large rock filled with familiar symbols—badger paws, children’s feet, 
beetle marks, and other familiar symbols.  As we ascended above the rock to the dwelling, one of 
the men made an offering at a designated place that none of the many tourists rafting down the 
Canyon would have noticed.  We each offered our prayers and hooma (ceremonial cornmeal) 
before we continued up the trail to the dwelling. Over the course of our pilgrimage, we visited 
numerous shrines, dwellings, mineral deposits, and other sites offering prayers, performing ritual 
smoking, and doing other specific ritual labors with and for those things that reside within the 
landscape. 
The landscape within Öngtupqa is filled with what me might call “footprints.”  As Hopi 
cultural historian Leigh Kuwanwisiwma (2004) relates, when Hopi people emerged from within 
Öngtupqa one of the first promises they (we) made was to migrate throughout the world in 
different directions to fulfill spiritual obligations, and then return to tuuwanasavi (center of the 
earth, Hopi lands) along with the knowledge we had obtained.  With the instruction to migrate 
                                                
28.  There is an extensive literature on pilgrimage in anthropology that unfortunately cannot be reviewed here.  
However, substantial works on Hopi pilgrimages, past and present, including some by Hopi people have recently 
been written. See, e.g., Leigh Kuwanwisiwma, T.J. Fergusson, and Chip Colwell, eds., FOOTPRINTS OF HOPI 
HISTORY | HOPIHINIWTIPUT KUKVENI’AT (2018). 
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was the instruction “kuktota,” which literally means “along there, make footprints.”  These 
“footprints” or itaakuku include ruins of former settlements, pottery, tools, petroglyphs, and 
artifacts left as offerings. This instruction was “given to the Hopi to demonstrate they had 
fulfilled their spiritual obligations.”29 It provides evidence that each of our clans was ready to 
join the rest of the Hopi people on our three Hopi mesas, and also marks our continuing, 
collective relations with the land.   
Hopis belong to the lands marked by our clan forebears not only because our ancestors’ 
footprints exist there (as historical markers), or because we claim them as a resource for our 
collective identity (making them sites of memory),30 but because we have ongoing relations with 
these places--our presences and performances in relation to these footprints do something in the 
world.  Just as our clans inhabited these spaces in the process of fulfilling their covenant with the 
creator, so we pass through them in process of fulfilling the same covenant.  Our bodies, which 
are produced in part from their bodies, sense the places they lived, perhaps in many of the ways 
they sensed them.  We remember that they continue(d) on just as we continue on.  Our cornmeal, 
grown from the ground which they hoped their future generations would reach, is now left by us 
and our descendants as an offering and a fulfillment of their hopes in the sites where they lived.  
The kernels from which our hooma is made came, in part, from the seeds they carried and 
planted along their migrations, generation after generation.  Through exchanges with these places 
over multiple temporalities, we personally and collectively establish relations with these lands.  
Our bodies perceive territory together with our ancestors and future generations as we experience 
                                                
29.  Leigh Kuwanwisiwma, Ang Kuktota: Hopi Ancestra Sites and Cultural Landscapes 46 EXPEDITION 25, 26 
(2004). 
30.  As Pierre Nora (1989:12) describes them, sites of memory (lieux de memoire) are objects of history, “moments 
of history torn away from the movement of history, then returned; no longer quite life, not yet death, like shells on 
the shore when the sea of living memory has receded.” 
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the land that contains proof that they, we, and hopefully our descendants, will likewise 
accomplish our journeys. 
Pilgrimage also means carrying responsibility for territory.  Because few members of the 
Hopi Tribe could feasibly take the journey, those that do become points of memory for the 
community.  In addition to performing ceremonies and having positive thoughts and a spirit of 
unangwvasi throughout the journey, one also takes responsibility for remembering the details of 
the journey, where sites are in relation to one another, observing the meanings and histories of 
each place along the route, and knowing which places should be respected and treated with care.  
Conquista 
The colonization of Hopi lands, including Öngtupqa, has had a profound effect on Hopi 
relations to territory and to one another.  The first Spanish expedition arrived on Hopi lands in 
1540, but it wasn’t until 1629 that Franciscan missionaries (nicknamed tota’tsi, glossed as 
“dictators” or someone who wants to “have his own way all the time”) settled on Hopi lands 
(Sheridan, et al. 2015:122, 191).  By the mid-1660s, Spanish churches were being constructed at 
Hopi—over the top of Hopi ceremonial spaces known as kivas (119).  Spanish documents show 
that the Franciscans “baptized” roughly forty percent of the Hopi population, after which they 
began to extract labor from the entire population, disrupting overall agricultural and ceremonial 
practices.  Hopis were forced to carry heavy logs, water, and other resources 90-100 miles from 
distant places to the Hopi mesas to build churches and provide materials for Catholic 
ceremonies, were forced to use their own materials to complete production of clothing items to 
satisfy the encomiendas being run by the priests, and were forced to hide their own ceremonial 
performances because such were considered “idolatry” by the Franciscans (120-121, 169-177).  
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While the Spanish viewed their work as missionization, it was much more about 
economic growth and conquest than beneficence and charity. While the policy of the governor of 
New Mexico prohibited Franciscans from using violence in their work with indigenous peoples 
(they were rather to “reduce[]” “obstinate spirit[s]” “with gentleness and mildness than with 
violence and harshness”), accounts of torture and abuse, including whipping and burning with 
turpentine were apparently common practice during the rule of Padre Fray Antonio de Ybargaray 
in the mid seventeenth century (142-145). One Hopi man, Sitkyoma (possibly Juan Cuna in 
Spanish documents), died after sponsoring a Hopi Nimankatsina ceremony, which was 
performed to allow his daughter to complete her marriage (170). Other accounts exist of priests 
commanding Hopi men to go get water from places like yam’taqa, only for the priests to abuse 
and rape their wives (189).   
Spanish expeditions first encountered Öngtupqa in 1540 (Vercamp 1940:3).  As Don 
Lago (2011) explains, the Spanish were intent on finding a navigable river that would allow 
supplies to be brought farther into the newly claimed empire, and when the Spanish 
conquistadors Coronado and Cardenas conquered Hopi lands, Hopis initially confirmed to them 
that a sizable river existed in Öngtupqa (42).  Coronado couldn’t resist, and sent a detachment of 
25 men along with a six Hopi guides to check out the major water source approximately 100 
miles away.  As Clark Tenakhongva recounts, the Hopi men “played the game and, you know, 
acted like they were all into it with them and took them down into the Grand Canyon . . . And 
one night [the Hopi guides] all had it planned that they were going to leave that night . . . The 
next day the Spanish men probably awoke and found no Hopis there.” (Sheridan, et al. 2015: 33).  
Two of the Spanish apparently survived, and when they returned to Hopi, the guides were 
tortured and executed (34). 
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The Spanish experience in Öngtupqa was one of frustration—it was an impediment to 
the kinds of networks of capital they sought to establish in the region rather than a source of life 
and memory and a center of relations with the cosmos as it continues to be for Hopisinom.  The 
Rio Colorado, though emptying into the Pacific Ocean, was replete with rapids that made 
navigation by ship impossible (Lago 2015:42). At 3,000 feet deep and 10 miles across, the depth 
and size of the Canyon impeded an overland route from California, requiring explorers to travel 
either to the north or south—territories occupied by substantial groups of more violent 
indigenous peoples. Even though the Spanish would claim the Canyon as part of their territory, 
no Europeans would return to the Grand Canyon for more than two centuries” (43).  Ultimately, 
following the Mexican revolution and the United State’s War with Mexico, the Canyon became 
part of the United States under the Treaty of Guadeloupe Hidalgo.31 
Conquest 
The colonization of Hopi lands by American settlers began roughly two centuries after 
the arrival of the Spanish.  The treaty of Guadeloupe Hidalgo, signed and ratified in 1848, gave 
the United States title to much of the present-day American Southwest, including what is now 
the Hopi Reservation and the Grand Canyon.  In 1882, the President Chester Arthur established 
the Hopi Reservation, which designated a rectangular plot of land approximately 70 miles by 50 
miles “for the use of the Moqui, and other such Indians as the Secretary of the Interior may see 
fit to settle thereon.”32  Eleven years later, the lands around Öngtupqa were designated the Grand 
Canyon Forest Reserve, the Grand Canyon National Monument in 1908, and ultimately Congress 
                                                
31.  9 Stat. 922 (Feb. 2, 1848) 
32 Moqui (or Hopi) Reserve, Executive Order (Dec. 16, 1882) In INDIAN OFFICE, EXECUTIVE ORDERS RELATING TO 
INDIAN RESERVES DROM MAY 14, 1855 TO JULY 1, 1902 9 (1902). 
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created Grand Canyon National Park in 1919.33 Hopi lands in between Arthur’s Hopi 
Reservation and the Grand Canyon National Park, however, became public domain, subject to 
mineral extraction and deforestation.  Various groups of settlers, including Mormon settlers in 
1858, claimed some of these lands.  However, most of the land in between Hopitutskwa and 
Öngtupqa was assigned to the Navajo Nation through executive orders in 1900 and 1918.  These 
designations by the United States Executive Branch and Congress effectively severed Hopi 
routes to Öngtupqa.  The last documented over-land trip by Hopi men to Öngtupqa for 
ceremonial purposes occurred in 1921.34 
Like Spanish colonization, colonization by the United States had a significant impact 
on Hopi time, place, and relations within Hopi territories.  The imposition of government 
boarding schools was among the most destructive devices American officials used to alter Hopi 
sovereignty and social relations in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (James 
1974:111).  Western schooling of Hopi children was a topic that severely divided Hopis against 
one another.  As James reports, while Hopi converts to Christianity and Hopi railroad and 
construction workers may have been required to send their children to boarding schools, Hopi 
agriculturalists and ceremonial leaders generally objected. Id.  Objecting parents seemed 
especially concerned that the United States would not permit them to take their children out of 
school to participate in ceremonies (even though school was not held on Sunday for the sake of 
Christian worship customs).35 An eventual compromise was made that young Hopi children 
                                                
33 Grand Canyon Association, Who Owns the Grand Canyon?, nature, culture and history at the grand canyon (last 
visited on Apr. 3, 2018), http://grandcanyonhistory.clas.asu.edu/history_whoownsgrandcanyon.html. 
34. See Ekkehart Malotki, THE ORAIBI SALT JOURNEY TO THE GRAND CANYON HOPI TRAVELS TO THE GRAND 
CANYON (2011). 
35. For example, in December 1890, school superintendent Ralph Collins requested troops from Fort Defiance to 
capture 104 children from the Hopi village of Orayvi and march them 40 miles away to Keams Canyon, AZ to take 
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would attend schools in their villages, while high school students would attend government-run 
boarding schools in Nevada, Utah, California, Oklahoma, Vermont and other locations around 
the United States. Hopis succeeded in keeping ceremonies alive despite children being sent to 
federally mandated schools, in part by sending Hopi leaders to distant boarding schools to 
maintain cultural practices (Sakiestewa-Gilbert 2010:71-94), in part through negotiations with 
federal agents about school calendars and attendance policies, and in part through 
accommodation of ceremonies to the Western workweek.  Still, the effects on language, 
ceremonial continuity, and even the Hopi landscape (including accelerated erosion as Hopi 
traditional farming diminished) have been severe. 
Hopis have continued to have a presence at Öngtupqa despite American settlers 
excluding it from official designations of Hopi lands and the federal government’s disruptions of 
Hopi ceremonial connections to it. In 1905, for example, construction began on the Hopi House 
located next to the newly built El Tovar Hotel on the south rim of the Grand Canyon.  As with 
the Watchtower, architect Mary Colter designed the building in a Hopi style adding a visual Hopi 
                                                                                                                                                       
them out of their community to attend a federal boarding school.  In subsequent years, as I have been told, Hopi 
parents began to strategically hide their children from government agents, sometimes in caves or in fields.  In 1892, 
when the majority of Orayvi children did not return to school from their summer break, Collins—over the objections 
of Hopi parents—sent 8 of the children to Lawrence, Kansas for more permanent schooling. In 1893, an adobe 
building was constructed near the village of Orayvi at the request of the more accommodating parents, but only 30 
students actually reported for school (there were probably around 200-300 children in the village). Those men who 
withheld their children, and who did not comply with other government mandates (e.g. land allotment), were then 
sent to federal prison at Alcatraz in San Francisco, CA (James 1974:110-115). By 1903, even the school teachers at 
Orayvi were protesting the levels of force used against Hopis to place children into school, as well as the lack of 
Hopi language and cultural content in the curriculum (Curtis 1907:475; Patterson 2010:98). Superintendent Burton, 
who was then assigned to oversee Hopi lands, was perhaps the most hated by Hopis and his white education 
staff.  Seeing the potential for a higher salary if he could get more students to attend school, Burton sought 
permission to establish a boarding school at Orayvi. As Belle Kolp, a staff member, would later write in an activist 
publication some years later, “Navajo [military officers, requested by Burton], armed with rifles, were sent to 
surround the Hopi village [of Orayvi] in the night . . . The snow thickly covered the ground, and was still falling. . . . 
Men, women and children were dragged almost naked from their beds and houses.  Under the eyes and the guns of 
the invaders they were allowed to put on a few articles of clothing, and then—many of them barefooted and without 
any breakfast, the parents and grandparents were forced to take upon their backs such children as were unable to 
walk the distance (some of the little ones entirely nude) and go down to the school building, through the ice and 
snow in front of the guns of the dreaded Navajos . . . That same evening a meeting of the school employees was 
called, and I gave in my resignation.” (125-26). 
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presence to the Grand Canyon Village area.  But the Hopi house represented more than just Hopi 
architecture, it was actually built through hired Hopi labor, with materials taken from the nearby 
forests.36  Many of the Hopi builders remained at the Grand Canyon and worked in the Hopi 
House as artisans and performers, including famed Hopi artist Fred Kabotie, who managed the 
gift shop. Id. Hopis regularly performed for tourists in the Canyon, including singing songs and 
performing dances, some of which were borrowed from other tribes. Id. Hopi people, however, 
have never owned the Hopi House, and by the 1970s, Hopis no longer have a living presence in 
the building that bears their name. 
Like Spanish conquest, American colonization altered both Hopi space and Hopi time.  
The designation of an arbitrary rectangle of land as the Hopi Reservation, separated and 
distinguished from the Grand Canyon, effectively reduced Hopi authority in its canyons to a 
matter of history.  While occasional recognition of Hopi cultural affiliations to the Canyon and 
its resources by Federal Agencies has allowed the Tribe to be represented in the Canyon in 
limited ways (e.g., through building names and architecture, or by funding river trips for Hopis 
to observe environmental changes), the Tribe’s sovereignty in the Canyon has been significantly 
reduced.  In particular, the imposition of non-Hopi modes of work and education on Hopi people 
have effectively imposed competing conceptions of time and space, which compete directly with 
temporalities and geographies established through Hopi song. 
 
‘Áyaa ‘iisht’aah 
The effects of Navajo conquest of Hopi lands is less well known.  There is little doubt 
that the Dine people of the Navajo Nation are settlers on Hopi and other Pueblo ancestral lands, 
                                                




(though there is substantial evidence of intermarriage between Hopi and Dine people since their 
arrival).37  Not only do multiple indigenous and non-indigenous histories describe Dine as 
settlers (accounts put Dine people arriving on Hopi lands in approximately 1650 AD, and again 
in the mid 1800s), but archeological and historical evidence is clear that the major archeological 
sites in the region dating prior to the sixteenth century do not originate with the Dine people.38  
As Hopi oral histories I have heard explain, Dine arrived as refugees, having been forced by 
other tribes downward from their homeland in the North.  When they arrived in Hopi lands, our 
ancestors granted them reprieve.  They fed Dine women and taught them for a period of years, 
but did not permit them to join the alliance of Hopi clans due in part to the exploitative behaviors 
of Navajo men (Wilton Kooyahowma, personal interview, 2014).  Over two centuries, Dine 
people formed alliances with the Spanish, obtaining from them their knowledge about 
sheepherding among other things (Blackhawk 2008).  But, after the American annexation of 
Southwest in 1848, Dine would suffer militarized displacement by the United States leading up 
to the long-walk and an eventual treaty with the Federal Government in 1868 and temporary 
                                                
37. See generally, Keith Kloor, Insider: Who were the Anasazi? 62 Archeology (2009), available at 
https://archive.archaeology.org/0911/etc/insider.html; but see Michael A. Schillaci & Wendy J. Bustard, 
Controversy and Conflict: NAGPRA and the Role of Biological Anthropology in Determining Cultural Affiliation 33 
PoLAR 352 (2010) (arguing that DNA evidence from biological anthropology reveals that there may have been 
intermarriage between Navajo and other Pueblo Tribes, and that Navajo people may be culturally affiliated with 
traditionally Hopi sacred sites.) 
38. Michael A. Schillaci and Wendy J. Bustared, Controversy and Conflict: NAGPRA and the Role of Biological 
Anthropology in Determining Cultural Affiliation, 33 PoLAR 352, 363 (2010) (citing Linda Cordell’s testimony 
before the NAGPRA Review Committeed) (stating that there is no archaeological evidence to indicate the Navajo 
were present at any Chaco Canyon pueblo during its prior Pueblo occupation, and that Navajo people were likely not 
present in the region until the 16th century.); Healing v. Jones, 210 F. Supp. 125, 134  (D.Ariz. 1962) (“From all 
historic evidence it appears that the Navajos entered what is now Arizona in the last half of the eighteenth 
century.”); Barry Goldwater, History of Moencopi, 125, (“The Hopi Indian Tribe historically occupied the area 
between the Hopi villages and the Grand Canyon. . . . A school was built in Tuba city soon after the turn of the 
century and many Government and Navajo families moved into the area for the first time.  Prior to that time the only 
neighbors of the Hopis were several Paiute families.”) 
	56 
	
confinement to a reservation.39  But in the decades that followed, an alliance between the Navajo 
Nation and the United States began to form, which enabled Navajo conquest of Hopi lands in the 
region.    
Navajo settlers required the occupation of a significant amount of land for both grazing and 
religious practices.40  In the latter part of the 19th Century, Hopis (who never signed a treaty with 
the U.S.) become the targets of expansive Navajo settlement as Dine left their federally 
designated lands and began occupying Hopi territory.  As Wilton Kooyahoema related, Dine 
received lands from United States government agents at or near Hopi sacred sites, perhaps as a 
means of instigating warfare between the Hopi Tribe and the Navajo Nation (Kooyahoema 
2014).    
An 1882 executive order signed by United States President Chester Arthur reserved 2.5 
million acres of land for the Hopi people to prevent the encroachment of Navajo settlers onto 
Hopi lands.41 However, other Executive Orders and congressional Acts between 1882 and 1934 
allowed lands set aside for the Navajo Nation to grow from 3.5 million acres to 14 million acres, 
                                                
39. Treaty with the Navajo, 1868, 15 Stat. 667 (Ratified July 25, 1908). 
40. William Michael Havens, Intercultural dynamics of the Hopi-Navajo land dispute: Concepts of colonialism and 
manifest destiny in the Southwest 60, 160 M.A. Thesis (U. of Ariz. 1995) 
41. Executive Order regarding Moqui (or Hopi) Reserve, Chester A. Arthur (Dec. 16, 1882). (“It is hereby ordered 
that the trace of country in the Territory of Arizona lying and being within the following-described boundaries, viz, 
beginning on the one hundred and tenth degree of longitude west from Greenwich, at a point 36 degrees 30 minutes 
north, thence due east to the one hundred and tenth degree of longitude west, thence due north to place of beginning, 
be, and the same is hereby, withdrawn from settlement and sale, and set apart for the use and occupancy of the 
Moqui and such other Indians as the Secretary of the Interior may see fit to settle thereon.”); see also Healing v. 
Jones, 210 F. Supp. 125, 137, 146 (D. Ariz. 1962) (quoting Indian Affairs Commissioner Hiram Price’s telegram to 
Hopi Indian Agent J.H. Flemming the day after the Executive Order was signed, stating, “President issued order, 
dated sixteenth, setting apart land for Moquis recommended by you.  Take steps at once to remove intruders,” and 
memorandum by R.V. Belt, Chief, Indian Division in 1888 stating “The Moquis reservation was established by 
Executive Order of December 16, 1882, for the Moqui and such other Indians as the Sevretary of the Interior may 
see fit to settler thereon. It comprises no lands set apart for the Navajoes and no Noavajoes have been settled thereon 
by the Department.”). 
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ultimately surrounding and even extending into the 1882 Hopi Reservation.42  The tide began to 
turn in the 1960s, when the Hopi Tribe brought legal action to remove Navajo settlers, asserting 
its continuing and exclusive ownership of the lands within its 1882 Reservation.43  The United 
States District Court for the District of Arizona determined that only about 1/4 of the 1882 Hopi 
Reservation now belonged exclusively to the Hopi people (the rest having been settled by 
Navajo), and refused to make a determination about the remaining ¾ of the reservation, 
designating it, instead, as joint use area for the two tribes.  When the joint use of these lands 
proved unworkable, the Navajo and Hopi Tribes were forced to the bargaining table by then 
Bureau of Indian Affairs Commissioner Robert L. Bennett, who placed a freeze on all building 
and development in much of the disputed 1.5 million joint use area, which included the lands 
connecting the Grand Canyon and the Hopi Reservation that had been settled by the Navajo 
Nation.  For Dine to make simple developments in the area, including improvements to existing 
settlements, the changes had to be approved by both the Hopi Tribe and Navajo Nation, which 
proved to be next to impossible.44  The freeze was ultimately lifted by President Barak Obama in 
2009.45 
Navajo settlement has significantly altered the geography of the Southwest in ways that have 
benefitted and harmed Hopi people. It is clear that Dine have played a vital role in the economy 
and politics of the Southwest.  As I have been told by many people in my community, Dine as a 
people are skilled in cross-cultural exchange, political strategy, and economic development, and 
                                                
42. Havens at 9. 
43. See Healing v. Jones, 210 F.Supp 125 (D.Ariz. 1962). 






have brought new enterprises and federal infrastructure to the region through their lobbying and 
entrepreneurial efforts.  During certain periods, the Navajo language became a lingua franca for 
transacting certain kinds of business among various groups in the indigenous Southwest.  But at 
the same time, many Pueblo people feel the Navajo Nation has used their position as 
intermediary to exploit the culture, land, water and natural resources in the region.  Many Hopis I 
worked with believed that the Navajo Nation’s willingness to exploit the land allowed it to gain 
favor with the United States government, which led to the granting of additional lands, resources, 
and political power that extended their authority in the region at the expense of indigenous 
groups.  Examples most often cited were Navajo extraction and refinement of uranium under 
Federal government contracts (leading to increases in cancer rates for Navajos and Hopis 
working in or living downwind of uranium mills),46 the development of Hopi aboriginal lands 
now located on the Navajo Reservation to build the Navajo Generating Station—the third largest 
carbon-emitting power plant in the United States47—and its coal infrastructure (which some have 
blamed for the arsenic contamination of the Hopi water supply), and damaging Hopi sacred sites, 
passing them off as Navajo cultural areas or prohibiting Hopis from being able to access these 
sites. 
 Given this brief introduction to Navajo-Hopi relations, it might not be surprising that on 
February 21, 2012, the Navajo Nation entered into an agreement with Arizona developer 
Confluence Partners, LLC, to work toward the construction of a tourist destination called the 
                                                
46. See Doug Brugge and Rob Goble, The History of Uranium Mining and the Navajo People, 92 Am. J. Public 
Health 1410 (2002) (stating that by the mid-1950s there were four uranium milling and mining centers, including 
one at Kayenta, AZ, near the Hopi Reservation) 
47. Brady Dennis and Steven Mufson, The West’s largest coal-fired power plant is closing.  Not even Trump can 





Grand Canyon Escalade on aboriginal Hopi lands (now part of the Navajo Nation) within the 
Bennett Freeze area near the confluence of the Colorado and Little Colorado rivers in the Grand 
Canyon. The proposed Escalade development comprised sixty acres of land in and around the 
Grand Canyon, including the construction of the “Escalade Gondola Tram, the .5 mile River 
Walk and the Confluence Restaurant” as well as “a destination resort hotel & spa, other hotels, 
RV park, commercial/retail space/opportunities and an airport.”48 In addition to Hopi and some 
Navajo protests, many environmental and naturalist groups expressed fervent opposition to the 
development, though it would have generated Navajo jobs in the Bennett Freeze area, which had 
suffered economically for decades.  
The years of protest over the Escalade coincided with the composition and performance of 
Puhutawi.  Creating the work took on new urgency after Tenakhongva and I discovered on our 
pilgrimage that the construction of the Escalade overlapped significantly with the locations of 
Hopi shrines in the area.  Upon comparing the architectural rendering with the actual landscape, 
we learned that one Hopi ceremonial site would have been completely destroyed, and other 
sensitive (utihi’i) places would have been harmfully disturbed.  The destruction and disturbance 
of Hopi sacred sites would have been a clear violation of a 2006 compact the tribes entered into 
that required the Navajo Nation to protect Hopi religious sites and guarantee Hopi religious 
practitioners privacy.49  Still, the Escalade Partners and their Navajo Nation advocate, persisted, 
claiming: 
We have uncovered no evidence of any sacred sites within the project 
boundaries or that would be negatively impacted by the project.  The 
                                                
48. Memorandum of Understanding by and between The Navajo Nation and Confluence Partners LLC 1-2 (Sep. 21, 
2012); See Grand Canyon Trust, Escalade: The Saga. (Mar. 3, 2018), available at 
https://www.grandcanyontrust.org/stopping-grand-canyon-escalade. (hereinafter “GCT Escalade”) 
49. See Hopi Tribe says Escalade development violates compact Navajo-Hopi Observer (October 14, 2016), 
available at https://www.nhonews.com/news/2016/oct/14/hopi-tribe-says-escalade-development-violates-comp/. 
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National Park Service, which is required by law to identify and protect 
Native American sacred places within the park, does not recognize the 
Confluence as a Sacred Site of either the Navajo or Hopi.  Final 
determination will be made after the project undergoes a complete 
archeological and cultural clearance process as required by Navajo codes 
and Law and submitted to the Navajo Nation Department of Historic 
Preservation for review, comment, and, if everything is done properly, 
approval.  If Sacred Sites will or would be desecrated, the project won’t go 
forward.  This is how all projects on the Navajo Nation are handled.” 
 
This, of course, was a half truth at best.  The U.S. National Parks Service had in fact identified 
several places in and around the confluence of the two rivers as Hopi sacred sites only two years 
earlier.50 
Tenakhongva composed the songs for Puhutawi, then, at a critical time when Hopi 
conceptualizations of Öngtupqa directly collided with the colonialist visions of the Grand 
Canyon presented by the Spanish, the United States and the Navajo Nation, who viewed the 
landscape as an exploitable space outside of the relations Hopi people had already established 
with the territory.  While the politics of the Grand Canyon were being worked out on a large 
scale through protests and diplomacy surrounding the building of the Grand Canyon Escalade, 
Puhutawi provided a cosmopolitical space for Hopi sovereignty to be worked out through 
rehearsals and performances for local, national and international audiences.51 
Sounding the Third Space of Sovereignty 
                                                
50. See Saul Hedquist and T.J. Ferguson, Interim Report, Ethnographic Resources in the Grand Canyon Region 
Prepared for Jan Balsom, Grand Canyon National Park 24-25 (May 30, 2010). 
51 As Marisol de la Cadena defines it, “cosmopolitics” is a way of conceptualizing politics as having multiple 
ontologies, and then proceeding to negotiate between sovereigns with the existence of these ontologies as a core 
objective. (de la Cadena 2010:360).  Indigenous modes of doing politics and the modes of the Spanish, the United 
States, and the Navajo Nation are certainly heterogeneous, reflecting their differing views on the world and its 
divisions of nature and culture.  But at the same time, these worlds are undoubtedly “partially connected.” I take 
cosmocosmopolitics, then, as a shared recognition of differing assumptions about animation, agency, and ownership 
of and within a territory, and then interconnecting these worlds “without making the diverse worlds 
commensurable” (361) or subsumed within one “universal” ontology.  Cosmopolitical work opens up the 




As discussed earlier in this chapter, taatawi function as a mode of authority, articulating 
relations between Hopi people and other actors within Hopi territory.  However, due to the 
effects of colonization, Hopi connections to our ancestral lands marked with itaakuku have 
become difficult to maintain, much less assert against the territorial claims of settler-states. As 
sound is a primary mode of connection between Hopi people and our territory, the ongoing, 
uninhibited creation of new taatawi to articulate these relations continues to be of central 
importance to Hopi people.  
Clark Tenakhongva and I began work on Puhutawi as a way to expand the reach of taatawi 
to new audiences.  I first approached Clark Tanakhongva about doing a collaborative 
composition after hearing about the challenges he was facing as he tried to incorporate new 
sounds into his songs.  In a 2009 interview, Tenakhongva explained that after winning a Native 
American Music Award and being nominated for a GRAMMY and a Canadian Music Award for 
best indigenous album, he approached his record label, Canyon Records, about adding some new 
elements into his songs. “I tr[ied] to tweak it up a little bit in a different way by adding other 
percussion music into it,” he said.   Tenakhongva specifically wanted to add African rainmakers 
and other kinds of percussive shakers to his songs. “But Canyon won’t allow me to do it, because 
it’s taking away from the element of being traditional.  You’re kind of going into a new genre . . . 
.”  Unfortunately for Tenakhongva, Canyon’s interest in “working with Native American artists 
to develop new styles of Native American music that expand upon traditional song form and 
performance” excluded, at least initially, the kinds of cross-cultural innovations Tenakhongva 
was interested in pursuing.52  And, because Canyon claims both the composition and sound 
                                                
52. See http://www.canyonrecords.com/shop/index.php?app=cms&ns=display&ref=canyon-records-story.  There is 
a rich body of ethnomusicological literature exploring the ways certain sounds are figured into racial types, and how 
those types are used as boundaries of inclusion and exclusion in certain genres and social contexts, including Native 
American contexts.  See, e.g., Meintjes, Louise, SOUND OF AFRICA!: MAKING MUSIC ZULU IN A SOUTH AFRICAN 
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recording copyrights to Tenakhongva’s albums, Tenakhongva was forced to obtain approval 
from Canyon to develop any of his existing songs in new ways. 
The following year, with the support of the Grand Canyon Music Festival, Tenakhongva and 
I started to think about what Hopi taatawi would sound like, and mean, if combined with 
European-originating instruments.  There had been precursors to our work.  Lois Albright had 
written an opera in 1954 entitled Hopitu, which purported to be based on Hopi legends.53  Jill 
McManus had recorded an album of Hopi katsina songs in a jazz idiom called Symbols of Hopi 
in 1983. However, even though Hopis have had a strong tradition of musical composition, and 
many Hopis have acquired substantial skill performing on European musical instruments,54 there 
are still very few examples where Hopi songs and singing styles have been joined with 
instruments typical to orchestras and operas, and especially with Hopi composers creating the 
underlying musical score.   
After several initial failures (“that sounds a bit too much like Pocahontas” Tenakhongva once 
told me), and then a successful trial run orchestrating one of Tenakhongva’s songs for a string 
trio in 2011 (which was initially performed at the Hopi village of Walpi), Tenakhongva and I 
began to think about a larger-scale work to be premiered during the Centennial of Grand Canyon 
National Park.  Once we had received word of the proposed Escalade Development, and had 
taken our pilgrimage into Öntupqa, Tenakhongva definitively selected a few songs from his most 
recent album and created two new songs for the project.  We began work to orchestrate them, 
                                                                                                                                                       
STUDIO (2003); Jacobsen, Kristina, Radmilla’s Voice: Music Genre, Blood Quantum and Belonging on the Navajo 
Nation, 29 Cultural Anthropology 385 (2014); Jessica Bissett-Perea, “What Is This ‘Inuit’ In Inuit Popular Music?: 
An Alliance Studies Critique of Sound Quantum Ideology & Audible Indigeneity” In MUSIC AND MODERNITY 
AMONG FIRST PEOPLES OF NORTH AMERICA (forthcoming 2018).  
53. Hopitu apparently included a cast of Hopi dances, assisted by the Lois Albright Vocal Ensemble. 
54. For a discussion on the musical talents of Hopi boarding school students at the Sherman Institute in Riverside 




connecting them together with interludes that translated the feel of the Hopi contexts painted by 
Tenakhongva’s songs into sounds we hoped would be accessible to a non-Hopi audience. Every 
few months we would get together to talk about the sound of the songs, what kinds of effects he 
thought should go alongside the songs, the kinds of percussion and string sounds he thought 
would match the texts of the songs, and how Hopi youth would be involved.  The result was a 
40-minute work, scored for Hopi singers and percussionists, two string quartets, orchestral 
percussion (glockenspiel and bass drum), and flute.  We were joined later by Gary Strautsos, a 
jazz artist who performs on flutes replicated from those found in caves at Canyon de Chelly 
(another Hopi ancestral site located on lands given to the Navajo Nation by the United States).  
The two string quartets who eventually premiered Puhutawi during the Grand Canyon 
centennial were established ensembles with particular interests in cross-cultural performance.  
The Catalyst quartet, staffed by winners and alumni of the Sphinx Competition (whose goal is to 
“encourage, develop, and recognize classical music talent in the Black and Latino 
communities”55), was particularly adept at playing new, complex and provocative compositions 
originating from diverse cultural contexts.  The quartet had been involved in the Native 
American Composer Apprentice Project for several years, which gives reservation-based high 
school students the opportunity to compose new music and hear it performed by professional 
musicians.56 The members of the Strata Quartet, based in Santa Fe, lived in close proximity to 
several Pueblo tribes in New Mexico, and at least one of the members had close connections to 
the Navajo Nation.  Both groups were particularly excited to work on this piece as it represented 
                                                
55 See Sphinx Competition. Sphinx Organization (2018), http://www.sphinxmusic.org/sphinx-competition/. 




a new world of sonic possibilities, and they put in substantial effort to work through the many 
issues that arose during its preparation and presentation. 
One of the first challenges we faced had to do with the boundaries of what was considered 
performable music on antique instruments. In the song Umumutatayayatani (rolling thunder 
shaking the earth), Tenakhongva had asked me to include the sound of an African rainstick when 
the song reached the oomi (the upward part or climactic third section of the song).  Because we 
didn’t yet have a percussionist slated for the performance, I pitched the idea of putting seeds 
inside the string players’ instruments and then tipping the instruments to one side to allow them 
to run across their wooden bodies.  In addition to producing a similar sonic effect, it seemed (at 
least to me) like the perfect symbol for the kind of work I thought we were doing: we were 
effectively planting Tenakhongva’s songs within these instruments in hopes that the songs would 
resonate with both Hopi and non-Hopi audiences. When Tenakhongva heard the idea, he was 
surprisingly skeptical and seemed a little uncomfortable.  First, he thought the musicians 
wouldn’t go for it. But, he also seemed concerned about the seeds.  “Couldn’t you use popcorn or 
beads or something,” he asked.  He had respect for the seeds, and didn’t seem to find the 
symbolism compelling.  As I came to learn, poshumi (kernels saved for planting), are owned by 
women, not men, and are given to men in accordance with women’s knowledge and judgement, 
to be planted and grown using our traditional dry farming methods.   As I attempted dry farming 
myself, I came to know how these seeds represent the prayers, labor, and sacrifice of Hopi 
people over many generations, and in hindsight it seems somewhat inappropriate to use poshumi 
solely to make an aesthetic or political statement.   
But I was equally intrigued by the responses of the quartets when they read the instruction in 
the score to put seeds in their instruments and let them cascade over their interior structures.  
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“The seeds in the instruments is not going to work.  It’s not safe for our instruments,” wrote one 
of the instrumentalists.  Another instrumentalist wrote,  
Seeds that have a shell on are not friendly to the inside of a wood-bodied 
instrument.  The inside is soft wood and its unsealed.  And newer 
instruments, like my own, have not ‘seasoned’ yet, so the wood actually 
still has moisture in it and the microscopic surface of the interior wood is 
too soft for me to feel comfortable have [sic] seeds with pointy ends of 
their shells moving around inside. . . . BTW, beans would be ok in my 
cello-dried beans are smooth all around.  Just a thought…57 
 
Ultimately, Tenakhongva offered to let the quartets perform the sounds he wanted on a 
traditional rukunpi (rasp) and putsik.yapi (gourd resonator).  One of the musicians nearly jumped 
out of his seat when offered the chance.   
Once rehearsals began, there were other negotiations that had to happen between the 
musicians and Tenakhongva.  At the beginning of our rehearsals with the musicians, I made clear 
that the development of the songs would have to be through a collaborative process, patterned 
after the way music is collaboratively owned at Hopi, where the composer is no more important 
than the other singers in terms of compositional authority (see Chapter 4).  This meant that the 
musical score was simply a starting point.  As it was, notating Tenakhongva’s singing into a 
standardized European-derived musical notation had been a challenge for me given the way Hopi 
music pauses and drags; and pitch contours do not easily snap to the standard grid of a musical 
                                                
57.   I don’t want to diminish the concerns of the classical musicians for the care of their instruments, particularly as 
many instrumentalists may consider their instruments as an important extension of their personhood. See Jack P. 
Lipton, Stereotypes Concerning Musicians within Symphony Orchestras,  12 J. PSYCH. 85, 89 (1987) (describing 
differences in self-perception by various classes of instruments); Harold F. Abeles and Susan Yank Porter, The Sex-
Stereotyping of Musical Instruments, 26 J. RES. IN MUSIC ED. 65 (1978) (suggesting that gender stereotypes 
associated with instruments “may have a major effect on the musical vocational choices of individuals.”). But I was 
curious if these fears were grounded in scientific or professional knowledge, or some other kind of fear.  As a string 
player myself, I had never heard of any of these concerns before, so I decided to consult a highly regarded luthier in 
the New York City area to ask whether or not placing seeds in an instrument would be dangerous to the instrument.  
The luthier responded that it was highly unlikely that any harm could come to the instrument by putting seeds inside 
and shaking them around.   
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staff.  Further, it was particularly challenging to imagine what could actually be added to 
Tenakhongva’s songs that wouldn’t also detract from them.  
It became challenging for many of the musicians to accept that they shared compositional 
authority with Tenakhongva, and could suggest innovations.  The more secure way was to ask 
the “composer” (me) what “he meant” rather than collaboratively working together to create a 
sound to resonate with the audience and (re)indigenize the space.  After our first performance, in 
which Tenakhongva ended up deviating substantially from what had been written in the score 
(resulting in fear on many of their faces), the quartet musicians began to concentrate more on 
Tenakhongva, trying to understand his style of singing, asking him questions about his songs, 
and making suggestions for new sounds.  Instead of looking to me as the compositional authority 
who was responsible for the success or failure of the performance, the quartets and Tenakhongva 
began to treat each other as legitimate equals, and began asserting their own creativity into the 
sonic fabric in relation to Tenakhongva’s.  It was a remarkable transformation to see everyone 
making contributions and solving problems, and then taking ownership as the work developed. 
Another challenge in bringing Hopi and non-Hopi musicians together to perform were 
differences in modes of aesthetic evaluation.  During our rehearsals of Yoisiwukiwtani, the song I 
discussed earlier in this chapter, the musicians playing the tawvö were noticeably disturbed when 
Tenakhongva would sing along at a different pitch than what they were playing.  As Gary 
Strautsos, our Hopi-flute player, later commented, “it’s like when I play my Native flutes with 
classical musicians, they always say my playing its too ‘pitchy’.”  Based on my own training in 
Western Art Music, I knew that there would be little tolerance for “pitchiness” or playing the 
same notes as another musician outside a narrow range of acceptable variation (unless, of course, 
that’s what the composer “intended”).  During rehearsals, Tenakhongva seemed to be 
	67 
	
unintentionally singing at an interval slightly above what everyone else was playing.  At first, we 
figured I had simply written the song in range that wasn’t comfortable for Tenakhongva. I went 
back after our first rehearsal and spent most of the night transposing and reprinting all of the 
musician’s parts a minor third lower to better fit Tenakhongva’s range, but when we rehearsed it, 
it didn’t seem to make a difference.  It wasn’t until I went back to listen to Tenakhongva’s 
recordings and the recordings I had made during rehearsals with other Hopi singers in 
preparation for dances that I recognized what we had been missing:   
Several Hopi singers have recently made studio recordings, and one thing they all seem to 
have in common is that they are overdubbed many, many times.  It mimics the performance 
context where taatawi are typically sung by groups of 10-20 men.  But the group aesthetic for 
Hopi male singing is not about creating a tightly focused pitch; Hopi singers learn to 
“harmonize” with other members of the group.  Singers layer their voices on top of one another, 
each perfectly following the contour of the song, but in a rich, warm band of sound rather 
insisting on a single “unison” line.  This creates, in standard music theory, what is called 
“parallel motion” where each voice follows the same contour but are offset by a specific interval. 
This kind of contour was carefully avoided by the kinds of “classical” composers whose 
frequency is most often featured in concert halls today, thus making the sound off-putting for 
some. For many years, I had just assumed (along with the quartet musicians) that Hopi signers, 
not formally trained in Western “music,” weren’t attuned to pitch in the same way.  What I came 
to realize was that Hopisinom who grow up in our villages are highly trained in vocal 
production, and the singing of a song in tight “harmonization” with another person is not a 
technical “deficiency,” but a cultivated aesthetic.  If taatawi exist within relations, you would 
expect that they wouldn’t sound like someone singing alone.  
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In our performance for radio broadcast, Tenakhongva beautifully sang Yoisiwukiwtani at 
roughly a major sixth above the violinists.  Some in the audience seemed disturbed by the sound, 
but for several of us, including the musicians, the sound took on a radiance and warmth that 
could really only be expressed in the way Clark had performed it in relation to them. 
Perhaps the pivotal moment in the collective process of preparing Puhutawi came during the 
rehearsal of an interlude we called Yooyangwu / Taavi, rainstorm and sunlight.  The section was 
sandwiched in between Yoysiwukiwtani (distant, slanted rain) and Umumutatayayatani (rolling 
thunder, shake the earth).  I had written the interlude by tracking as closely as I could the 
traditional compositional process for creating taatawi (described in Chapter 1), spending months 
in my small field and orchard below Third Mesa just west of the Hopi village of Hotevilla, 
listening to and, somewhat awkwardly at first, occasionally singing to my plants there.  It was 
also during the time of our pilgrimage to Öngtupqa, during which I became fascinated by the 
sound of water all around me.  It remains remarkable to me that the water in Öngtupqa comes, in 
part, from rainstorms that pass through our Hopi lands, which are collected, and over time, flow 
into the Colorado and Little Colorado rivers that meet there.    
Our rehearsals of Yooyangwu / Taavi were challenging at first—my attempts to sound a 
rainstorm via classical string instruments through prescribed symbols on a page didn’t seem to be 
getting close to the collective sound I had hoped for.  Then, it started to rain—hard. 
“So, actually, I have to be with the bass drum at F, so I’ll just like—after E happens for long 
enough time, I’ll look over at you?” 
“Sure.” 
[The sound of the rain hitting the roof intensifies] 
“What? There’s real rain.  We don’t need—” 
“Why don’t we just stick with that?” 
“We don’t need to make rain.” 
“Just record it and play it over the—” 
“Or let’s listen, and learn how to rain . . .”  
[Everyone laughs, and then pauses.] 
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“This is how it should sound.” 
“It sounds a lot like [the score], actually…” 
[Musicians begin experimenting by tapping their instruments.] 
 
Looking down from the stage where we were rehearsing, I noticed Tenakhongva’s wife, Ann, 
looking out the large windows toward the Canyon.  I noticed that she was crying.   
Other people were also moved by the songs Tenakhongva sang during the performance.  As 
the applause from our second performance began to subside, two Hopi women arose in the 
crowd and began to speak back to Tenakhongva from the audience so that everyone in the hall 
could hear.  They told Tenakhongva how grateful they were that he is keeping Hopi music alive. 
But they also said that, “regardless of comments or obstacles you will face, this is the only way 
some of us will ever be connected to our land.” 
Conclusion 
If Hopi taatawi are meant to resonate within Hopi spaces, giving voice to indigenous 
authorities within those spaces, then I argue that the creation and performance of Hopi song is an 
act of Hopi sovereignty.  Thus, performances of Hopi taatawi at Öngtupqa are not merely the 
contribution of a Hopi perspective to what has become a ‘multicultural’ Grand Canyon.  Rather, 
the sovereignty articulated through taatawi is in direct opposition to colonialist visions of the 
Southwest.  Hopis have experienced the same tensions that Glen Coulthard has found at 
Denedah, in which colonizing governments have refused to abide by grounded normativities—
modes of governance that emerge from the land—and instead, impose capitalist frameworks 
upon indigenous peoples that exploit them, their land, and their modes of creative 
production.  As he explains, “Place is a way of knowing, of experiencing and relating to the 
world and with others; and sometimes these relational practices and forms of knowledge guide 
forms of resistance against other rationalizations of the world that threaten to erase or destroy our 
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senses of place” (Coulthard 2014:61).  Like other indigenous performances that have asserted 
indigenous sovereignties (e.g., Idle No More, Standing Rock), taatawi performances enact Hopi 
space and time, directly contradicting the imagined place of the Grand Canyon and the objectives 
of three settler-states who have sought to dispossess, erase and/or assimilate Hopi into their own 
cartographies of colonization and taxonomies of creativity, while at the same time opening up 
spaces for generative decolonization and indigenization through negotiations in sound. 
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Chapter 3:  
Transacting Taatawi:  
The Circulation of Hopi Voices under Settler Law 
 
Introduction 
In the August heat of 1940, folk music collector Laura Boulton (1899-1980) travelled to the 
remote village of Hotevilla, Arizona, a small community of sandstone houses on the Hopi 
Reservation, to record our taatawi.58  Boulton, while trained as a classical singer, lacked formal 
training in anthropology or ethnology.59  And yet, she had achieved substantial success as a field 
recordist and public intellectual, trading largely on her collections of exotic ceremonial 
expressions.60  During her visit to Hotevilla, Boulton met Dan Qötshongva, Hotevilla’s 
kikmongwi or chief; Thomas Bahnaqya, his traditional spokesman; David Monongye, who would 
become an influential political leader of the “traditionalist” movement; and a few other men who 
we have not yet identified.  The men sang a series of eleven songs for Boulton, who recorded 
them on her Fairchild disk recorder—a cutting-edge portable recording device of the day.  
                                                
58.  Boulton’s thirst for ceremonial songs comes across quite explicitly in her autobiography, The Music Hunter.  In 
her account of her visit to Hopi lands in 1940, Boulton explains that “Hopis have religiously guarded their ancient 
traditions . . . and have always been very reluctant to part with their songs . . . . Before I had been with them twenty-
four hours, I was recording.  By the time I left I had recorded some of their most sacred rituals, the Snake Dance and 
the Flute Dance.” LAURA BOULTON, THE MUSIC HUNTER: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF A CAREER 428-29 (1968).   A 
quick inspection of her recording log reveals that she did very little recording of non-ceremonial songs, such as 
grinding songs or lullabies, and focused almost entirely on ceremonial songs typically sung by men. See Laura 
Boulton, Southwest Indians (Aug.–Oct. 1940) (unpublished field notes) (on file with the Columbia University 
Center for Ethnomusicology). 
59.  Carl Rahkonen, The Real Song Catchers: American Women Pioneers of Ethnomusicology, Music Library 
Association Women’s Music Roundtable (Feb. 14, 2003), https://perma.cc/Z3CY-FVL8. 
60.   Prior to arriving at Hotevilla, Boulton had made at least three other music-collecting expeditions—one to 
Chicago’s A Century of Progress exhibition’s “Indian Village” in 1933, one to the Bahamas in 1936, and another to 
various indigenous groups in Africa as part of her husband’s collecting work as an ornithologist.  See Bronfman, 
Alejandra, Sonic Colour Zones: Laura Boulton and the Hunt for Music, 3 SOUND STUDIES 20, 25 (2017); BOULTON, 
THE MUSIC HUNTER at 427 (1968). 
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Boulton, who was usually a meticulous record-keeper, left no description of the sonic transaction 
she made with these men at our village, and none of the family members of the men—all of 
whom are now deceased—recall the men ever receiving remuneration or royalties from them.61  
One of the acetate discs made from the encounter contained what is perhaps the most widely 
distributed Hopi ritual song ever created. It was released in an album entitled Indian Music of the 
Southwest under two record labels, RCA Victor and Folkways (later Smithsonian Folkways), 
selling more than 5,500 copies through 1986.62  The song is still available for purchase in CD 
form, or, more conveniently, via download on Smithsonian Folkways’s website or iTunes for 
$0.99, and it is even available for on-demand streaming with an Amazon Music Unlimited 
subscription. 
In the previous chapters I described yeewa, the process of generating taatawi, or Hopi 
ceremonial songs, within networks composed of human and non-human actors.  I then explored 
how tawi performance enacts Hopi sovereignty by bringing people, land, and other entities in the 
Hopi cosmos into productive relations through its ordering of time and space.  In this chapter, I 
explore the ways taatawi became transformed from a mode of relation into an object to be 
transacted.  In particular, I seek to understand how early settler fieldworkers came to hybridize 
Hopi taatawi with their own technologies, and how these hybrid taatawi began to circulate 
through foreign networks of relations.  Using Boulton’s Hopi recordings as a case study, I 
attempt to understand why people like Qötsongva, Monongye, and Bahnaqya, who were gifted 
                                                
61. This finding is based on my fieldwork at Hopi from 2009–2015 during which I gave copies of the recordings to 
members of Monongye’s and Bahnaqya’s families and asked if they had any knowledge of Laura Bolton, the 
recordings, or any payments or royalties received from them.  However, during a meeting with elders in December 
2010, some of the members of the ritual societies at Second Mesa explained that had heard about instances where 
people had recorded ceremonial songs for visitors around that same period. 




ceremonial singers, important Hopi leaders, and activists deeply invested in the Hopi anti-
colonial resistance of the first part of the Twentieth Century, would agree to record for someone 
like Boulton—the self-proclaimed “music hunter”—who made a living exploiting indigenous 
voices.  I show how this encounter launched one of our ceremonial songs into the intellectual 
property structures of the settler state, and I end the chapter by challenging the justness of the 
way these taatawi are claimed by non-Hopi institutions as their intellectual property under settler 
legal frameworks, asking whether these songs were ever Boulton’s to exploit in the first place.  
A close reading of the collision of networks involved in the creation of Boulton’s 
recordings of Qötshongva, Bahnaqya and Monongye is important for a number of reasons.  First, 
as an act of reclaiming (Tuhiwai-Smith 1999), this chapter seeks for a just resolution to the 
taking and misuse of indigenous cultural expressions, but in doing so, it also seeks to recover 
vital histories that show our relations to these expressions. On a broader scale, exploring how the 
facts of this case apply to existing cultural and intellectual property laws helps us to see just how 
much of a role settler-colonialism has played in determining the outcomes of disputes over 
ownership of indigenous voices.   
Second, this reading allows us to move beyond thinking about colonialism as simply the 
assertion of power and the taking of rights, but also as a re-engineering of creative networks by 
actors who had intersecting interests and motivations. As an indigenous person, I understand 
how colonialist power structures operate to dispossess and erase us from our lands and our 
relationships one another.  However, failing to recognize the motivations both on the part of 
individual colonizers and the colonized only further entrenches the inevitability of colonialism 
where it was actually—and remains—far from certain.  Drawing from my own ethnographic and 
archival work alongside that of Hopi intellectuals, historians, political scientists and 
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anthropologists, I question whether Boulton’s ouvre of recordings were simply the result of 
settler-colonial appropriation, or, more precisely, following Bruno Latour, a material 
manifestation of the intersection of multiple lived trajectories—the actual joining of vastly 
distinct networks of people and other entities living their particular values and modes of 
existence (Latour 2013). Why was making these recordings the logical next step for Boulton, her 
Hopi informants, and the kooyemsis and other beings whose songs these are?  Was there a 
meeting of the minds that created these recording, and if so, under what values or terms did they 
meet?   
Finally, this chapter and the ones that follow seek to develop a place for taatawi and 
other kinds of indigenous sound within our global intellectual property frameworks.  To arrive at 
these interventions, I first ask, how does the kooyemsi song Boulton released within the 
commercial music market fare under the legal frameworks of the United States as compared to 
the laws and protocols of the Hopi people?  And, as I explore in more detail in the next chapter, 
are there harms involved in transforming indigenous sound into another’s intellectual property 
beyond simply the loss of potential profits?  How might the tools available through intellectual 
property and contract law be deployed to create indigenized legal systems through which these 
recordings can again circulate on the terms of indigenous peoples?  
Before proceeding, I want to also make clear that my reconstruction of the events below 
is still incomplete, and there is more work to be done to understand these actors, particularly the 
Hopi ones, and their motivations for collaboration with Laura Boulton.  As Stewart 
Koyiymptewa encouraged me during my dissertation defense, there are still opportunities to “dig 
deeper” by continuing to learn from the memories of our Hopi elders.  It is my goal now to seek 
out a better understanding of the events that occurred at Orayvi at the beginning of the twentieth 
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century, the origins of the Traditionalists, and the way this and other similar transaction has 
affected (and continues to affect) the Hopi people. 
The Kooyemsi Song 
Years before Qötsongva, Monongye, and Bahnaqya would encounter Laura Boulton, a 
man named Siitaqpu introduced members of our village to the Hopi kooyemsi song they would 
record (Wilton Kooyahoema, interview with the Author, 2009).  Kooyemsi are beings that 
mediate between humans and katsinam (cloud people or spirit beings) by interpreting for them 
and introducing them.  They are known for their humor, but they are also important teachers.  As 
I met with people to better understand the recordings, the only thing people could remember 
about Siitaqpu is that he lived in the Hopi village of Hotevilla, and that he was a member of the 
two horn ritual society—the society responsible for some of the most important ceremonies that 
occur annually in our village.  This ritual socity also happened to be the ritual society to which 
Qötshongva, Bahnaqya and possibly Monongye belonged.   The song Siitaqpu introduced is 
simple and joyful, describing four of the Hopi directions, kwiningyaq (northwest), taavang 
(southwest), tatkyaq (southeast), and hoopaq (northeast), and the colors of the clouds that emerge 
from those directions. While the song may not seem sacred, embedded in the simplicity of the 
song is a mnemonic of Hopi relations to Hopitutskwa (Hopi lands) and the beings that exist 
within it, as well as the teachings and commitments required of those who live there.  For this 
reason, the song has been identified by village leaders as one that should only be performed by 
the kooyemsi or those who have authority to sing their songs. 
There is no doubt as to who rightfully controls the song: the kooyemsi.  They have 
ultimate say over when the song is performed and who performs it.   Assuming the song had 
been produced in a traditional manner (discussed in Chapter 1), Siitaqpu likely witnessed the 
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generative process that produced the song, together with other human and non-human 
collaborators.  Then, he likely sang it to others in the kiva or ceremonial space, which is where 
Qötshongva and Bahnaqya probably learned it.  As several Hopi composers have explained, 
singing a song in the kiva does something to the ownership of the song—Siitaqpu effectively 
transferred any personal claim he had on the song to the members of his ritual society and to the 
beings who would later perform it, giving them the unrestricted right to refine it, perform it, and 
remember it under a Hopi principle of obligated-reciprocity (see Chapter 4).  Placed within this 
positive commons of ownership-obligation,63 the songs could then only be used for the good of 
the people and the benefit of the world. 
 
Singing “Hostile” Traditionalism 
In 2008, I began an effort to return the taatawi Boulton recorded in 1940 back to our 
people, including the kooyemsi song she had released commercially.  Whenever I played 
Boulton’s recordings for people at Hopi, I usually asked if they recognized the voices of the 
singers.  Nearly everyone from my dad’s generation and older would identify the men as David 
Monongye, Thomas Bahnaqya, and Dan Qötshongva.  Interestingly, it usually wasn’t the sound 
of the voices people remembered (only Neal Monongya, David’s son, positively identified his 
father’s voice based solely on its sound); rather it was by the relationships these men had to one 
another and their reputations as a collective that gave away their identities.  On one section of the 
tape, a confident and instructive Monongye speaks—in English—to an imagined, non-
indigenous audience: “This is David Honanie [sic] speaking,” he says as an introduction to a 
memorable Povoltawi (butterfly dance song). “This song is composed by an Indian Man from 
                                                
63 I borrow the term “positive commons” from Marc Perlman’s recent Society for Ethnomusicology Pre-Conference 
paper, “Who Owns the Unowned? Protecting Traditional Music from Appropriation” (Dec. 2, 2015). 
	77 
 
Hotevilla.  It is imitating the Spanish song.”  Monongye’s voice is then joined on the recordings 
by several other men, singing in Hopi and making the kinds of calls and other sounds one would 
expect to hear in the village plaza during an actual tiikive (ceremonial dance).  The effect, as 
Boulton described it, was to make the song “typical” of what she imagined was real Hopi life—
and in doing so, also make it more exciting and exotic for the intended audience. Still, I often 
wondered what it was about the recordings that made everyone believe that the singers were 
Qötshongva, Bahnaqya and Monongye, and what that might tell us about who owns their singing 
voices now?   
As I understand it, Qötshongva self-identified as the kikmongwi (chief) of our village, the 
village of Hotevilla, at the time he recorded for Boulton.  Sometime around the beginning of 
World War II, Bahnaqya (joined some time later by Monongye) was appointed to be a traditional 
spokesman for Qötshongva.  In their later years, Qötshongva, Bahnaqya and Monongye became 
widely known as “traditionalists”—a powerful faction in Hopi politics that existed for several 
decades.  Given the name, and Hotevilla’s reputation for resistance to the settler-colonial 
encroachments I will discuss below, one might think that “traditionalists” like these men would 
be averse to a woman like Boulton recording their village’s ceremonial songs.  As Boulton 
would later record in her autobiography, “It was at the Hopi reservation that the local 
government agent told me: ‘You won’t get any songs here.’ So-and-so—he mentioned a 
musicologist by name—had just left and in three months he did not get a single song” (Boulton 
1968:428).  But to make the assumption that Hopi tradition would necessarily exclude the use of 
non-indigenous technology is to misunderstand an important aspect of Hopi history and 
society.64  As I will argue, the willingness of the Traditionalists to record for Boulton and other 
                                                
64. See MATTHEW SAKIEWSTEWA GILBERT, EDUCATION BEYOND THE MESAS xxiii (2012). (“Some . . . may consider 
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powerful individuals outside of the Hopi community played an important role in the rise and fall 
of the Traditionalist movement and the development of the contemporary concept of Hopi 
cultural property, which has been particularly influential within the international indigenous 
rights movement.  
To understand Hopi Traditionalism and its leaders requires grappling with a still 
unsettling chapter of Hopi politics that led to the collapse of the largest Hopi village, Orayvi, and 
the creation of a new village, Hotevilla, in 1906.  In the years leading to breakup of Orayvi, 
internal and external pressures from population growth, disease, famine, missionization, and 
other physical and social forms of colonial violence had caused significant division among the 
people of Orayvi.65 Those resistant to settler-colonialism’s reach into the community desired to 
live their lives without having to accommodate the kinds of sweeping changes the federal 
government was demanding—including mandatory government schooling for Hopi children and 
the implementation of Western democracy and property regimes in lieu of traditional governance 
and ownership by clans.  In 1906, Qötshongva, Bahnaqya, and Monongye, along with others 
whom the federal government deemed “hostiles”, were expelled by their own village members.  
They then traveled six miles Northwest to an area filled with cultivated orchards known as 
Ho’at’vela to establish a new village.  The breakup of Orayvi—after millennia of existence—set 
the stage for a new political order at Hotevilla in which traditional Hopi relations and ways of 
life, rather than a powerful ruling class that seemed increasingly sympathetic to American 
settlers, would govern.  However, their political independence was short-lived.  Almost 
                                                                                                                                                       
the resisting group to the more traditional of the two, but the ideas of both resisting and accommodating have always 
been critical aspects of Hopi history and society.  In this regard, Hopis functioned according to Hopi culture when 
the pushed back against the U.S. government and each other, and it was equally Hopi-like for Hopi accommodators 
to adopt, adapt, and accept change for what they believed benefited their people.”)   
65. For a more complete documentary history of the breakup of the Hopi village of Orayvi, see Whiteley, Peter 
(2008) The Orayvi Split: A Hopi Transformation New York: American Museum of Natural History. 
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immediately, federal government forces brutally imposed colonial order on Hotevilla. Young 
men like Bahnaqya and Monongya, as well as older men like Qötsongva, were forced to attend 
government sponsored boarding schools where they were taken from their homes and fields and 
required to learn trades like silver-smithing and construction in far off cities.   
After learning of the violence happening at Orayvi and Hotevilla, a wide variety of 
activists—including musical activists—visited Hopi lands to intervene.  Many of these 
individuals helped lobby the Federal Government to allow tribes to retain their traditional 
cultures and political autonomy. One prominent figure who circulated in elite East Coast music 
circles, Natalie Curtis-Burlin, persuaded then President Theodore Roosevelt to endorse the 
preservation and promotion of Hopi and other indigenous peoples’ music and culture through her 
musical anthology The Indians’ Book.66  (Roosevelt would actually visit Hopi lands to 
experience a snake-antelope ceremony at the Hopi village of Walpi in 1913.67)  Educators at the 
Sherman Institute—a boarding school in Riverside California attended by many Hopis—reversed 
their bans on indigenous dancing, and began allowing Hopis to perform some ceremonies, albeit 
for promotional purposes.  At the same time, Hopis themselves began visiting distant locations to 
demonstrate the sophistication and efficacy of their ritual performances, recording songs at the 
                                                
66. Only a few months before the Orayvi split, Theodore Roosevelt penned a brief letter upon receiving the 
manuscript of Curtis’s book.  It said, “These songs cast a wholly new light on the depth and dignity of Indian 
thought, its simple beauty and strange charm—the charm of a vanished elder[?] world—of Indian poetry.”  While 
the allusion to social darwinism is clear, it shows a marked change from the colonial rhetoric and violence he 
perpetuated earlier in his life, including statements like, “I don’t go so far as to think that the only good Indians are 
the dead Indians, but I believe nine out of every 10 are . . . And I shouldn’t like to inquire too closely into the case of 
the tenth.” 1886 speech in New York, in Landry, Alysa “Theodore Roosevelt: ‘The Only Good Indians Are the Dead 
Indians’ Indian Country Today June 28, 2016, available at 
https://indiancountrymedianetwork.com/history/events/theodore-roosevelt-the-only-good-indians-are-the-dead-
indians/ 
67. The library of congress maintains film footage of the event on its website. 
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Berlin Phonogram Archiv in 1906,68 performing the Hopi Snake Dance in front of the United 
States Capitol in 1926,69 and participating in the A Century of Progress Exhibition in 1930s 
Chicago, to name a few.  These efforts at ceremonial activism likely contributed to the reversal 
of public opinion regarding government policies of extermination and assimilation of indigenous 
peoples that had predominated in the decades prior.  John Collier, who became Commissioner of 
Indian Affairs from 1933-1945, drew from his experiences with Pueblo tribes of the Southwest 
in the development of the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA) of 1934, which allowed tribes to 
adopt their own constitutions (albeit with the approval of the Secretary of the Interior) thereby 
allowing greater political autonomy for indigenous peoples living in the United States.70 
Interestingly, though Collier believed collective indigenous culture was vital connecting link that 
made indigenous societies successful,71 many early Tribal constitutions developed under the IRA 
did not contain provisions allowing tribes to protect the artistic and ceremonial traditions of the 
peoples they governed, Hopi being an exception to the rule.72 But perhaps this was because 
                                                
68.  See Ziegler, Susanne (2006) DIE WACHSZYLINDER DES BERLINER PHONOGRAMM-ARCHIVS BERLIN: 
ETHNOLOGISCHES MUSEUM, STAATLICHE MUSEEN ZU BERLIN. 
69. The event was allegedly attended by nearly 5,000 people, including Vice President Charles Dawes, three 
Supreme Court Justices, House Speaker Nicholas Longworth, and many members of Congress. When the BIA 
attempted to ban the dance in 1927, they were criticized for interfering with Hopi religious practice. See Office of 
the Hsitorian and the Clerk of the House’s Office of Art and Archives, “Hopi Indians Performed Sacred Dances at 
the U.S. Capitol” UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES HISTORY, ART & ARCHIVES (accessed on January 4, 
2018), http://history.house.gov/HistoricalHighlight/Detail/35633?ret=True 
70. See Indian Reorganization Act (Wheeler-Howard Act), 25 U.S.C. § 5101 – 5129; see E.A. Schwartz, Red 
Atlantis Revisited: Community and Culture in the Writings of John Collier 18 Am. Indian. Q. 507, 513-514 (1994) 
(describing the impact of Collier’s visit to Taos Pueblo on what became the underlying policies of the Indian 
Reorganization Act). 
71 See Schwartz, Red Atlantis Revisited at 514 (finding that in his early writings, particularly “The Red Atlantis,” 
“Collier stressed culture as the definitive binder of the community.”) 
72.  See Elmer Rusco, The Indian Reorganization Act and Indian Self-Government In Eric D. Lemont, ed., 
AMERICAN INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM AND THE REBUILDING OF NATIVE NATIONS (2006) (arguing that the 
Bureau of Indian Affairs did not use a boilerplate constitution for each Tribe, but did use an outline of core topics); 
Elmer Rusco, Civil Liberties Guarantees under Tribal Law: A Survey of Civil Rights Provisions in Tribal 
Constitutions 14 AM. INDIAN. L. REV. 269, 270-272 (1988) (finding that only a small minority of tribal constitutions 
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expressions of indigeneity, previously despised as backward and primitive and in some cases 
banned outright by federal policy,73 had obtained a new political salience in modern twentieth 
century America.74   
Qötshongva, Bahnaqya and Monongye no doubt recognized the social, environmental, 
and political effects that resulted from the hybridization of Hopi and settler modes of 
governance.  Many Hopi youth, after being sent to boarding schools, never returned home.  And 
when students did return, they often felt ostracized from family and others in the village because 
of what they had learned and what they had forgotten.  As Matthew Sakiestewa Gilbert explains, 
some students could not speak their language when they returned home, at least temporarily, and 
lacked the skills to feel productive on the reservation.  In some cases, students preferred the 
training, conveniences and lifestyle they had achieved and wanted to leave the reservation behind 
(2010:137-161).  But as young Hopis left home for school or military service to learn trades 
useful to the American economy, significant changes began to occur on Hopi lands.  The 
traditional agricultural fields surrounding the Hopi villages fell into disuse, and eroded into 
massive washes dividing the land and washing away fertile soil.75  The political landscape at 
                                                                                                                                                       
out of the 220 surveyed contained provisions granting cultural rights). 
73.  See BIA Circular 1665, Department of the Interior Office of Indian Affairs (Feb. 14, 1923), excerpts available 
at http://www.webpages.uidaho.edu/~rfrey/PDF/329/IndianDances.pdf (stating that “The dance per se is not 
condemned . . . however, under most primitive and pagan conditions is apt to be harmful, and when found to be so 
among the Indians we should control it by educational processes as far as possible, but if necessary, by punitive 
measures when its degrading tendencies persist.  The sun-dance and other similar dances and so-called religious 
ceremonies are considered “Indian Offences” under existing regulations, and corrective penalties are provided.”); 
see Rules Governing the Court of Indian Offenses, Department of the Interior, Office of Indian Affairs (Dec. 2, 
1882), available at https://rclinton.files.wordpress.com/2007/11/code-of-indian-offenses.pdf. 
74. As historian Philiop Deloria has explains in his book Playing Indian, with the turn of the twentieth century, the 
figure of the noble savage became institutionalized within American society in organizations like the Boy Scouts of 
America and Campfire Girls (Deloria 1998:119-111).  He explains that the impetus for this institutionalization of the 
Other came about because “American identity was increasingly tied to a search for an authentic social identity, one 
that had real meaning in the face of the anxious displacements of modernity.” (Deloria 1998:101). 
75 I want to thank Michael Yeatts of the Hopi Cultural Preservation Office / NAU for showing me comparative 
photographs of Hopi fields and of the Orayvi wash area over the twentieth century. 
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Hopi also continued to fracture.  In 1937, through a vote in which less than a third of eligible 
Hopi voters took part, a representative democracy was imposed on the Hopi people (Richland 
2011:218).  Each of the nine autonomous Hopi villages, once organized around carefully 
balanced clan and ceremonial systems, became subsumed into the larger, federally recognized 
Hopi Tribe, with decision-making authority on many fundamental issues vested in a single tribal 
council.76  While a majority of the villages began to send representatives to the tribal council, 
Hotevilla and Songoopavi remained (and still remain) among the few villages that refused to 
formally recognize the sovereign authority of the Hopi Tribe.  
With the Tribe divided on core issues of governance, Qötshongva, Bahnaqya, and 
Monongye developed a political platform and leadership style that was both strategic and 
charismatic.  They took upon themselves the name “Traditionalists” and rigorously opposed 
foreign American governance and its policies of imperialism.  In the early 1940s, Bahnaqya, for 
example, rejected his draft summons in protest of the War, and between 1940 and 1945, was 
repeatedly jailed (Clemmer 1995:185). During those days of imprisonment, he conducted an in-
depth study of the relationships between Hopi and English, becoming “a seasoned, experienced, 
articulate cultural broker” (id.).  Some traditionalists were known to have taken sacred 
ceremonial artifacts to groups of influential people, using them to demonstrate their authority or 
to describe Hopi prophesies about the end of the world (Wilton Kooyahoema, interview with 
author, 2009;  Clemmer 1995:182). These provocative displays of Hopi culture must have 
resonated with an American populous trained in Christian millenarian traditions and anxious 
over the experience of mechanized warfare.  Their presentations were used as proofs to 
                                                
76.  See Constitution and Bylaws of the Hopi Tribe, art. III, § 2; art. IV § 4 (1936). 
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demonstrate the importance of maintaining Hopi ceremonial culture and traditional ways of life 
and to advocate for an end to imposed settler-colonialism and global nuclear warfare. 
The following exchange I had with the late Wilton Kooyahoema, a respected elder and 
leader from Hotevilla who was alive during the rise of Traditionalism, and Lee Wayne 
Lomayestewa, a village leader from Songoopavi, shows just how far Traditionalists were willing 
to go to advance their political goals: 
WK:  “I don’t think at the time when I, when I was still young they uh 
not allowed any, any recording from Songoopavi. . . .  So they not 
allowing anything. But you know these people who were calling 
themselves ‘Traditionalists,’ they used to gather some men and 
they go down on the fields [below Hotevilla] somewhere just out 
in a hiding place. Then they can record a lot of those things. [He 
pauses.] But because it’s not allowed in the village too also, but 
that’s what they’ve been doing.  And they found out that they 
were, and then I thought maybe they were, they get suspicious you 
know they sing something real, our religious belief songs and all 
those things, so . . . 
TR: Right. 
WK: They make us stop too.  They got in a big argument over that thing. 
So it’s been, I was about maybe 11 . . . 11 years old.  When that 
thing happened here. 
TR: Oh? 
WK: And my grandfather was the one that was against this so they, he’s 
one of the One-Horn Society Priests and he’s kind of worried 
about that their—that their songs might be the ones that they [the 
Traditionalists] would sing or things like that. 
 
From most accounts, Qötshongva, Bahnaqya and Monongye’s mode of authentically 
performing and explaining aspects of Hopi ritual in order to defend the Hopi people from 
encroachments by American policymakers was not always appreciated by village members, 
though it was clearly attractive to many outside the Hopi community.  As Kooyahoema 
explained, because recording of ceremonial songs wasn’t allowed in the village (and in most 
cases still isn’t), these men were known to go out into the fields below the village to record 
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ceremonial songs.77   Paradoxically, while the Traditionalists clearly placed significant value on 
Hopi ceremony, it must have seemed to village members like they were utilizing ceremony to 
bring recognition for themselves as gatekeepers of the exotic rather than humbly performing the 
songs in the ways they were intended to be used—to benefit all living things. As political 
historian Richard Clemmer (1995:182) explains, “The more the [Traditionalist] Movement’s 
leaders gravitated toward charisma, the more critical Hopis became of them; the more well-
known they became outside Hopiland, the more they were pushed by Euro-American cultural 
patters to assume charismatic roles.”     
It seems then that Qötshongva, Bahnaqya and Monongye were not unlike other 
indigenous interlocutors who were eager to record ritual music for early fieldworkers.  As Erika 
Brady (1999:110-13) suggests, many informants were interested in making phonograph 
recordings because it was new, more fun to use, and because it seemed to provide a more 
authentic rendition of an informant’s expressions than what an ethnographer might otherwise 
take away from an interaction.  In addition to their interests in the technology, many early 
indigenous informants were on the fringe, engaging in behavior that was “at odds with the 
community” or who were “by nature both more adventurous and more reflective than most.” 
(Brady 1999:107-108). Qötshongva, Bahnaqya and Monogye share much in common with 
Brady’s descriptions:  while they were leaders who were deeply reflective about the future of 
their villages and were willing to utilize new technologies to achieve positive change, they were 
also at odds with their community because they were willing to compromise Hopi principles 
regarding the circulation of taatawi and the knowledge contained in them.  It may be that 
                                                
77.  As Boulton writes, “We went a long way out into the desert, and under one of those weirdly shaped cacti 
(protected by law as a rare plant but providing absolutely no shade), I set up the recording gear and captured 




Qötshongva, Bahnaqya and Monongye understood sound recording as a more direct medium that 
could accurately present what they considered to be the most valuable aspects of Hopi culture to 
help transform public opinion.  Unfortunately, we can only speculate on their intentions 
regarding recording for Boulton on that August day. 
 
Becoming the “Music Hunter” 
 In contrast to that of the Traditionalists, Laura Boulton’s trajectory originated with 
formal vocal training at Western Reserve University, and then graduate studies at the University 
of Chicago.  By all accounts, Boulton possessed a vivacious personality and was a skilled social 
networker, even by today’s standards.  Letters from men and occasional women praising her for 
her charm and wit saturate the historical record she left behind. And through her vast network of 
personal connections, she gained access to some of the most advanced recording devices 
available—devices even the Federal government apparently struggled to gain access to78—as 
well as funds to travel to exotic, remote destinations.  
The First World War and the rise of American imperialism in the first part of the 
Twentieth Century produced new markets for the exotic in the United States, which acted as the 
perfect leaven for growing Boulton’s career. Boulton’s craft as a music collector was in her 
ability to convince indigenous and ethnic minority peoples to perform large volumes of source 
material into her recording devices, and then use the resulting recordings to generate lectures 
emphasizing her interlocutors’ colorful otherness along with anecdotes gleaned from her travels.  
Her first major expedition to collect indigenous sound happened in her own backyard of 
Chicago.  In 1933, Boulton attended the A Century of Progress Exhibition, a large-scale world’s 
                                                




fair that juxtaposed the new technological feats of the day with the traditional practices of 
indigenous peoples stationed in a so-called Indian Village. With her recording equipment in 
hand, Boulton combed through the Indian Village, recording hundreds of tracks, including some 
Hopi traditional songs sung by members of the village of Walpi who were working at the fair. A 
few years later, she made a new set of recordings while accompanying her husband on a bird-
gathering expedition in Africa.  These recordings provided the material for her signature lecture 
on the CBS lecture circuit, which she titled “Rhythm in the Jungle.”  The lecture appears to have 
been a critical success, and CBS offered her a 5-year lecturing contract that included a staggering 
66 to 75% cut of gross receipts, with a minimum fee of $100 ($1,677 in current dollars).79 Soon 
after embarking on her lecturing career, Boulton left her husband and moved to New York City.  
By 1940, she was lecturing at numerous local society clubs across the East and Midwest, as well 
as major universities, including Harvard, and was featured on various radio programs.80  
It is not entirely clear why Boulton decided to go to the Southwest in 1940, or how she 
ended up at Hopi recording the Traditionalists. Boulton claims in her 1968 autobiography that 
her visit to the Southwest was part of a “project for the Indian Affairs Bureau,” which roughly 
corresponds with letters from BIA officials written to her after the fact81 and the prominent 
thank-you to them in the liner notes of her Indian Music of the Southwest LP.  The historical 
record suggests, however, that Boulton needed a quick-and-dirty collecting trip to fulfill the 
recording contract she had signed with RCA.  Upon learning that her grant for funding to go on a 
                                                
79.  Of course, she would pay her own way and do her own advertising, but her agency deal was also non-exclusive. 
80.  See letters from Kirtley F. Mather of Harvard University (Aug. 12, 1940); Thomas L. Stix (July 29, 1940); 
Gertrude G. Gort (Aug. 13, 1940); A. Moran of Audio-Scriptions (May 25, 1941) available at ATM. 
81.   Letter from the Office of Indian Affairs, Department of the Interior (May 11, 1941). 
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second African expedition had been turned down, 82 likely due to the impending war in Europe 
and North Africa, Boulton targeted the multi-day Inter-Tribal Indian Ceremonial at Gallup, New 
Mexico--a well-known Santa Fe Railroad outpost and Route 66 tourist destination located on the 
edges of several Indian reservations.83  The potential similarities to her earlier collecting work at 
the A Century of Progress Exhibition are uncanny.  
 A few days before she would leave for Gallup, Boulton would receive a concerned 
telegram from W.L. Woodward, secretary for the Gallup Ceremonial.84  In it, Woodward raised a 
critical question: would Laura Boulton pay her indigenous informants for their time?  Prior to 
that time, there is no evidence that anyone had ever questioned Boulton’s right to the music of 
the people singing on her recordings. Boulton clearly believed there were rights in the music: her 
manager at RCA informed one of Boulton’s covetous colleagues that Boulton was having “the 
music of [her Southwest Indians] recordings copyrighted in her name.”85 At that time, only 
“compositions”—not sound recordings—needed to be intentionally “copyrighted”; the common-
law right to reproduce, publish or sell a sound recording attached from the moment of creation.  
This suggests that Boulton and her record label believed the songs she was recording belonged to 
her simply by capturing them.  In any case, I have not yet found a response to Woodward’s 
telegrammed question from Boulton that would help us clarify whether she ultimately paid her 
informants for their creative work and performances. 
While Boulton spent her first week in the Southwest at the Gallup Inter-Tribal Indian 
Ceremonial, her correspondence during this time shows that she may not have been having the 
                                                
82.   Letter from Carnegie Corporation of New York, ATM (Dec. 11, 1939). 
83.  Letter from W.L. Woodward to Laura Boulton, ATM (Jul. 9, 1940). 
84.  See Telegram from W.L. Woodward to Laura Boulton, ATM (Aug. 6, 1940). 
85.  Letter from RP Wetherald to EP Hunt, ATM (Dec. 20, 1940). 
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success she was hoping for. To get to authentic reservation Indians, Boulton needed 
transportation to make the 130-mile trip from Gallup to Hopi lands over dirt and gravel roads.  
Three Bureau of Indian Affairs Officials from Washington, DC happened to be making a trip to 
Orayvi, and they invited her to join them.  As she recalls, after the officials would go about their 
business, she would set up shop and begin recording. At Orayvi, Boulton may have briefly met 
with and recorded Don Talayesva, a well-educated Hopi man who had returned home to take up 
his ceremonial responsibilities again. Talayesva would later write in his 1941 autobiography Sun 
Chief about wishing he had a Victrola (made exclusively by RCA) to listen to the recordings he 
had made (Talayesva 2013:392). Boulton then traveled to the Hopi village of Hotevilla where 
she would meet Qötshongva, Bahnaqya, and Monongye, and then on to Toreva, a government 
outpost, and then to Mishungnavi, and then on to other tribal lands around the Southwest. 
The presence of the Bureau of Indian Affairs officials from Washington, D.C. must have 
been something out of the ordinary for those at Hotevilla, because the Traditionalists decided to 
allow certain ceremonial performances to happen out of season.  While it wasn’t unusual for 
tourists to visit Hopi lands in the Spring to watch a katsintiikive (katsina dance) during the 
roughly six months that the katsinam reside in the village for the winter and spring, Boulton 
reports that the Hopi leaders authorized a katsina dance in late August—something unheard of 
after the katsinam have already departed.  Boulton recalled that this performance, though 
permitted by her “Hopi friends,” was heavily protested by other members of the village who 
scolded them for keeping the katsinam from their Summer home in the San Francisco mountains. 
 While she succeeded in recording Hopi people where others had failed, Boulton’s tactics 
seem to have been met with tricksterism.  Boulton believed she had captured something never 
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before recorded.86  At Mishungnavi, Boulton writes in her notes that she had recorded sacred 
Snake and Flute songs, and later recalled that her informant “would be killed if it became known 
that he had performed” them for her.  In reality, nearly all of the songs she recorded at 
Mishungnavi were actually Supai, Hualapai, and other songs of neighboring tribes, or else songs 
like “Baiwali”—a song about going to the outhouse.87 In fact, the number of Hopi-appropriated 
songs from other tribes that were sung for Boulton during her visits to the Hopi villages is quite 
remarkable.  The collection of songs from Hotevilla and Orayvi, however, is the exception, 
because those recordings seem to be completely devoid of tricksterism—the songs listed in her 
field notes correspond with the actual songs as performed on her recordings.  It appears that her 
Hopi informants at Hotevilla were taking this opportunity seriously. 
While we don’t know exactly what agreement Boulton made with the Traditionalists at 
Hotevilla, to say that Qötshongva, Monongye and Bahnaqya were duped or beguiled by the 
smooth-talking Boulton would be utterly inconsistent with who they were becoming in 1940. 
While not claiming Boulton was on even footing with her informants in terms of power, it seems 
that some meeting of the minds—an intersection of networks and of values—must have 
materialized in order for this recording to come into existence.  But what were the terms? And, 
what does the historical record’s silence on these terms mean for those who seek to understand 
the effects of these transactions in sound today?  
Latour (2013) has suggested that understanding the intersections of seemingly distinct 
domains—perhaps indigenous sound and commercial recording, for example—requires that we 
look not just to a specific event, but to entire trajectories surrounding events--“antecedents and 
                                                
86. Quote from LB Music Hunter: “By the time I left, I had recorded songs from their most sacred rituals” 
87 I thank Alph Secakuku for listening to these recordings and identifying the contents of these tracks. 
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consequences,” “precursors and heirs” or “inputs and outputs.” In looking at intersections in this 
way, we begin to see how each participant within a creative network coped with discontinuities 
as they continued along their lived trajectory. In other words, as we read the performers’ and the 
recordist’s biographies, and see how each framed the exchange within their larger projects—we 
begin to see overlaps in the networks and values within which each party lived. 
In reflecting on these accounts, I can envision many possible scenarios of what happened 
on that August day.  While the presence of powerful BIA officials may have been one reason the 
Traditionalists were willing to share the village’s taatawi with Boulton, it may be that Boulton 
simply deceived the men as to her identity and intentions.  In her visit to Canada the year after 
her Hopi trip, for example, Boulton apparently traveled around with anthropologists, recording 
their informants under the guise of making archival specimens for the Canadian Film Board. 
After allowing Boulton to collect their “one good [song]” out of years of “comb[ing] a district 
thoroughly,” Boulton let it slip that she was actually planning to release a Canadian record for 
RCA/Victor, infuriating the local anthropologists.88  It’s plausible that during her visit to 
Hotevilla, Boulton appeared to be a representative for the Bureau of Indian Affairs, someone 
responsible for taking their voices back to Washington and sharing them with key leaders.  Just 
as Hopi performances of the Snake Dance in front of the Nation’s capital in 1926 led to the 
reversal of the anti-dance policy established under the BIA’s Circular 1665, perhaps the 
performance of Hopi ceremony for BIA Officials could likewise alter government policy toward 
the Hopi people. 
It is also entirely possible that Boulton and the Traditionalists did in fact reach an 
agreement granting Boulton the right to publish and commercially exploit the recordings.  The 
                                                
88 See Letter from Hellen Creighton to Mr. McInnes, ATM (Oct. 14, 1941). 
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Hopi Traditionalists may have had a strong desire to amplify their voices for the sake of securing 
greater public influence.  At this early stage in the Traditionalist movement, Qötshongva, 
Bahnaqya and Monongye sought to establish themselves not only as Hopi ritual leaders, but also 
hoped to show the American public that Hopi cosmology was a relevant view on a world heading 
back into war. The Traditionalists recognized that authority in the Hopi world was becoming 
increasingly contingent on the exercise of power in Washington, and perhaps found in Boulton 
the capacity to reach this new political power center and beyond.  Boulton’s capacity to record 
and distribute ceremonial songs meant Hopi traditional principles, temporalities, geographies, 
and prophetic teachings embedded in the songs they sang could have an audience with the 
American populous.  It also meant that Traditionalists would be the voice for Hopis across the 
world.  Perhaps the potential to preserve Hopi autonomy by amplifying Hopi voices through 
record distribution outweighed the potential harms of giving a non-Hopi control over a 
kooyemsi’s voice.   
 
Reclaiming our Ancestors’ Voices  
We may never know what really happened at Hotevilla on that August day.  And in fact, 
the exact details of any agreement involving the production of early field recordings as to their 
future use is usually unclear and almost never in the form of a written contract.89 Questions about 
ownership and use of these kinds of materials remain unsettled, even after decades have passed; 
                                                
89. Ethics and practice surrounding work with indigenous peoples prior to the 1970s generally did not take into 
account copyright law, and often proceeded without written transfers of ownership.  See, e.g., Anthony Seeger, 
Ethnomusicologists, Archives, Professional Organizations, and the Shifting Ethics of Intellectual Property, 28 
YEARBOOK FOR TRADITIONAL MUSIC 87, 92 (1996) (“When I recorded the Suya Indians of Brazil in the 1970s, it 
was so obvious that I did so with their consent that I did not bother to get even verbal clearances.  None of them 
could read or write, which made written contracts impossible.”).  As a result, many institutions possess collections 
of field recordings containing Native American or other indigenous peoples’ ritual songs or other sensitive forms of 
cultural expression, but without a clearly documented chain of title from the indigenous performers. 
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and yet, even with these ambiguities, the voices of indigenous peoples continued to be circulated 
through distant networks, detached from the individuals and communities who produced them.  
But is this really a just ending to this story?  Who should own our ancestors’ voices?  And what 
can be done now to remedy past, and sometimes illicit, transactions in sound? 
 The after-life of Boulton’s Hopi recordings raises just these sorts of questions. Following 
her departure from Hopi, Boulton selected the kooyemsi song she recorded during her visit to 
Hotevilla for inclusion in her album Indian Music of the Southwest, which is now widely 
available through a variety sources, including Amazon, iTunes, GooglePlay, and educational 
services like Alexander Street Press.  Victor records, and now Smithsonian Folkways, distribute 
Indian Music of the Southwest through a copyright license it obtained from Boulton, which 
perhaps unsurprisingly mentions nothing about any rights of the indigenous creators or 
performers to the expressive material contained in the album.90   Nearing the end of her career, 
Boulton entered into an agreement with Columbia University to sell the master tapes and the 
reproduction rights to her entire collection of 30,000 recordings (including the ten remaining 
recordings she made at Hotevilla) to Columbia University in exchange for $10,000, an annuity 
and a named professorship.91  The agreements Boulton made imply that she, independent of the 
Hopi singers, the Village of Hotevilla, or the Hopi Tribe, could allow others to reproduce, 
publish, and sell the recordings.    
 But what if these contracts are wrong—egregiously wrong.  What if Laura Boulton never 
obtained any rights to the recordings, and simply published them without permission?  And, what 
                                                
90.  Contract between Laura Boulton and Folkways Records (1956), available at ATM. In response to early drafts 
this Note, Smithsonian Folkways has expressed its willingness to work with the Hopi Tribe and Hopi village and 
ceremonial leaders to take down infringing content from its website. 
91.  See Fox, Archive of the Archive.  The $10,000 figure, however, does not include the funds contributed by a 
wealthy Columbia alumnus who endowed a chair out of affection for Ms. Boulton, to the tune of roughly $250,000 
($2 million, accounting for inflation). 
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if Qötshongva, Bahnaqya, and Monongye had no right to convey these songs to Boulton in the 
first place?  For the remainder of this chapter, I look at the justness of Boulton’s actions under 
settler and Hopi laws governing the ownership and circulation of sound recordings made on 
Tribal lands.  I first apply existing copyright law to destabilize the underlying assumption, 
codified in Bouton’s agreements with the Columbia, Victor, and Folkways labels, that Boulton 
ever owned the right to control the recordings made at Hotevilla.  As with many areas of Native 
American law, there are few precedents in which the ownership of field recordings have been 
challenged on the basis of copyright or other kinds of intellectual or cultural property law.  Yet, 
given the state of the law, it probably would not be a stretch for a court could find that neither 
Boulton, Columbia University, nor Smithsonian Folkways currently holds a valid right to 
reproduce the kooyemsi and other taatawi Boulton and the Hopi singers recorded at Hotevilla.   
In addition, there are other property-based legal regimes, such as the Native American Graves 
Protection and Repatriation Act and the doctrine of aboriginal title that could likewise be relied 
on to challenge Boulton’s claimed interest.  My arguments is that, absent a valid claim to 
ownership by Boulton, the recordings would likely be owned by the singers’ (or their successors) 
or by the Hopi Tribe under tribal law, and any unauthorized uses of the recordings could 
constitute copyright infringement, misappropriation, unfair competition, and/or conversion. 
 
Ownership of the Indigenous Voice under Settler Law 
 In Chapters 1 and 2, I explored the ways taatawi establish Hopi authority within territory, 
forming relations between Hopi people, the land and other actors in the cosmos.  Settler law, as I 
will now explore, has significantly altered the functionality of taatawi, converting them in some 
instances into objects to be owned and transacted.  In the following sections, I explore the way 
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ownership of indigenous voices is treated under settler law, and how indigenous peoples might 
strategically use settler law to reclaim our ancestors voices.  I examine (1) the doctrine of 
common-law copyright, (2) the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, and (3) 
the enforcement of Tribal cultural or intellectual property laws on non-tribal-members, and apply 
each of these legal formulations to the Hotevilla recordings. 
  Before delving into these three legal doctrines, though, it is important to look at how 
United States courts decide what law to apply to events occurring on tribal lands, whether it be 
federal statutes passed by Congress, laws passed by tribal counsels, or judge-made law.  In 
deciding which law to apply to determine ownership interests in sound recordings made on 
reservation lands under the legal systems of the United States, a court must first grapple with the 
complex overlay of tribal and federal sovereignty the United States has constructed.  From the 
point of view of the United States, tribes possess inherent sovereignty over their membership and 
territory,92 including the power to legislate and adjudicate in civil matters such as contract, tort, 
and property ownership claims that arise between tribal members and, in some cases, between 
members of the tribe and non-members.93  United States federal law, when directed at Tribes, is 
considered supreme, even over Tribal laws. For example, Tribal laws can be preempted by acts 
of Congress or the Executive, or overturned by federal judicial review.94  Resolving an 
                                                
92.   United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975) (“Indian tribes are unique aggregations possessing 
attributes of sovereignty over both their members and their territory . . . ; they are a separate people possessing the 
power of regulating their internal and social relations . . .”) (internal citations omitted). 
93.   See, e.g., Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 221-23 (1959) (finding that when a contract’s cause of action arises 
on an Indian reservation, and the defendant is a tribal member, adjudicative authority lies in the tribal court); Smith 
v. Salish Kootenai College, 434 F.3d 1127, 1140-41 (2006) (“The Tribes’ system of tort is an important means by 
which the Tribes regulate the domestic and commercial relations of its members”); Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1, 61 
(1899) (property inheritance dispute involving tribal lands subject to the “laws, usages and customs of the tribe, and 
not by the law of the State of Minnesota”). 
94.  State law may be preempted under the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, U.S. Const. art. VI, § 2, but 
because tribes exist outside of the Constitution, United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 212 (2004), tribal laws are 
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ownership dispute arising on tribal lands, then, requires looking first to federal statutes. Where 
no federal statute applies, a court would then look to federal common law (judicial precedent) on 
the subject.95  In the absence of a federal statute or existing federal common law, courts may 
apply tribal law, particularly if it determines that “the issue in controversy is one that federal law 
recognizes as within the purview of tribal governance.”96  Tribal law may include tribal statutes, 
customary principles, or common law derived from its own or other jurisdictions.97  
Alternatively, where an issue in controversy is not recognized as pertinent to tribal governance, a 
federal court may create a general rule based on principles generally accepted in other courts.98 
 
Copyright and Ownership of the Indigenous Voice 
When a performing artist records a song in a recording studio, the result is a work called 
a “sound recording” under copyright law.  Sound recordings are defined by the United States 
Copyright Act as “works that result from the fixation of a series of musical, spoken or other 
sounds.”99  They are a kind of creative work that results from impressions of sound waves in 
material—typically a recorded performance that is captured via microphone on disk, tape, or in 
                                                                                                                                                       
typically preempted by federal power under the “plenary power” doctrine.  See United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 
375 (1886). 
95.   Despite the Supreme Court’s assertion in Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) that “[t]here is no 
federal general common law,” federal Indian law is one specific area of federal common law that persists.  See Nat’l 
Famers Union Ins. Companies v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845, 851-52 (1985). 
96.  1-7 Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law § 7.06[2] (2015). 
97.   1-4 Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law § 4.05[8] (2015). 
98.   See, e.g., Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land and Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316, 336-37 (2008), where the 
Supreme Court fashioned a new rule preventing the enforcement of tribal laws that restrain the alienation of 
reservation lands held in fee simple by non-members in a case where tribal customary non-discrimination laws had 
been asserted as an important aspect of tribal sovereignty. 
99.   17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
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memory chips.100  “Sound recordings” are different from “musical works” or “songs,” which are 
essentially the instructions for a performance (e.g., a musical score or a “lead sheet”).  This 
distinction is easy enough for most musicians to accept.  What is difficult to conceptualize is 
how sound recordings, like all copyrightable works, are considered to be “intangible”—in other 
words, copyright law doesn’t protect the physical objects produced in a recording session (e.g., 
the “master recording” or “audio tapes”); it protects the “expression” that is contained in physical 
objects. The consequences of this conceptual separation between physical copies and intangible 
“works” for indigenous song will be taken up in greater detail in Chapter 4. 
Because “sound recordings” are a relatively new kind of creative work, and sound 
recording technologies have changed rapidly over the last century, American lawmakers and 
judges have struggled to define how this new category of creative work should be owned.  While 
federal copyright statutes pre-dated the invention of sound recording technologies, state court 
judges actually performed most of the work of determining ownership and protecting sound 
recording rights.  They drew on the common law right of first publication, unfair competition, 
and conversion to protect works from unjust exploitation.101  In some states, legislators enacted 
criminal and civil statutes providing criteria for ownership rights in sound recordings and 
penalties for violating those rights.102  However, the need for more comprehensive national 
protection of sound recordings, particularly after the arrival of the cassette recorder, led to the 
                                                
100.  See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012).  Interestingly, for works that are not generally written down, an audio tape or 
digital file may actually contain the musical work (i.e., the instructions for how the work is to be performed) and the 
sound recording (the rendering of the musical work).  However, streaming audio may contain only the sound 
recording copyright.  United States v. Am. Soc. of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 627 F.3d 64, 74 (2d Cir. 2010) 
(holding that “streaming” audio is not a musical work, but a performance “that renders the musical work audible”). 
101.  COPYRIGHT OFFICE, FEDERAL COPYRIGHT PROTECTION FOR PRE-1972 SOUND RECORDINGS, 
25–28 (2011). 
102.  Copyright Office, State Law Texts (July 5, 2011), https://perma.cc/B7D2-WTEH; Copyright Office, Survey of 
State Criminal Laws (Dec. 12, 2012), https://perma.cc/QC5S-937S. 
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passage of the 1971 Sound Recording Amendment to the 1909 Copyright Act—nearly a century 
after the invention of the phonograph.103  This Amendment added sound recordings to the list of 
works eligible for federal copyright while also substantially limiting the scope of protection in 
these works.104  Importantly, the Sound Recording Amendment applied only to future recordings: 
“No sound recording fixed before February 15, 1972, shall be subject to [federal] copyright” 
until at least 2067.105  Even today, only those sound recordings created after February 15, 1972, 
are entitled to federal copyright protection. 
The problem for Tribes like the Hopi Tribe, which became sites of substantial recording 
activity prior to the 1970s, is that there is essentially a gap in copyright law when it comes to 
recordings made on tribal lands.  The Copyright Act makes clear that, in absence of federal 
copyright protection for pre-1972 sound recordings, “any rights or remedies under the common 
law or statutes of any State” continue to apply.106  For recordings made on state lands, state 
common law or statutes, if any, are still relied on to determine ownership interests.  However, 
federally recognized Indian tribes are not states, nor are tribal members generally subject to state 
property laws or to the jurisdiction of state courts for their activities on tribal lands.107  Because 
                                                
103.   Sound Recording Amendment, Pub. L. No. 92-140, § 3, 85 Stat. 391, 392 (1971) (emphasis added); see also 
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, History of the Cylinder Phonograph, https://perma.cc/QSS5-27S4 (last visited Oct. 5, 
2016).  Even though members of Congress had for nearly fifty years introduced bills to add sound recordings to the 
list of protectable works under the 1909 Copyright Act, Congress—likely influenced by the Radio Broadcast 
industry—failed to do so.  A central issue preventing such an amendment was disagreement over whether sound 
recordings represented a creative work of authorship under the Constitution’s Intellectual Property Clause.  
COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 5, at 10–13. 
104.    See generally 17 U.S.C. §§ 102(a), 114 (2012); COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 5. 
105. 17 U.S.C. § 301(c). 
106.  17 U.S.C. § 301(c) (2012). 
107.  In re Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. 737, 757 (1866) (“As long as the United States recognizes [a tribe’s] national 
character they are under the protection of treaties and the laws of Congress, and their property is withdrawn from the 
operation of State laws”) (emphasis added).  See generally Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832); 1-6 
COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 6.01 (LexisNexis 2015) (explaining that “[w]ithin Indian 
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the Copyright Act is silent on what law, if any, applies to pre-1972 sound recordings created on 
reservation lands, it remains uncertain what protections indigenous performers, like Qötshongva, 
Bahnaqya, and Monongye would have for their pre-1972 recorded works.108    
How Common-Law Copyright Affects Ownership of the Boulton Hopi Recordings 
 In the case of the Hotevilla recordings, the Hopi Tribe could potentially assert ownership 
in pre-1972 sound recordings by claiming rights under the doctrine of common law copyright.109  
While no federal precedents currently exist applying common law copyright to sound recordings 
created on Tribal lands, the United States Supreme Court has held conclusively that in situations 
where it is inappropriate to rely on state law, federal common law should apply.110  Because 
federally recognized Indian tribes are located outside the jurisdictional boundaries of states, 
where the majority of common law copyright rules have been fashioned, a federal court would, 
absent existing precedents of the particular tribe or rulings in other related areas of federal 
common law (admiralty, bankruptcy, antitrust, etc.), generate its own common law doctrine to 
                                                                                                                                                       
country, generally speaking, primary jurisdiction . . . rests with the Federal Government and the Indian tribe 
inhabiting it, and not with the States[.]”) (internal citations omitted).  Even in “P.L. 280” States, where State civil 
jurisdiction has been extended onto tribal lands, States still lack jurisdiction to determine ownership and interests in 
real and personal property.  25 U.S.C. § 1360(b) (2012). 
108.  When the Copyright Revision Act was passed in 1976, Congress specifically wanted to eliminate state 
copyright laws, except in the case of sound recordings made prior to 1972.   See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 131 
(1976) (“the preemptive effect of section 301 is limited to State laws”).  There is no indication that the amendment 
sought to eliminate tribal laws governing sound recordings. 
109.  In addition to common law copyright (sometimes called the right of first publication), unfair competition and 
misappropriation are two additional common law claims typically asserted in infringement cases involving pre-1972 
sound recordings.  As this Note specifically deals with ownership, these other common law claims are not explored 
here. 
110.  Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943); Hotevilla just  ch otherson to early anthropological 
encounters between Native Americans and researchers in the early twentieth Nat’l Farmers Union Ins. v. Crow Tribe 
of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 852 (1985) (holding that questions relating to aspects of tribal sovereignty are matters of 
federal common law); see also County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226 (1985). 
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protect these kinds of recordings, likely drawing upon the persuasive authority that already exists 
in state court decisions.111 
The general rule in state courts has been that sound recording rights vest in the performer of a 
recording—not the recordist. 112  Typically, when a record label wants to obtain the rights to an 
artist’s recording, it has to receive those rights via transfer—through either an explicit or implicit 
agreement. The challenge comes when, as with the Boulton Hopi recordings, no agreement exists 
over the future reproduction and publication of a recording and the only copy of a performance 
remains with the recordist. Courts and commentators have disagreed about whether ownership of 
common law copyright in a sound recording follows the holder of the physical master recording, 
absent explicit contractual language between the performer and recordist or other evidence 
indicating intent to assign or retain the copyright.113  In situations where contracts are silent as to 
                                                
111.   1-7 Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law § 7.06[2] (2015) (“Federal courts will apply tribal law to 
adjudicate a dispute when the issue in controversy is one that federal law recognizes as within the purview of tribal 
governance.”)  For example, federal courts have often looked to tribal law in contract, tort, and matters involving 
tribal membership, but have not looked to federal and state law when making choice of law determinations 
involving issues like banking or malpractice.  See Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land and Cattle Co., 554 
U.S. 316, 340 (2008) (finding that a tribal law regulating lender discrimination could not be applied against non 
tribal members, while suggesting similar state and federal banking laws could be); LaFromboise v. Leavitt, 439 F.3d 
792 (8th Cir. 2006) (finding that a medical malpractice suit against a government hospital brought under the Federal 
Tort Claims Act was governed by North Dakota malpractice law rather than the malpractice laws of the Turtle 
Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians, even though the tort occurred on tribal lands).  An extensive search of these 
areas has revealed no existing federal precedents on the application of common law principles to pre-1972 sound 
recordings absent reliance on a particular state’s common law. 
112.  See Forward v. Thorogood, 985 F.2d 604, 605 (1st Cir. 1993) (“The performer of a musical work is the author, 
as it were, of the [recorded] performance.”); Waring v. WDAS Broad. Station, 194 A. 631, 635 (Pa. 1937); R.C.A. 
Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman, 28 F. Supp. 787 (S.D.N.Y. 1939) (copyright vests in performer despite extensive labor on 
the part of the recording engineer); Ettore v. Philco Television Broad. Corp., 229 F.2d 481, 496-97 (3d Cir. 1956) 
(Hastie, J., dissenting); see also Capitol Records, Inc. v. Naxos of Am., Inc., 820 N.E.2d 250, 259 (N.Y. 2005). 
113. . As Robert Clarida has argued, ownership in “pre-1972 sound recordings can thus be established 
much more informally than ownership of a federal copyright, which is independent of the tangible object in which it 
is embodied, [17 U.S.C. § 202], and which cannot be transferred without a signed writing, [17 U.S.C. § 204].”  
Robert Clarida, Who Owns Pre-1972 Sound Recordings?, The Intell. Prop. Strategist (Nov. 13, 2000), 
https://perma.cc/RRT5-Y52L.  See also Bertolino v. Line, 414 F. Supp. 279, 285 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (“Under common 
law [a recording] artist who agrees to sell his work contracts away his common law rights unless he reserves them 
by the terms of the contract.”).  However, the First Circuit has stated that, while courts “did in a number of cases 
infer from an unconditional sale of a manuscript or painting an intent to transfer the copyright . . . even under the 
doctrine this physical transfer merely created a presumption and the ultimate question was one of intent.”  Forward 
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the intention of the author to transfer his or her ownership interest, judges have looked to 
whether or not the performer had the clear opportunity to negotiate for control over the common 
law rights in the recording.114  If the artist passed on the opportunity to reserve his or her rights, 
they are implicitly transferred to the recordist.   
But, where there is no agreement whatsoever between the recordist and the performer, as in 
the Boulton Hopi recordings, courts are hard pressed to say that the performer has passed on the 
opportunity to reserve their rights to a recording.  In circumstances where there is no evidence 
that the parties negotiated over the rights to a sound recording, some courts have found that the 
sound recording remains the common law property of the performer, even if the recordist walked 
off with the physical media.  In Baez v. Fantasy Record, Inc., for example, a folk singer sued a 
record label for copyright infringement when it sought to commercially release a demo tape it 
had recorded for her six years previous.115  The producer of the demo had sold the recording to 
RCA, who began producing records from it.  By the time RCA had started production on the 
album, the folk singer had gained popularity and signed with another label.  The California 
Superior Court concluded that the plaintiff held “common law copyright in her musical 
interpretations, renditions and performances as recorded;” the defendants held “no right, title or 
                                                                                                                                                       
v. Thorogood, 985 F.2d 605 (1st Cir. 1993). 
114 Ingram v. Bowers, a case decided the year before Boulton recorded her first Hopi song (and actually involving 
her first record label), provides one such example.  In that case, the widow of famed Italian singer Enrico Caruso 
sought to establish her late husband’s common law property right in sound recordings he made with the Victor 
Company. Ingram v. Bowers, 57 F.2d 65, 65 (2d Cir. 1932).  The contract Caruso signed with Victor made no 
reference to who would own the common law rights in the initial recording, though it did state that payment would 
be made to Caruso as a royalty.  Judge Learned Hand opined that, because the contract simply required Caruso “to 
make these records,” and made no mention of his future control over them, the Victor Company owned the master 
recordings and the records produced from them. Id. at 65.  Because Caruso had failed to reserve the right to control 
the future uses of the recording when he executed the contract with Victor, he held “no proprietary interest in the 
profits arising out of the records.” Id. 
 
115.  Baez v. Fantasy Records, Inc., No. 543152, 1964 WL 8158, *6 (Cal. Super. Oct. 30, 1964). 
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interest in” the demo tape; and the Court ordered the destruction of all records produced by RCA 
and the transfer of the physical tape to the singer.116 
Are the facts in Baez case distinguishable from the case of the Boulton Hopi recordings?  
Because Boulton made no written agreements with Qötshongva, Bahnaqya, and Monongye, and 
no evidence suggests that the performers had the opportunity to reserve any rights in the 
recordings she made,117 it would appear that the common law default rule—that the sound 
recording copyright remains with the performer—would be applicable to the songs Boulton 
recorded.118  If the doctrine of common-law copyright is determined to be applicable on Hopi 
lands, the holder of the common law right in the recordings could enjoin—and, if an exploitation 
has already occurred, potentially receive damages from—the unauthorized reproduction, 
distribution, public performance,119 or creation of derivative works from the recordings, so long 
as the claim is not barred by laches or some other tribal or equitable defense.120  The holder 
could potentially recover, for example, the profits and royalties from Boulton’s licensing of the 
recordings to Victor and Folkways Records, and recover profits from their use by Alexander 
Street Press.  The holder could also foreseeably bring an action for injunctive relief and unjust 
                                                
116. . Id. at *5. 
117.  See Ingram v. Bowers, 57 F.2d 65 (2d Cir. 1932). 
118.   See Baez v. Fantasy Records, Inc., No. 543152, 1964 WL 8158, *6 (Cal. Super. Oct. 30, 1964); see also 
Waring v. WDAS Broadcasting Station, 194 A. 631, 635 (Pa. 1937), and Capitol Records, Inc. v. Naxos of Am., 
Inc., 830 N.E.2d 250, 259 (N.Y. 2005). 
119   But see Flo & Eddie v. Sirius XM Radio, 70 N.E.3d. 926 (N.Y. 2017) 
120.  David and Melville Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 8C.02 (rev. Ed. 2015). A common law public 
performance right pertaining to sound recordings is a recent innovation, found only in a handful of cases. 
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enrichment against those who derive income (research grants, access fees) by making them 
available to the public.121 
The Problems of Applying Common-Law Copyright to Indigenous Sound Recordings 
Despite its potential to remedy unauthorized uses of the Hotevilla recordings, common 
law copyright may not be a perfect and enduring solution to prevent misappropriation of Hopi 
ceremonial songs.  First, the scope of the exclusive rights in sound recordings is quite thin, only 
preventing the actual duplication of the recordings themselves, not the underlying musical works 
or even sound-alike performances.122  Because some of the most insensitive misappropriations of 
Hopi ceremonial performances have occurred through imitation performances, common-law 
copyright unfortunately provides little protection in the areas of most urgent concern.123 Second, 
common law copyrights in pre-1972 sound recordings last only until they are preempted by the 
Copyright Act, which is slated for 2067, after which such recordings will enter the public domain 
and can be used, without restriction, by anyone for virtually any purpose.124  Third, even if the 
Hopi Tribe were to sue the Boulton’s estate, Smithsonian-Folkways, Columbia University, or 
any other user of the Hopi song recordings for infringement, those potential defendants may 
assert common law defenses or appeal to the First Amendment to enable them to use the material 
                                                
121.  For more on how the Boulton archive was leveraged for grant and institutional funds, see Fox, The Archive of 
the Archive (2017).  Additionally, the notice and takedown provisions of the Copyright Act may be applicable to 
pre-1972 sound recordings.  See Capitol Records v. Vimeo, 826 F.3d 78, 87-93 (2d Cir. 2016) (“We conclude that 
the safe harbor established by § 512(c) protects a qualifying service provider from liability for infringement of 
copyright under state law.”). 
122.  See NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.10(A)(2) (2015).  The copyright in pre-1972 sound recordings is thin 
enough that the Copyright Office has allowed “remixes” of these works to justify a copyright in the new version.  Id. 
at n.41. 
123.  See Angela Riley and Kristen Carpenter, Owning Red: A Theory of Indian Cultural Appropriation 94 Tex. L. 
Rev. 859, 918 (2016) (describing how a Boy Scout Troop who conducted dances mimicking Hopi-Tewa rituals); 
Peter Whiteley, The End of Anthropology (At Hopi) 35 Journal of the Southwest 125 (1993) (describing an ersatz 
performance of the Hopi snake dance by the Smoki fraternal organization). 
124.  17 U.S.C. § 301(c) (2012). 
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without tribal authorization.125  Such arguments may be appealing to courts accustomed to 
adjudicating cases under the Copyright Act, where the stated policy goal is “[t]o promote the 
Progress of Science and the useful Arts” and not necessarily to protect individual or tribal 
ownership interests.126 
Federal Cultural Property Laws and the Protection of the Indigenous Voice 
 In the preceding section, I made the argument that an action for common-law copyright 
infringement could potentially stop Smithsonian Folkways, Columbia University, and the 
Boullton estate from reproducing and distributing the recordings Laura Boulton made with 
Qötshongva, Bahnaqya, Monongye, and other Hopi singers during her 1940s visit.  But that 
argument was based on the shaky premise that common-law copyright—a nearly defunct 
intellectual property framework of the settler-state—applied, and still applies on Hopi lands 
where other protocols for owning and circulating sound had already existed.  The Native 
American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act of 1990 may be a potential alternative for 
federally recognized Indian tribes, like the Hopi Tribe, seeking to reclaim recordings of sacred 
materials or materials vital to the perpetuation of Tribal culture, because it recognizes to some 
degree collective indigenous ownership interests. 
How the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act might apply to 
Recordings 
 The United States Congress has in recent decades recognized the inherent rights of tribes 
to possess and control aspects of tribal culture, and to allow enforcement of those rights through 
                                                
125.  While § 117 of the 1976 Copyright Act established the fair use doctrine in federal law, the doctrine was 
actually developed under state and federal common law, see generally, Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F.Cas. 342 (C.C.D. 
Mass. 1841, and would likely be available as a defense to a common law copyright infringement claim. 
126.   U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see Feist Publ’ns v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991) (“The 




various tribal and federal mechanisms.  Congress has given national recognition to tribes’ and 
tribal members’ ownership interests in sacred objects or objects of cultural patrimony under the 
Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA).127  The Act allows tribes 
and, in certain circumstances, tribal members and their descendants, to demand the 
“expeditious[] return[]” of certain categories of items once “owned or controlled” by them from 
a museum or federal agency which does not hold proper “right of possession.”128  Because the 
statute requires the full, physical return of these objects rather than simply requiring holding 
institutions to provide tribes access to these materials, some archivists and legal scholars have 
argued that NAGPRA could potentially allow tribes to reclaim intellectual property interests in 
certain types of sound recordings in addition to the physical media on which they were originally 
recorded.129 
While there is no indication that Congress meant to include pre-1972 sound recordings in its 
consideration of repatriable objects under NAGPRA, some recordings may reasonably come 
under the Act if they meet the definitions of “sacred objects” or “objects of cultural patrimony.”  
“Sacred objects” are narrowly defined as “specific ceremonial objects which are needed by 
traditional Native American religious leaders for the practice of traditional Native American 
religions by their present day adherents.”130  Objects of “cultural patrimony” are those “having 
ongoing historical, traditional, or cultural importance central to the Native American group or 
                                                
127.   Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA), 25 U.S.C. §§ 3001–3013 (1990). 
128.   25 U.S.C. §§ 3005(a)(5), (c) (2012). 
129.   See interviews with James Nason and Karen Underhill in Trevor Reed, Returning Hopi Voices: Toward a 
Model for Repatriation of the Archived Traditional Voice 30–32 (Feb. 2010) (unpublished M.A. thesis, Teachers 
College, Columbia University) (on file with Teachers College, Columbia University); see also First Archivists 
Circle, Copying and Repatriation of Records to Native American Communities, Protocols for Native American 
Archival Materials (2007), https://perma.cc/6YJB-YKR2. 
130.  25 U.S.C. § 3001(3)(C) (2012). 
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culture itself” and, according to tribal law or custom, “cannot be alienated, appropriated, or 
conveyed by any individual.”131   
When applied to sound recordings, these definitions make enforcement of NAGPRA’s 
provisions strangely arbitrary.  In some cases, a sound recording may be “needed” to perform a 
given traditional ceremony, thus qualifying as a “sacred object.” In others—e.g., where the 
ceremony has been recorded multiple times or has been memorized by tribal members—perhaps 
the recording is not “needed” enough to be a sacred object.132 The words “traditional” and 
“religion” also add to the complexity of applying NAGPRA’s definition of “sacred objects.” Can 
one define the boundary of “traditional” without resorting to antiquated binaries (Latour 1993)? 
And how might one define “religion” for some indigenous communities where there is no 
demarcation between religious practice and everyday reality?  NAGPRA’s definition of “cultural 
patrimony” raises similar concerns.  Certainly some recordings of cultural performances may be 
considered inalienable from a tribe due to their historical, traditional, or cultural importance to 
present-day tribal culture and thus be considered “objects of cultural patrimony.”  Others, 
however—e.g. recordings of songs specific to an individual or songs with only a cursory 
relationship to tribal history, tradition or culture—would not meet the definition.  The use of the 
term “culture” as a bright-line standard is especially troubling, as there is no generally accepted 
definition for the term (Eagleton 2000; Williams 1977).133  Additionally, NAGPRA only applies 
to Native American objects held by federal agencies, museums, and other federally funded 
                                                
131.  25 U.S.C. § 3001(3)(D) (2012). 
132.  But, what about tribes that “need” to have exclusive control over ceremonial recordings to maintain their sense 
of identity and sovereignty?  This question is discussed in the following section. 
133.  See generally, Terry Eagleton, The idea of Culture Oxford, UK: Blackwell; Williams, Raymond (1977) 
Marxism and Literature. New York: Oxford, 11-20. 
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institutions,134 or to objects “which are excavated or discovered on federal or tribal lands after 
November 16, 1990.”135  Tribes could not utilize NAGPRA to reclaim sound recordings from 
privately owned collections. 
Finally, even if NAGPRA could be successfully applied to pre-1972 tape recordings, wax 
cylinders, and other media containing sacred ceremonies or culturally significant performances, 
it is not yet clear whether the statute is a feasible means through which tribes may reclaim 
American intellectual property or tribally generated access or circulation rights pertaining to 
these objects.136  On one hand, the focus of the statute is explicitly on objects pertaining to 
religion or patrimony, posing questions of statutory construction that may weigh against tribes’ 
ability to reclaim anything more than the master recordings themselves.  Even if a tribe could 
successfully secure the return of the physical recording, nothing in NAGPRA directly suggests 
that tribes would be able to assert control over the duplication, creation of derivative works, 
performance, or distribution and display of existing and future copies of that a particular media 
recording.  Further, tribes may not actually need exclusive control over all copies of sound 
recordings to fulfill NAGPRA’s implied goals—to perpetuate tribal culture or to practice tribal 
religions.137  On the other hand, it is clear that Congress’ purpose in passing NAGPRA was to 
remedy prior instances of trespass, conversion, and misappropriation, which stripped tribes of 
                                                
134.  25 U.S.C. § 3001 (2012).  “Museums” is broadly defined to include all federally funded institutions including 
museums, archives, colleges and universities, and even State or local governments.  The Smithsonian Institution is 
exempt from NAGPRA’s provisions, although the National Museum of the American Indian Act, as amended, 
regulates repatriation activities involving its collections.  See 20 U.S.C. § 80q-9a(b) (2012). 
135.  25 U.S.C. § 3002 (2012). 
136.  See First Archivists Circle, supra note 24. 
137.  This argument, however, sidesteps the ontological considerations at stake in tribes’ claims to intellectual 
property ownership, which will be discussed more in Chapter 4. 
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control over their ancestors’ remains, their culture, and their religious practices.138  It would 
seem counter to such a policy to require federally funded institutions to return physical objects, 
like ceremonial altars or audio tapes of Native American voices, but then allow these institutions 
to continue to duplicate and sell copies, publicly display replicas of such items, or give public 
demonstrations of them without the consent of and consultation with the respective tribes or the 
original creators’ descendants. 
How NAGPRA Could Affect Ownership of the Boulton Hopi Recordings 
As with the application of copyright law to the Boulton Hopi recordings, the application of 
NAGPRA falls within a legal grey area.  Laura Boulton’s collection is currently held by 
Columbia University, an institution that regularly receives federal funds, fulfilling one element 
of the statute.  And, the Hopi Tribe is a federally recognized Indian tribe, which can claim 
“sacred objects” and “objects of cultural patrimony,” fulfilling another.  Further, because there 
was no contract between Boulton and the Tribe, there is no indication that Smithsonian, 
Columbia, or the Boulton Estate could claim a valid “right of possession” from the original 
cultural authorities who could alienate these recordings from the Hopi villages.139   
It seems likely that some of Boulton’s Hopi recordings could be eligible for repatriation as 
“sacred objects”: Hopi ceremonial leaders have indicated that a number of the recordings in the 
Laura Boulton collection are the only source of information about certain parts of sacred 
ceremonies—the recordings “fill in the gaps” where key liturgical knowledge has been 
                                                
138.  See 101 Cong. Rec. H10985–91 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 1990) (statements of Reps. Campbell and Collins). 
139.  25 U.S.C. § 3005(c) (2012).  The standard of proof required to show a right of possession is whether “standing 
alone before the introduction of evidence to the contrary,” the Tribe’s evidence “would support a finding that the 
[f]ederal agency or museum [including federally funded institutions] did not have the right of possession[.]”  Id.  
Laura Boulton no doubt held an exclusive chattel property right in the blank acetate disks that she brought with her 
to Hotevilla in August 1940.  But, as both common law and Hopi statutory law (as will be discussed later) recognize 
that once a recordist allows recording media to be transformed by the imprint of a (ceremonial) performer’s voice, 
an additional property right is created which implies a right to control the physical media. 
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forgotten140 and are needed by ceremonial practitioners.141  However, many of the recordings are 
of non-ceremonial performances or are interchangeable with existing Hopi ceremonial songs, 
and might not be necessary for the performance of Hopi religion.142  And, even if a particular 
recording were necessary to perform a ritual, it is not clear that—in the eyes of a Federal District 
Court judge (the one authorized to make such decisions about ownership under the statute)—the 
Tribe would need to have exclusive control over the recording (or even the exclusive right to 
exploit it) in order to make the ritual efficacious.143   
Alternatively, many of the Hotevilla recordings might be reclaimed under NAGPRA as 
“objects of cultural patrimony” as they are collectively owned works containing historical and 
cultural information about Hopi ways of life that are vital to the community’s perpetuation.  For 
example, some of these recordings contain performances detailing historical figures and events, 
ceremonial sites, resource conservation and distribution methods, agricultural knowledge, 
meteorological practices and others.144  However, other sound recordings are more artistic in 
nature, evoking landscapes or describing the composers’ experiences, or simply expressing 
melodic phrases and vocables, which might not be considered “cultural patrimony” under 
NAGPRA’s definition.145  Even if the recordings could be considered “cultural patrimony” and 
                                                
140. . Returning Hopi Song—A Hopi Perspective, HOPI MUSIC REPATRIATION PROJECT (Feb. 5, 
2011), https://perma.cc/722Z-835Z. 
141.  See, e.g., Leewayne Lomayestewa, Returning Hopi Songs—A Hopi Perspecdtive. Hopi Music Project Podcast. 
(Feb. 5, 2011), available at https://hopimusic.files.wordpress.com/2011/02/03-podcast_leewayne-final.mp3. 
142.  Reed, supra note 76. 
143.  The counterargument here is that the Hopi Tribe may need to exercise complete control over ceremonial 
recordings to effectively prevent inappropriate or unauthorized uses of ceremonies outside of established protocols, 
which is believed to be causing harm to the Hopi social structure and knowledge economy.  See Richland, Talking 
Tradition, infra note 97. 
144.   Id. 
145.   On the other hand, even songs made from vocables or “nonsense syllables” may convey cultural meaning in 
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otherwise eligible for repatriation, it may be difficult for the Tribe to argue that it needs 
exclusive control over the recordings (not to mention the intellectual property rights), rather than 
just receiving copies of or access to the recordings, in order to maintain cultural continuity.146  
Further, as a practical matter, establishing proof of religious necessity or status as cultural 
patrimony would be quite difficult in the Hopi context because it would no doubt require 
furnishing evidence that would be either extremely invasive or inappropriate to disclose to the 
uninitiated.147 
Applying Tribal Law to Non-Member Recordists and Holding Institutions 
 In addition to potentially relying on NAGPRA’s protections for indigenous sacred objects 
and objects of cultural patrimony, a tribe may also be able to rely on its own laws to reclaim 
these items against those who misappropriate them.  While I have not yet found a case where 
tribal laws governing sound recordings have been used to remedy unauthorized uses of them, this 
kind of action may be possible given the developments in case law presented by Chilkat Indian 
Village v. Johnson. 
Chilkat v. Johnson and Tribal Cultural Property Laws  
 In Chilkat, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit examined whether a a 
tribe’s cultural property law forbidding the  removal of “traditional Indian artifacts, clan crests, 
                                                                                                                                                       
Native American contexts.  As Charlotte Frisbee has argued in her landmark study of vocables in Navajo ritual 
songs, “If one considers all the possibilities identified thus far when studying Navajo vocables, the end result can 
only be a confirmation . . . . that there are no meaningless syllables in Navajo ceremonial music.”  Charlotte Frisbee, 
Vocables in Navajo Ceremonial Music, 24 ETHNOMUSICOLOGY 347, 372 (1980).  Vocables in Hopi songs, for 
example, are known to provide listeners with a sense of culturally-specific places or demonstrate attributes of 
characters in traditional stories.  See Kathleen Sands & Emory Sekaquaptewa, Four Hopi Lullabies: A Study in 
Method and Meaning, 4 AM. INDIAN Q. 195, 196 (1978). 
146.  The counterargument is that Hopi culture cannot perpetuate itself along established social structures and 
maintain established protocols if the exclusive right to reproduce, distribute, publicly perform, stream, or license the 
recordings to others is held by an institution that is not subject to tribal laws. 
147.  See Justin B. Richland, “What Are You Going to Do with the Village’s Knowledge?” Talking Tradition, 
Talking Law in Hopi Tribal Court, 39 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 235, 264-65 (2005). 
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or other Indian art work . . . without the prior notification of and approval by, the Chilkat Indian 
Village Council”148 could be enforced against someone who was not a tribal member.  The case 
involved the taking of four carved wooden posts and a screen covered with a Tlingit village’s 
traditional designs by a Native Art dealer, who had allegedly purchased them from a Village 
member without the tribe’s consent.149  The Ninth Circuit in Chilkat held that the Village’s claim 
demanding the return of the tribally recognized cultural properties was potentially enforceable in 
federal court.150  Addressing the case as a mixed question of tribal and federal law,151 the court 
held first that, “[w]hatever proprietary interest the Village has in the artifacts is a creature of 
tribal law or tradition wholly unconnected with federal law.  No construction of federal law is 
necessary to adjudicate title.”152 This means that tribes can effectively determine ownership in 
cultural properties through their own legal systems, and not through federal law. It then 
explained that “the heart of the controversy over the claim will be the Village’s power, under 
federal law, to . . . apply [its cultural property law] to non-Indians.”153  Applying tribal laws to 
non-members had become much more difficult to do after the Supreme Court’s decisions in 
Montana v. United States in 1981, which established the rule that the inherent sovereignty of a 
Tribe only extends to non-members of the tribe in narrow sets of circumstances (such as when 
the non-member’s actions threaten or have some direct effect on the economic security, health or 
                                                
148.  Chilkat Indian Village, Alaska, Ordinance of May 12, 1976. 
149.  See Christopher S. Byrne, Chikat Indian Tribe v. Johnson and NAGPRA: Have We Finally Recognized 
Communal Property Rights in Cultural Objects? 8 J. Envtl. L. & Litig. 109, 114 (1993). 
150.  Chilkat Indian Vill. v. Johnson, 870 F.2d 1469 (9th Cir. 1989). 
151.  Chilkat Indian Vill. v. Johnson, 870 F.2d 1469 (9th Cir. 1989). 
152.  Id. at 1474 .(emphasis added). 
153.  Id. (emphasis added). 
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welfare of the tribe or when the non-member enters into an agreement with the tribe touching on 
the law implicated).154 
The Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the United States District Court for the District of 
Alaska to determine whether the tribe had “sufficient attributes of sovereignty” to impose its 
laws on a non-tribal-member and to adjudicate the case. On remand, the District Court held that 
“it would appear that under its constitutional power, Chilkat Indian Village had the power to 
prevent the sale or disposition of any assets of the Village without the consent of the Council,”155 
and that it could enforce the provision against Johnson, a non-member of the Tribe, owing to the  
potential of his behavior to impact the welfare of the tribe, thus falling within the scope of 
Montana.  Following the Tribal Court’s determination that Johnson had violated tribal law and 
its order for Johnson to return the objects,156 Johnson agreed to a settlement that included the 
return the artifacts to the Tribe.  
Application of Chilkat to the Boulton Hopi Recordings 
The Hopi Tribe might also secure and enforce its interests in the Boulton Hopi recordings by 
seeking to enforce its own laws governing ceremonial recordings against the Boulton estate, 
Smithsonian Folkways and Columbia University.  As in Chilkat, where the Ninth Circuit found 
                                                
154.  The Supreme Court actually articulated the limits to tribal civil jurisdiction over nonmembers in two major 
cases: Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982), and Montana v. United States, 540 U.S. 544 (1981), 
but only Montana has received considerable elaboration by the Court.  Under Merrion, nonmembers can become 
subject to tribal regulations governing a tribe’s property and resources when they conduct economic activity on 
tribal trust lands.  455 U.S. at 137, 144-45.  Under Montana, a tribe can also regulate the activities of nonmembers 
on tribal lands held in fee when they (1) enter into contractual relationships with the tribe or its members in such a 
way that the activity has a nexus with tribal interests, or (2) when nonmember activities on an Indian reservation 
“threaten or ha[ve] some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the 
tribe.”  540 U.S. at 566. 
155. Chikat Indian Village, IRA v. Johnson, et al., No. 90-01, 20 ILR 6127, 6128 (Chilkat Tr. Ct., Nov. 3, 
1993) (quoting Chilkat Indian Village v. Johnson, No. J84-024-CIV at 13-14 (D. Alaska Oct. 9, 1990). 
156.  Id. at 6142. 
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the Village’s ownership of cultural property to be “a creature of tribal law or tradition,”157 the 
Hopi Tribe, as will be discussed in the next chapter, has similarly passed its own laws 
establishing ownership over audio recordings depicting Hopi esoteric and ritual knowledge.  But 
enforcing its laws on non-members, like Boulton’s Estate, Columbia University, or Smithsonian-
Folkways, may be increasingly difficult.  Recent U.S. Supreme Court cases has been unclear 
about the conditions necessary for a tribe to assert its legislative and adjudicatory jurisdiction 
over non-members.  In two initial cases in 1982 and 1983, the Court held that when a non-
member’s conduct occurs on a tribe’s trust lands—lands on which a tribe has the power to 
control entry and exit—tribal laws implicated by that conduct may be enforceable on the non-
member simply because the non-member entered the land.158  But, the Supreme Court has slowly 
walked back from these decisions, finding that in some contexts, a tribe may be required to meet 
the Montana test to enforce its laws on non-members even if it controls the territory where the 
action occurred under its own sovereignty.159  In other words, before the Hopi Tribe can enforce 
its laws on Boulton’s estate and others, it may need to show that the unauthorized use of the 
Hotevilla recordings (or the unauthorized use of recordings in general) directly affects the 
economic security, the health or welfare of the tribe.  This may seem like a tough sell.  Unlike in 
Chilkat where the law being violated by the art dealer meant that the tribe would be completely 
deprived of these important physical objects, the Hopi Tribe would have to show some form of 
                                                
157.  See Chilkat Indian Vill. v. Johnson, 870 F.2d 1469, 1473 (9th Cir. 1989). 
158.  See New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 333 (1983) (recognizing the power of tribes to 
exclude people from tribal lands, and thus the power to condition entry on compliance with regulations); Merrion v. 
Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 144-45 (1982) (recognizing the inherent power of tribes to tax non-members 
on tribal trust lands as  “part of its power to govern and to pay for the costs of self-government” and that “[a] 
nonmember who enters the jurisdiction of the tribe remains subject to the risk that the tribe will later exercise its 
sovereign power.”) 
159 See, e.g., Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 360 (2001) (“The ownership status of land, in other words, is only one 
factor to consider in determining whether regulation of the activities of non-members is ‘necessary to protect tribal 
self-government or to control internal relations.’”). 
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harm or economic/political impact from the reproduction, publication, or sale of these recordings 
by others—something that may be challenging to prove without evidence of lost sales or profits, 
physical or emotional harm, or some other established basis for a judicial remedy.160   
Conclusion 
Who owns the voices of Qötshongva, Bahnaqya and Monongye?  The answer remains 
uncertain, even with the variety of legal pathways provided under settler law for indigenous 
peoples to reclaim control over such materials.  First, while copyright may provide an author 
protection against unauthorized reproduction, publication, sale, and the creation of derivative 
works, it remains unclear whether copyright actually applies to works created on tribal lands.  
Second, while the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act allows tribes to 
reclaim ownership of “sacred objects” and “objects of cultural patrimony,” those protections 
appear arbitrary in the context of sound recordings, protecting only the expressions of indigenous 
“religions” and those communally owned artifacts that appear to establish a tribe’s “essence.” 
And finally, even where tribes have existing laws governing the circulation of recorded voices, 
settler law has made it difficult or impossible to enforce those laws absent establishing 
conditions of harm or negative economic or political impact on the tribe.  
If settler law demands evidence of harm or direct impact on indigenous economies or political 
stability, where might we find such evidence in the context of recorded indigenous voices?  In 
                                                
160 .  There have been few recent cases where judges have held that the actions of non-tribal-members on tribal 
lands rose to the level of harm sufficient to allow the tribe to enforce its laws on the non-member. Dolgencorp, Inc. 
v. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians, 746 F.3d 167 (5th Cir. 2014), aff’d by an equally divided court, Dollar 
Gen. Corp. v. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians, 136 S. Ct. 2159 (2016) (holding that the tribe had jurisdiction 
over a non-member corporation where a tribal member was allegedly molested by an employee of the corporation); 
Attorney’s Process & Investigation Serv. V. Sac & Fox Tribe, 609 F.3d 927 (8th Cir. 2010) (holding that a tribe had 
jurisdiction over a non-member contractor who stormed and raided the tribe’s government offices); Elliott v. White 
Mountain Apache Tribal court, 566 F. 3d 842, 850 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that a tribal court had jurisdiction in a 
case to enforce its regulations on a nonmember who allegedly trespassed on tribal lands and set fire to millions of 
acres of forest notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s determination in Hicks, because the tribe could both control 




the next chapter, I examine the impact of unauthorized uses of recorded Hopi voices.  As part of 
this exploration, I examine the harms that may arise from selling and publishing these voices 




Chapter 4:  
Indigenous Voices as Embodied Memory 
 
Introduction 
 Nearing the end of one of my first fieldwork experiences out home, I was able to locate 
two of the descendants of one of the performers on the recordings Laura Boulton made of Hopi 
performers at the A Century of Progress Exposition in 1933.  I traveled to one of their homes in 
Tuba City, Arizona to learn more about the performer and the songs he sang on the recordings, 
and to find out how his descendants thought the recordings might be used going forward.161   As 
I played the tracks, the men immediately recognized the voice as that of their grandfather and 
great uncle, respectively, and confirmed that the song was one he regularly performed.  One of 
the men pulled out a leather suit with fringe from an old trunk, and showed me pictures of the 
performer wearing a war bonnet.  As they explained, he was a traveling musician at the turn of 
the Twentieth Century, sailing to remote parts of the world to perform his songs and the songs of 
other tribes.  
After listening to five or six songs, most of them social dance and katsina songs, the 
conversation went in a direction I hadn’t anticipated.  I had been asking the men if it would be 
appropriate to use these songs for educational purposes to help people learn about Hopi culture.  
Knowing that my family came from his same village, and sensing my own limited knowledge of 
Hopi culture, one of the men responded,  
If you come out [here], you’ll get to recognize which katsinas are that 
these songs belong to . . . You just have to spend a lot of time out here.  
You need to do that because it’s your culture.  That’s what we tell you 
                                                
161 This is an expanded and re-transcribed account of my initial interview described in Trevor Reed, Reclaiming 
Hopi Voices: Toward a Model for Community-Partnered Repatriation of Archived Traditional Music. MA Thesis 
(Teachers College, Columbia University 2010).  
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guys all the time: “Come out.” Because you’re the ones that will carry it 
along.  We’re just going to teach you guys and show you guys and 
everything else.  If you lose it, what are you guys going to do?  You can’t 
do anything because its lost.  That’s why I’m telling you, come out here 
once and a while, and do things out there.” 
 
I told him that I had begun to listen to the songs while I traveled to and from the 
University on the New York City subway, and I was really starting to enjoy the songs.  I 
somewhat tentatively agreed that I would start coming out home more often, but he clearly 
sensed the conflict I was having between living a pahaana or settler lifestyle and a Hopi one.   
I want you guys to come home and learn your tradition.  You’ve recorded 
this thing, you’ve listened.  Now I want you to understand, what is that 
song telling you? . . .  [As you listen] you’ll have a broad picture. You can 
probably even see—when they are singing you probably can see yourself 
walking among the plants, singing.  Because with our tradition, you go 
over there and you talk to them and you sing among the plants and that’s 
what they grow with. They know. I do that, and I still do that . . . It’s like 
that throughout the whole images. Everything is tied into it. . . . Listen to it 
good, and try to sing along with it.  You’d be surprised, one of these days 
you’ll pick it up. It’ll come to you.  If you play this over and over, it will 
get into your head.  Your feet will just go right along with it, when it has 
that pause.  That’s what I would do.  
 
In this chapter, I want to explore the way Hopi taatawi are circulated and preserved within 
bodies and collectives, and the harms that arise when they become disembodied, abstracted, 
severed from their relations, or transformed in to objects of property. As this performer’s 
descendants expressed, taatawi reside not in disks, tape, or CDs but in people who are present on 
Hopi lands.  Taatawi are remembered and transferred through collective performances that 
follow established protocols deeply tied to village, clan, ceremonial and gendered modes of 
relation.  These relations ensure that members of each community are cared for, both spiritually 
and physically, which includes preservation of ancestral voices and the production of new, 
generative taatawi.  The preservation of taatawi in collectively embodied memory preserves not 
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only the formal elements of a song—lavayi (speech) and melody (tawvö)—it also seems to 
preserve the networks of actors that animate each song.   
In contrast, when taatawi are preserved in disembodied forms and circulated outside of 
existing protocols, there is significant potential for harm to individuals, to the Hopi creative 
economy, and ultimately to Hopi sovereignty.  As I hope to show in the sections that follow, 
some taatawi are harmful by nature if used improperly, and converting them into recorded media 
may put those who have not been appropriately prepared through practices of initiation or wiimi 
in danger as they come into contact with them.  Second, converting taatawi into forms of 
property may sever Hopi relations to our voices and those of our ancestors, replacing them with 
forms of relations derived from Enlightenment thinking, which may be detrimental to the way 
Hopi creativity has historically functioned.   Finally, preserving disembodied indigenous voices 
within the archival apparatus of the settler state, while potentially making them available for 
future generations of indigenous people, may also subject these voices to “anonymous care” and 
servitude to support the settler state, further eroding indigenous sovereignty.  These harms 
provide the backdrop for three proposals I explore in Chapter 6 for indigenizing intellectual 
property going forward. 
 
 Circulating Taatawi 
Over the course of my work to return our ancestors voices back to the Hopi people, I 
have come to the conclusion that taatawi are meant to circulate within relationships. This is 
because taatawi are not simply aesthetic objects, which have the same function as objects of a 
similar form (e.g., music, literature, dance, etc.).  Rather, as discussed in Chapter 2, each tawi 
contains embodied connections between individuals, families, clans, land, and territory.   
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As I described in Chapter 1, when a yeewa composes a song, he or she does so by 
cultivating a close, sonic relationship with the plants in his or her field—plants whose own 
genetic material has traveled a parallel lineage to the yeewa or his or her children.162  The yeewa 
and the plants collaboratively make aesthetic choices that produce each tawi. Then, when a song 
is nearing completion, the yeewa often shares the song with a close member of his or her family, 
a father figure by clan (“dad”), or a ceremonial mentor (“godfather”), any of whom may offer 
guidance or suggest changes.  The next people to hear and refine the song are other men in the 
kiva, who typically include people from one’s own clan, a closely related clan, or other neighbors 
who affiliate with the kiva and share responsibilities for its maintenance and the ceremonies that 
happen there (see Parsons 1939:9-10).  In the weeks prior to ceremonial performances, these men 
will rehearse the songs, working them into the memories of everyone present.  In the case of 
social dances, ceremonial dancers will then rehearse with the singers, working the words, the 
melodic content, the form, and other aspects of the song into their bodies and kinesthetic 
memory.  When the ceremony is carried out for the members of the village, songs are often 
performed in repetition, so that members of the village who are present can listen and work the 
songs into their memory.  Throughout their creation and circulation, taatawi always seem to exist 
within bodies—bodies connected through closely held networks of responsibility and obligation.   
Based on my experiences out home, it seems that the working of songs and sound into 
interconnected bodies accomplishes two important things: first, collective embodiment of 
                                                
162. There are a number of ways a Hopi farmer receives seeds, but when most people I talked to discussed how 
people get seeds for planting they would describe it in one of two ways.  First, prior to marriage, the farmer may 
receive seeds from his or her mother or maternal relatives who own the tangible material of the clan.  The farmer 
may also plant fields for his or her paternal relations, especially those who provided the farmer with a name.  After 
marriage, the husband may receive seeds from his wife and her relations who own fields. At the end of the harvest, 
the corn or other natwani is given back to the mother or the wife, and carefully stored for the next year’s planting. 
There are also times when seeds are shared (for example, seed runs where ritual runners are given a handful of seeds 
in repayment for their labor), but in general the seeds a yeewa plants will often have traveled a similar genealogical 
path as his or her own.  In fact, many farmers refer to their plants as children. 
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taatawi preserves them over time along with their connections to the networks which animate 
them.  Second, embodied circulation of taatawi prevents the songs from becoming static sonic 
objects. This is because embodied circulation requires the presence of those who know the songs 
each time they are performed or shared with another person.  Presence is a vital part of the 
circulation of taatawi and other forms of Hopi knowledge. 
Embodied Circulation as Preservation 
Anthony Seeger, in his 1996 article on the ethics of sound archives in a decolonizing 
world, points out the relative frailty of recorded sound.  Individual humans can remember sound 
(at best) only about 90 years, while the prognosis for most other modes of preserving sound is 
much worse.  Physical recording media, on average, has a shelf-life of about15 years.  Even the 
most stable media—magnetic tape—has a life expectancy of only about 50 years.  One can 
increase the lifespan of sound by notating it onto more permanent media, but the reproduction of 
sound from notation also requires someone or something that can make the appropriate 
transformations from the recording context into what is likely a substantially different 
performance and listening environment.  Experience with digital media, for example, has shown 
that it requires conversion into newer formats at short, regular intervals, as compression 
technologies, bandwidth, and social expectations around the quality of sound change.163  
Technologies that reproduce sound, or that transform notation into sound are also limited in that 
they do not necessarily produce the networks from which the sounds originated.   
The embodiment of song, not only by individuals, but by entire networks, has allowed 
Hopi taatawi to be preserved for long periods of time and with many of these songs’ networks of 
relations still intact.  This became clear to me one summer while I sat eating a bowl of my 
                                                
163. See JONATHAN STERNE, MP3:THE MEANING OF A FORMAT (2012) 
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favorite Hopi food—nöqwivi—in our clan’s house on the Hotevilla village plaza. From our 
dining room table, I regularly hear taatawi being sung just outside our door as a tiikive takes 
place in the village plaza.  On some nights, I can also hear the voices of the singers in the three 
kivas that are out our front door.  During a povoltiikive (butterfly dance), I recall being 
completely taken aback as the singers entered the plaza. To my surprise, I heard the sounds I had 
so often heard while in New York listening to the voices of David Monongye, Thomas Bahnaqya 
and Dan Qötshongva on one of the recordings they made with Laura Boulton in 1940.  But this 
time I was hearing their taatawi in fully fleshed-out form: 
Buenos Tardas [sic] Amigo 
Buenos Tardas [sic] Amoqüe,  
Yan [haqam?] Kastiilam inumi lavaytiq’e, oovi pas nu halayi. 
  
Good Afternoon, My Friend [in Spanish]  
Good Afternoon, Hopi person [in Spanish]  
This is how the Spanish speak to me, because I’m so happy.  
 
There are a number of remarkable things about this song, but the one I want to emphasize 
here has to do with the length and scope of its preservation.  Beyond the three copies of this song 
held by Columbia University, Indiana University, and the Library of Congress, to my 
knowledge, the only other source for this song is the memories of Hotevilla village members, 
who, having performed it last in the 1940s, have remembered it until it was again performed in 
the plaza in 2010.  While I wasn’t able to record the most recent rendition by the butterfly 
dancers in the plaza, my recollection of the version of the song sung in the plaza was that it was 
practically identical to what Monongy, Bahnaqya and Qötshongva sang for Boulton 70 years 
earlier.  Perhaps even more impressive is that, as one elder told me, the song actually contained 
words appropriated from the Spanish missionaries, dating back to when they occupied Hopi 
lands from 1628 - 1680.  
	121 
 
Admittedly, the sound recording does little justice to this tawi. In Boulton’s rendering of 
the song, we are limited to a brief clip.  We hear the singers performing the kuyngwa 
(introduction with stylized tag), the atkyaqw (“lower” part), and to oomi (“upward” part), and 
some occasional shouts from others imitating typical sounds from the plaza.  But, we get only a 
truncated, four-minute version of what would likely be a 10-15 minute song. We get a general 
feel for the contour of the song, but we miss the texture and thickness of 30-40 voices singing in 
harmony (suukye).  We hear the drum faintly in the background of Boulton’s recordings but miss 
its pitch and massive presence in the plaza and in the kiva.  We miss the sounds of the 
instruments the dancers wear on their bodies, and the noise of the audience.  We can’t see the 
bodies of the dancers as they carefully time their movements just behind the pulsing drum—and 
its sudden pauses. We miss the hot, dry wind with the occasional shade of clouds as they pass 
over head; we miss the smell of nöqwivi cooking on the stove.  We miss the fact that, though 
there are male voices on the recording, this dance typically involves teenage couples, one male 
and one female, dancing together.  We miss the intricately cut and painted kopatsotskit (tablita 
headdress) the women wear, which were given by each male dancer to his female companion; we 
miss the payback the dancer makes via his family to his partner’s family over the course of the 
dance, as baskets of food weave in and out of the line of dancers in the plaza.  As I was often 
told, remembering taatawi involves not only remembering words and melody; it often means 
remembering the movements of bodies in time and space, the relationships that are animated in 
its performance, the histories embedded in the lavayi, and the places —things that always seem 
to disappear from a sound recording over time.  It is not surprising, then, that the ability to 
remember taatawi is highly valued in Hopi society.   
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I fully admit that the picture I paint of embodied memory is the ideal rather than 
everyone’s reality.  I myself struggle to learn and remember taatawi, because I didn’t grow up 
with hopilavayi as my primary language, and because I am not always present at Hopi.  I rely on 
recordings to help me recall events and songs, as do many others.  One night I was invited to go 
into the kiva for a rehearsal, and I took out my sound recorder inconspicuously, hoping not to 
bring attention to the fact that I was recording the songs.  (A friend of mine had told me it was 
okay because we were only rehearsing social dance songs, but I was still nervous.)  Much to my 
surprise, as I looked around at the other 20-30 men, there was a sea of small LED lights.  I 
wasn’t the only one recording. In fact, as I came to realize, many Hopi men make recordings of 
rehearsals and then play these back in the evenings or in the car on their way to work as a way to 
keep these songs present in their mind during the day as they attempt to memorize them.  These 
recordings also allow others to experience the songs out of time, usually privately, in ways they 
might not be able to unless they lived in the village and could hear the singers rehearse night 
after night. Since 2000, KUYI Hopi Radio has also become a repository for taatawi, making 
space for people to record the songs they remember, and then regularly broadcasting those songs, 
when appropriate, over the airwaves.  As Stewart Koyiymptewa has pointed out, memory in 
Hopi society seems to be changing (Colwell & Koyiymptewa 2011:68).  It seems like memory is 
gradually becoming externalized from the body.  This may be one reason why elders like the 
performer’s grandson from the beginning of this chapter express anxiety over the displacement 
of taatawi, lavayi, and ritual performances from the body and of the social shift from embodied 
networks to disembodied forms. 
The Importance of Presence 
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The second benefit to the embodied circulation of taatawi is that, because songs are 
preserved in people, Hopi songs need not be conceptualized as discrete objects attached to a 
single moment in time and space or to a single authorial point of view.  Rather, in the 
collaborative process of creating taatawi, each tawi eventually comes to resonate with multiple 
points of view as the lavayi and tawvö are reworked by those who remember and perform them.  
During one rehearsal prior to a butterfly dance in the Summer of 2012, I had the chance to see 
this kind of collaborative authorship at work.  In the dim light in the center of the kiva, the 
drummer and the sponsor of the dance—two older men—were quietly singing from their own 
memory, accompanied by the soft, yet penetrating kiva drum.  Every once and a while, the 
drummer would stop while the men worked out the melodic contour of the song collectively, 
each listening carefully for one another until the right sound emerged.  There was no need to go 
back to an objective source for reference, the song existed as a combination of the kiva members 
memories and voices.  What was necessary was consensus at a particular moment in time—
collective understanding that the meanings produced by the song would resonate with those for 
whom the songs would be sung. 
As I mentioned, singers have begun to rely on sound recording to aid their memory. As 
economic demands continue to drive people’s daily routines, may Hopi people are forced to live 
away from Hopi lands and must commute back home to the Hopi reservation on the weekends to 
participate in rehearsals and to take care of their obligations to others and to the land.  For those 
who must make the 92 mile trip from Flagstaff, or the 250 mile trip from Phoenix, recordings 
made during a rehearsal can give participants a feeling of presence at a particular time or within 
a place during the long hours of travel back and forth from the reservation to the city or during 
the work day.  
	124 
 
The move away from embodied presence isn’t always comfortable, though.  For example, 
I remember seeing the men of a kiva get a bit frustrated when one of the composers failed to 
show up to the rehearsal to share his taatawi with the group.  In lieu of his presence, he had sent 
a recording of his songs to them.  The drummer and the sponsor of the dance were trying to 
match their voices to the recording, but it was clear that something was being lost in the process.  
The dynamic process of refining the song, repetition after repetition, night after night; the slight 
change in words, teaching about the meaning of the tawi by those holding navoti; these seemed 
to be missing.  I recall hearing someone suggest not using the song if the composer wasn’t able 
to attend. 
Taatawi circulate through bodies and relations, and in doing so allow for the preservation 
not only of words and melodies, but of connections to people and to territories.  Circulating 
taatawi requires presence.  While recorded taatawi can help one feel present when they are 
distant from Hopi land and relations, recordings of indigenous voices cannot fully substitute for 
the presence of indigenous peoples and our modes of relation.  
The Toxicity of Colonized Memory 
 While Hopis have begun regularly recording their own taatawi only in the last few 
decades, the systematic documentation of Hopi culture by European settlers has been going on 
almost since the beginning of audio recording.  These settlers generated a massive amount of 
collected specimens, documents, photographs, field recordings, and scholarly writings that 
occupy significant amounts of space on museums’, libraries’ and archives’ shelves around the 
world.164  As discussed in Chapter 3, in the mid-1990s, after the passage of the Native American 
                                                
164. In 1977, David laird produced a 3,500-entry bibliography of scholarly writings on Hopi alone.  The number of 
Hopi ritual artifacts, human remains, photographs, and other cultural items is impossible to calculate given that they 
exist in both public and private collections around the world. Hopi sound recording collections are numerous, 
including scholarly recordings made by Jesse Walter Fewkes, Natalie Curtis Burlin, Samuel Barrett, Helen Roberts, 
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Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA), the Hopi Tribe developed a strategy to 
reclaim these materials from the institutions that continued to hold them without the Tribe’s 
permission. It began by passing its own laws demanding the return of Hopi remains, artifacts and 
recordings of “esoteric knowledge,” deeming them to be the “cultural property of the Hopi 
people.”165  (Brown 2003:14; Leigh Kuwanwisiwma, interview with the author, 2009).  As 
several government workers explained to me, soon thereafter, much to their surprise, package 
after package arrived at the Tribal Office complex filling their cubicles to overflowing with items 
ranging from human remains to photographs to compact discs.   
 On one occasion, the Tribe received some particularly important ritual objects that 
ceremonial leaders from one of the Hopi villages were eager to use in an upcoming dance.  It 
seemed like the Tribe was finally receiving the restitution it deserved after centuries of taking; 
that holding institutions were now providing opportunities to revitalize aspects of Hopi culture 
that had been absent for many years, rather than being complicit in extinguishing it. But soon 
after the ceremonial performers began using the repatriated items, they became sick, with rashes 
and sores appearing where the items had come in contact with their bodies.  Medical 
professionals soon discovered, much to everyone’s horror, that the items had been preserved 
with arsenic.166  Arsenic, while effectively preserving the life of the ritual items as museum 
objects, had poisoned the very people for whom the objects had been created.   
                                                                                                                                                       
Earnest and Pearl Beaglehole, Willard Rhodes, Robert Black, George List, and Robert Rhodes. Recordings made by 
tourists, missionaries, and Hopis or other indigenous peoples are also numerous. 
 
165. Hopi Tribe Resolution H-70-94 (1994). 
166. Arsenic was apparently a common substance used in preserving specimens gathered during expeditions, 
particularly those processed into “natural history” collections. See Lisa Goldberg, A History of Pest Control 
Measures in the Anthropology Collections, National Museum of Natural History, Smithsonian Institution. 35 J. Am. 
Institute for Conservation 23, 29-30 (1996). Some objects in the Smithsonian collection are actually labeled 
“Poisoned” and provide a date. 
	126 
 
 Why tell a story about toxic artifacts in a discussion about recorded ceremonial songs? At 
first glance, the risks of reusing preserved ritual artifacts seem completely distinct from problems 
associated with recorded sound. One might argue that sound is merely air vibrations which can’t 
poison anyone, or that using a sound recording for one purpose can’t affect the experience of it 
for another person. And yet, as I will argue here, there may be real harms involved in uncritically 
recirculating and reincorporating preserved indigenous voices into a community’s social fabric.  
As hybrids of settler modes of preservation and indigenous generative power, recorded 
indigenous voices, in some contexts, may take on a heightened degree of toxicity.  
 As Mel Chen (2011) explains, toxicity operates as both a powerful metaphor and as a 
physically or viscerally experienced condition. Toxicity can become a metaphor for an attribute 
which is feared, which can pollute, or which invades; in Chen’s reading of childrens’ lead 
poisoning from toy train cars made in China, toxicity takes on a dimension of otherness in 
relation to the white, the heteronormative, and the firm-minded.  But for Chen, who suffers from 
a toxin sensitivity disorder, toxicity also describes a state of living with contamination 
(intoxicated) or of being stuck with the consequences of failed investments (toxic assets). In 
theorizing the intersection between metaphorical toxicity and toxicity as experience, Chen 
reminds us that toxins are easily assigned to containers, to boundaries, and to racialized or 
gendered stereotypes, rather than being understood as actually animating relationships by being 
“conditions with effects, bringing their own affects and animacies to bear on lives and nonlives” 
(282).  In viewing the toxicity of preserved Hopi voices, I too, like Chen, seek to examine both 
the metaphorical toxicity of Hopi recordings—fears surrounding their capacity to invade and 
contaminate bodies and collectives—as well as the experienced condition of living with recorded 
and preserved voices which, while critically emptied of the “scholarly value” once imagined by 
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their collectors, are something of a toxic asset being rapidly sifted back onto indigenous 
communities.167 
The preservation of Hopi taatawi outside their networks of relations has the potential to 
make them toxic in at least three ways: (1) it makes dangerous songs more readily available for 
circulation, (2) it disrupts Hopi modes of song circulation, converting songs into  intellectual 
property primed for the global information economy, and (3) it transforms Hopi voices into 
archival objects of the settler-state, subject to its anonymous care rather than the care of 
indigenous communities. 
Harms from Songs that are Utihi’i 
 The conversion of some Hopi songs into easily circulating media formats increases the 
chance that someone will be harmed by them.  Of course not all taatawi have the potential to 
harm; Hopi protocols exist to prevent people from misusing songs that are more than “music” or 
“art.”  These songs may contain forms of knowledge or practices that are restricted or otherwise 
safeguarded so that they circulate only through specific kinds of embodied relations.  Failure to 
recognize the ontological differences between songs that contain knowledge or practice that are 
restricted and those that do not may expose the hearer to adverse consequences.  
 Taatawi can contain several different kinds of knowledge.  Some of that knowledge 
might be considered tuwi: practical knowledge or social norms.  Some songs, for example, teach 
valuable information about weather patterns, planting, locations of ancestral or ceremonial sites, 
                                                
167. In his paper The Archive of the Archive, Aaron Fox (in press) shows how Laura Boulton’s collection 
of 30,000 indigenous and “traditional” songs from around the world currently housed at Columbia University is 
quite literally a toxic asset as currently separated from indigenous communities. Used in a transaction between 
Columbia and an wealthy octogenarian infatuated with Boulton to buy her affection, the disorganized and deeply 
problematic collection of “hunted” indigenous voices was touted by the University as a prized work of scholarship 
and a pillar of the Columbia music department, despite everyone’s knowledge that its existence was merely a front 
for a multimillion dollar donation.  The collection is, in Fox’s assessment, entirely useless and worthless absent the 
indigenous communities from whom the recordings originated. 
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etc.  Other songs contain elements of social practices that are specific to village or Hopi culture.  
For example, one song contained in the Laura Boulton recordings was described to me as a 
suspaltawi or a “begging song” that hadn’t been sung in decades.  As I came to learn, teenage 
boys and girls used to sing these suspaltaatawi in late August as they would go around from 
house to house, snaking through the village, looking for an open door or window where they 
could call out to the person inside asking them to share something tasty to eat—usually piiki (a 
roll of the paper-thin Hopi cornbread) if the ones calling were boys, or melons and fresh corn if 
girls were the ones asking.  When I played these songs, most people would usually smile quietly 
to themselves, thinking about the song and the kind of happiness (haalayi) that comes from 
knowing how to do traditional things and having fun while doing them.  
 Interestingly, songs that overtly contain tuwi often implicitly carry more profound 
concepts and knowledge that only those who are initiated have the right or ability to know.  For 
example, when I played Boulton’s recording of the suspaltawi I just described for Wilton 
Kooyahoema, an elder from Hotevilla, he first spoke to me about how the songs worked for the 
youth, but he then went on to explain their connection to other bodies of knowledge: 
WK: . . . it means a lot of things too that, it’s that it happened way, way 




WK: So that’s what this is representing is starvation so they could gather 
some stuff for the elders and stuff like that. . . .  
 
WK: . . . It’s part of the religious belief too this uh, Wuwtsim [Men’s 
ritual society] and the Maraw [Women’s ritual society] they go do the 
same thing as the kids do . . . so it’s kind of like this but then its, the songs 
are a little different. . . .  
 
…I know some of the Maraw songs and some of these that are Wuwtsim 




 Most Hopis know that there are some songs that belong to ceremonial societies, like the 
Maraw or women’s society, and the Wuwtsim or men’s society, that simply should never be 
recorded, even if some of them are heard in public.  A few years ago during a Nimankatsintiikive 
(home dance), I saw one of our village priests looking up at the second-story of a house 
overlooking the plaza.  In a matter of minutes, the activity in the plaza subsided and all eyes 
turned as the priest demanded a camera from a young woman who had apparently been recording 
the ceremony using a small, and probably very expensive device.  Initially, the young woman 
pretended like she hadn’t understood.  But those in the house encouraged her to do what the 
priest said.  She handed the device down, the priest inspected it and took it with him, and the 
ceremony continued.168   Contrast this with another recent ceremony, a povoltiikive (butterfly 
dance) I recently attended at the Village of Kykotsmovi.  Cameras were plainly visible from the 
rooftops and chairs in the plaza as people were recording the dance.  iPhone videos of 
povoltiikive and other dances make up a significant body of Hopi recordings currently available 
on YouTube, which sometimes have extensive discussions in the comments about whether or not 
these kinds of events should be publicly circulated through social media.169  
                                                
168 Compare similar experiences recounted by John Loftin, Religion and Hopi Life (2003) and by Hopi youth in 
Ritva levo-Henriksson, Media and Ethnic Identity: Hopi Views on Media, Identity, and Communication 85-85 
(2007). 
169 See, e.g., Comment by Todd Troxell. Bacavi’s Butterfly Dance I, YouTube (Sept. 16, 2011), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ndG7yByhRlk (“Our elders have told us to not record these dances in the 
villages. We should respect this request. When I go home to the dances, I take my children and they learn what it 
means to be Hopi by being there. I can't imagine being Hopi and disobeying my elders. Please remove.”); 
Comments by John Doe and Bobbi Seechoma, Hopi Buffalos 2015 @ Shungopavi, YouTube (Jan. 24, 2015), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cDDcTNIPkOM (JD: “Why is this dance allowed to be filmed but the katsina 
dances are not allowed to be filmed? . . .” BS: “I’m full blooded Hopi and this is my village.  Kachina dances are not 
allowed to be filmed and people are not allowed to take pictures because they are sacred to us.  They are our spirits 
and they take care of us.  It’s disrespectful to do such actions are [sic] recording videos and taking pictures.”) 
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 Why do people react so differently to recordings of nimankatsintaatawi and 
povoltaatawi? Most people gloss the distinction as being between ceremonial performances that 
are “sacred” and those that are “social.”  But what does this mean?   
 When people use the terms “sacred” and “social,” it seems like what they are describing 
is the extent to which the knowledge or practices being expressed or performed can circulate.  
Tuwi can essentially be known by anyone who wants to put forth effort to learn it.  Whenever I 
ask for information about farming or orchard keeping, or where to get the right clay to repair our 
clan house, people have always been generous with me. But knowledge about the performance of 
rituals and their meanings is understood to be meewanpi,170 or restricted to those who are 
initiated into the particular ceremonial order involved or who receive a leadership role or have 
other obligations to possess that knowledge in the village.  Those who receive meewanpi often 
do so in combination with wiimi—restricted ceremonial practices or initiations. Initiation is an 
embodied mode of learning that is meant to cause a fundamental transformation in people; 171 
many of my family, friends and colleagues have spent years contemplating their decision to 
receive this knowledge because of the heavy responsibilities (tsöptangwu) that come with 
holding and using this knowledge.   
 While I wasn’t able to ask the priest why he chose to disrupt the filming of the 
nimankatsinam during the nimankatsintiikive I just described, my sense is that his purpose was to 
                                                
170. The definition of meewanpi provided by the Hopi Dictionary is “restricted knowledge” or something that 
shouldn’t be divulged. See Hopi Dictionary Project, HOPI DICTIONARY/HOPIIKWA LAVAYTUTUVENI: A HOPI-
ENGLISH DICTIONARY OF THE THIRD MESA DIALECT (1997). 
171. An exploration of initiation by me would be inappropriate, though other scholars have made the decision to do 
so.  What is important is that initiation transforms people through embodied action that can’t be done solely in the 
abstract or without being present.  See John Loftin, Religion and Hopi Life 58 (2003) (“The practical expression of 
Hopi ceremonies embodies fundamental religious significance since the Hopi experience the sacred through the 
concrete forms and rhythms of their world.  The concrete practicality of their world manifests itself as sacred, for it 
is the sacred that creates and sustains the world's life and forms.”) See generally, Victor Turner’s discussion of 
liminality in ritual performance in From Ritual to Theatre (1983). 
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teach all of us, including the young woman, to show respect to those who hold meewanpi and to 
prevent those who are not initiated from having the ability to possess and facilely distribute that 
knowledge.  On the other hand, many people say that ceremonies like the povoltiikive are fair 
game for recording because they are just “social dances” that are more “cultural” than “sacred.”  
Not everyone agrees, as even with “social dances,” meewanpi lies very close to the surface. 
  Those who hold meewanpi are often respected for the personal sacrifices they are 
required to make to obtain and hold this knowledge, but they may also be subject to greater 
scrutiny.172  As Peter Whiteley (1998:3) has written, “[r]itual knowledge serves as the scheme of 
value, the ‘currency,’ perhaps, of power.”173  By keeping their knowledge secret, ritual 
specialists can distinguish themselves from those without ritual knowledge.174 In my experience, 
though, I have found that most people who hold meewanpi don’t tout it or use it as a means of 
self-aggrandizement.  More often I have seen these knowledge holders actively use that 
knowledge to benefit others, which in some cases requires being protective and assertive when 
this knowledge is used without permission or implicated in the conversations or actions of those 
who do not hold it. 
 Because holding meewanpi requires the transformation of bodies before it can be 
internalized and received, the ingestion and incorporation of meewanpi into the body without the 
necessary wiimi may cause serious problems, both physical and social.  In a recent Hopi Food 
and Agriculture Symposium session on the use of taatawi in Hopi farming practices, Hopi elder 
                                                
172. As Hotevilla elder Wilton Kooyahoema once explained to me, what was often the most difficult part of being a 
village leader holding a significant amount of ritual knowledge was the criticism village members of made of his 
decisions. 
173. Peter Whiteley, RETHINKING HOPI ETHNOGRAPHY 93 (1998). 
174. Id. at 92. 
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Leonard Talaswaima from the Second Mesa village of lower Sipaulovi explained the risks of 
using taatawi containing meewanpi outside of their ritual context: 
“Some of the songs that people sometimes sing without knowledge of the 
sacredness of the songs may run into difficulties in their lives, so we have 
to be very respectful about it, and advisable that we listen very carefully. . 
. . We refer to these songs as being utihi’i—they should be handled with 
care; only people that should handle them need to handle them.  They have 
a wuvaapi—a whip. Anything that may happen to you is part of that.  
Even though they [authorized people] sing them in public, you shouldn’t 
sing it.  Your stomach will swell up.” 
  
 As Talaswaima explains, just as acquiring meewanpi requires the transformation of the 
body, using restricted knowledge without having undergone such a transformation can have 
corporeal affects.  He uses the metaphor of the whip with the Hopi audience to explain the cause-
and-effect relationship of knowingly violating Hopi protocols surrounding meewanpi.  Certain 
katsinam who visit the Hopi villages are known to carry a whip (made of yucca), one purpose of 
which is to correct intentionally wrong behaviors.  Similarly, using or disclosing songs that are 
utihi’i may also bring about discomfort and pain in someone’s life.   
 Hopis are not alone in making causal connections between embodying ritual songs 
without the appropriate authority and personal sickness.  Toelken (1998), for example, who made 
numerous recordings with late Navajo storyteller Yellowman, described just how dangerous 
certain kinds of Navajo cultural expressions can be when used outside of their ceremonial 
context.  When Toelken approached Yellowman’s widow about potentially giving the tapes 
containing Yellowman’s words to a repository for safekeeping, she expressed substantial fear:  
“[W]hat if someone hears the stories at the wrong time of the year, or what if someone says some 
of those words out loud in the wrong situation. They could be injured.  You better send them to 
me. I will destroy them” (385). Toelken did eventually send the tapes.   
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In addition to the physical dangers associated with embodying and performing songs that are 
utihi’i, there may be social harms that may befall those who come in contact with these materials 
without the proper authority.  In some cases, contact with a ritual society member while they are 
conducting ritual labor requires one to join that ritual society,175 or requires the intervention of 
clan relatives to make a substantial offering to the society to repay them.  As I’ve been warned, 
people could be required to join the clown society when they laugh at or pointed fingers at the 
way ritual clowns are dressed. 
In addition to containing knowledge that is considered meewanpi or utihi’i,  Hopi taatawi 
also often contain navoti--another category of knowledge that is accumulated over time and 
passed to others.  As Justin Richland explains, many anthropologists believe navoti originated 
with each of the individual clans that make up a Hopi village, carried with them through time and 
space, and that this knowledge is closely held by its owners as a source of political power in 
relation to other clans (Richland 2009:98).176 The word contains the same root as the word 
navota, which means to notice or be aware of through the senses.177  Acquiring navoti requires 
actively listening to those who are willing to share things like historical knowledge, prophecies 
of the future, and their understanding of the way the world works.178  Some navoti is shared only 
within a family line or within a clan to preserve or perpetuate it.  Other times, it is shared when 
                                                
175. As Parsons (1969) notes, at Hopi, contact with individuals who are performing their ceremonial duties can 
subject the individual to certain obligations to society.  “Any Hopi falling in with Snake society men on their snake 
hunt must join the society” (1969: 1:112-113, fn *). 
176. Justin Richland, Hopi Sovereignty as Epistemological Limit, 24 Wicazo Sa Rev. 89, 98 (2009). 
177. HOPI DICTIONARY, at 309 (defining navota as “notice (by means of any of the senses), perceive, be aware of”). 
178 As Stewart Koyiyumptewa explains it, navoti is a kind of knowledge that is “passed down from generation to 
generation,” which can include things like “farming techniques,” “cooking and traditional food gathering,” as well 
as “ceremonial knowledge.” Chip Colwell and Stewart Koyiyumptewa, Translating Time: A Dialogue on Hopi 
Experiences of the Past In BORN IN THE BLOOD: ON NATIVE AMERICAN TRANSLATION 71 (2011).  As Koyiymptewa 
explains, what sets navoti apart from other kinds of knowledge is the way it is conveyed—within relationships—and 
how it is produced as it is conveyed—through “tracing the past.” Id. 
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someone shows responsibility and a willingness to offer something in reciprocity: whenever I 
visited someone seeking an answer to a difficult question about Hopi life, I was told that I should 
always bring traditional foods for the knowledge holder.  Navoti is often remarkable in its scope 
and depth, and tends to be closely tied to places and genealogies.  Navoti  may also be meewanpi, 
because the knowledge conveyed can only be transferred along with the corresponding wiimi.179 
As I described in Chapter 1, taatawi contain both human language (lavayi) and melodic 
material (tawvö). Both lavayi and tawvö can express practical knowledge or tuwi, restricted 
knowledge or meewanpi, or accumulated experience or navoti.  Taatawi are not simply generic 
aesthetic objects—they exist within networks of living, agentive entities with diverse points of 
view.  For example, I recently heard a song performed in public that briefly contained the 
melodic contour of a kind of song that I knew was meewanpi.  The careful weaving of portions 
of that restricted song into the tawvö being sung made it all the more powerful for those who 
heard it and recognized it. While meewanpi may be harmful to those who use it or consume it 
without the necessary wiimi, it can also be shared skillfully to the uninitiated by embedding it 
subtly in other kinds of taatawi. In this way, the potential for harm is lessened as the restricted 
knowledge is mediated by those who are responsible for safeguarding it. 
 
Harms from Converting Songs into Property 
 Second, preservation of indigenous voices outside of the body and outside of indigenous 
networks of care may allow them to be more easily claimed as someone’s or some entity’s 
                                                
179 To further clarify the difference between navoti and wiimi, Micah Loma’omvaya and T.J. Ferguson explain, 
“Navoti is a historical understanding derived from experiences handed down by ancestors to their descendants.  
Wiimi includes sacred artifacts and the knowledge of how to use them properly in religious ceremonies and rituals.  
Together, navoti and wiimi provide both the means to know the past and the ability to invoke the power of the 
ancestors in the rpesent through ritual offerings and ceremonies.” Quoted in Lyle Balenquah, “They are Still Here: 
Wupatki Pueblo and the Meaning of Place” In HISAT’SINOM: ANCIENT PEOPLES IN A LAND WITHOUT WATER, 
(Christian E. Downum, ed. 2012). 
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“property.” Under settler copyright law, upon being transferred from the body to a physical 
object, a song will typically become owned, to the exclusion of all others, by an “author,” which 
could be the singer, the composer, the recordist, or all three.180  What is the harm in recognizing 
Hopi songs as ownable property?  In this section, I explore the tension between “property” and 
indigenous ownership frameworks in the context of debates among Hopi ceremonial leaders and 
government authorities about whose modes of ownership should apply to the Boulton recordings 
I described in Chapter 3.  As I will argue, applying foreign ownership frameworks like copyright 
to songs created and circulated within indigenous modes of ownership and care pose significant 
challenges for indigenous groups.  Siding with settler modes of ownership over indigenous ones 
risks potentially disrupting not only indigenous creative economies, but potentially destabilizing 
their political sovereignty as well.  And yet, sometimes property frameworks are the only ways 
tribes can assert authority against the settler-state to care for their ancestors’ voices.     
 In December 2010, I nervously arrived at my first meeting with the Hopi Cultural 
Preservation Office (HPCO) and its Cultural Resources Advisory Task Team (CRATT) to begin 
the return of Boulton’s 121 Hopi sound recordings, which I introduced in Chapter 3.   Staffed by 
Hopi elders, ritual society leaders, educators, cultural activists, ceremonial practitioners,  and 
others who are particularly sensitive to the needs of the Hopi community,181 these two entities 
regularly provide guidance and direction to the Hopi Tribe, federal agencies, and researchers on 
issues of cultural significance to the Hopi people.  At any given meeting, you might hear HCPO 
and CRATT learning about and giving advice on a remarkably broad range of issues, like what 
                                                
180. See 17U.S.C. § 101 (defining “fixed”); see generally the discussion on Copyright in Chapter 4. 
181. It is important to point out that the Hopi public doesn’t always agree with the positions of the HCPO or 
CRATT.  Recent efforts have been launched to circumvent the authority of the HCPO, who currently controls 
whether and how research takes place on Hopi lands. 
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to do with newly discovered human remains on Hopi lands, how changes in water levels in the 
Grand Canyon could harm animals and plants, and whether objects found at archeological sites 
hundreds of miles away are those of our ancestors.  They approach their work with respect and 
humor while actively defending the interests of the communities they represent.  
 Even though there were other critical issues affecting the Tribe in December of 2010,182 I 
was given an hour on the meeting agenda to present a few songs from the Boulton collection.  I 
brought with me a sample of four songs, including the ones Boulton recorded with Qötshongva, 
Monongye and Bahnaqya. Given the sensitivity of the songs in the collection, and the complex 
questions over ownership and access these recordings presented, then HCPO Director Leigh 
Kuwanwisiwma had invited ceremonial leaders from across the Reservation to help us better 
understand how these recordings, and their associated intellectual and cultural property rights, 
should be returned to the Hopi people. 
 I came into the meeting under the naive presumption that CRATT would be able to 
definitively say who really owned the recordings, and what we should do with them.  I was 
looking for a unanimous, “tradition”-based directive that would “express the sovereign will of 
the autochthonous Hopi sociopolitical organization” (Richland 2011:223)—an unrealistic and, as 
I now know, a somewhat un-Hopi request.  What I actually witnessed was a contentious debate 
in which competing narratives of ownership and access emerged.  One narrative viewed 
ownership of the indigenous voice as a function of political sovereignty grounded in the 
democratic ideals and property structures of the settler state.  The other viewed ownership of 
these voices as an obligation toward networks of relations that create, remember, and perform 
                                                
182. One key cultural issue facing the Hopi Tribe at the time was the use of reclaimed sewage water on 
Nuva’tukya’ovi—the San Francisco Peaks near Flagstaff Arizona—for the purpose of generating artificial snow.  
Nuva’tukya’ovi is the home of our katsinam, and pumping sewage onto this sacred place was untenable for most 
Hopis. For a brief history, visit https://www.crossingworlds.org/hopis-protect-water-sacred-mountain/ 
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these songs.   As I will explore, these narratives in many ways echo debates originally discussed 
in Chapter 3, and help us to better understand how colonization of indigenous ownership 
structures affects Hopi lives and political sovereignty in the 21st Century. 
Narrating Songs as Tribal Property   
Within the United States, claims to ownership are generally narrated through the legal 
discourses of property.  This narrative typically derives from frameworks established by 
constitutions, statutes, judicial decisions, regulations, and other forms of law which we believe 
articulate our ability to control, use, and to exclude others from controlling and using, things of 
actual or potential value. An explicit statement of rights by the sovereign, such as a statute, 
provides an efficient, consistent narrative of ownership which can be used to adjudicate disputes 
over the control and use of things in a shared world.   
 The Hopi Tribe is known to be at the forefont of efforts to establish ownership interests to 
cultural expressions through the language of cultural property. The Tribe established a specific 
tribal statute in 1994 that sought to proclaim the law on who owns things like ethnographic field 
recordings made on Hopi lands which contain ceremonial knowledge: 
NOW THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED by the Hopi Tribal Council that 
it hereby reiterates its constitutional resolve to protect the cultural interests 
of the villages, clans, and societies on matters related to the intent of [the 
Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act]  . . .  
 
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED by the Hopi Tribal Council that archival 
records, including field notes, audio tapes, video tapes, photographs, 
which describe and depict esoteric ritual, ceremonial and religious 
knowledge, be placed under restriction by museums and other repositories 
for public access and hereby are declared to be the cultural property of 
the Hopi people.183 
 
                                                
183.  Hopi Tribal Resolution H-70-94 (emphasis added). 
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 A straightforward reading of the Resolution would seem to designate materials like 
Boulton’s Hopi recordings as “cultural property” owned and managed by the Hopi Tribe.  And 
for some advocates of tribal sovereignty, this statement, presumably voicing the will of the Hopi 
people, would end any dispute over who owns recorded Hopi voices.184  When I asked those 
present at the December 2010 meeting who should own the Boutlon recordings, HCPO Director 
Leigh Kuwanwisiwma and a number of the elders said we should simply apply the Resolution, 
viewing it as authoritative on matters of cultural ownership: 
LK: And that’s basically one of your questions.  Who [should own these]?  Noo [right]?  
And we have our authorizing resolution that establishes, really a legal authority by the 
Council, a delegated authority to CPO on behalf of the clans, noo [right]?  We need to 
work out how we’re going to deal with it, too.  You know.  Ason putwat itam pay hin aw 
naato wuuwantotani. [We are still continuing to think about that very thing.] Pay pi pam 
oovi pi pay su’anta, himu Owen pay, uh, pam resolution pay an’i itam piw ura it pas 
yua’aykuyat aw antoti Council epeq, [Now actually that is because what Owen (one of 
the the elders attending), said is very similar to that resolution, the very same way we 
also, you recall, made a similar statement there to Council about doing it this way,] and 
Council unanimously approved that resolution. . . .  
 
Niikyangw pay imuy ngamuy pu’ imuy wiiwimkyamuy angq pay qatuvosti i’ pas aapi pay 
Council aw ökiwtani.  [But for our clans, our religious society members, that will be 
difficult to be present in groups before the Tribal Council.]  . . . 
 
So that was a compromise there.  Noq oovi [So], that’s a pretty serious responsibility that 
all of us have.  Me’ uma piw, CRATT hooyam pu’ itam pi uma pi it itamumi it aw 
hintsatskya. [Look everyone, CRATT team,  there is a lot for us to get done.]    So that 
resolution is an important resolution.  Noq oovi [So] Jerry is right, there is a delegated 
authority vested in CPO and our CRATT team here, but how to work out, noo [right],  
and protect it.  That’s all of our job here yet to do.   
 
As Kuwanwisiwma points out, the Hopi Tribe has every right, under its Constitution and 
Bylaws, “[t]o protect the arts, crafts, traditions, and ceremonies of the Hopi Indians.”185  As one 
                                                
184.  See First Archivists Circule; See also Trevor Reed, Decolonizing Ownership: The Hopi Music Repatriation 
Project in The Oxford Handbook of Musical Repatriation (in press) (referencing an interview with a prominent 
university archivist who claimed that the tribal government was equivalent to the sovereign, and dealing with tribal 
politics was not “terribly bright”) 
185. Constitution and Bylaws of the Hopi Tribe art VI, § 1(k). 
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elder went on to say, by passing the resolution “[t]he Council was just exercising their authority 
given to the Council by the people.”  But Kuwanwisiwma also seems to concede that recognizing 
the Tribe as the owner of cultural expressions on behalf of Hopi villages, clans, ceremonial 
societies, and others, may not satisfactorily resolve the question of who should control recorded 
Hopi ancestral voices singing ceremonial songs.  
 There were also others who believed the Resolution should be followed, but not 
necessarily because of its statutory form, its constitutionality, or its democratic method of 
adoption.  For them, the resolution seemed to make sense for practical reasons—it designates an 
ultimate authority to resolve difficult disputes over ownership of and access to objects that are 
ontologically and politically complex, without making ownership a zero-sum game.  At one 
point during the meeting, for example, two village leaders began to debate who would own some 
highly sensitive tsu’tiikive (snake dance) songs Boulton recorded, given that her incomplete field 
notes designated the songs as belonging to both of their villages. (To exacerbate matters, 
tsu’taatawi [snake songs] are often considered meewanpi, and are typically safeguarded so as to 
prevent appropriation and misuse by those who are not initiated into each village’s tsu society—
including members of other villages).   After going back and forth, one of the elders conceded, 
“So, yeah, you can give it to the villages; but I think a central location [i.e., the Tribe] should be 
where it’s at.”  The debate reinforced why, from a pragmatic standpoint, treating these 
ceremonial song recordings as tribal property (rather than owned by particular villages, clans, 
ritual societies, etc.) and vesting ultimately authority to control them in the Hopi Tribe, may be 
the best way keep things that are utihi’i (sacred, restricted) from those outside the tribe, while 
leaving the door open for diplomacy between villages, clans, and ceremonial societies for a later 
time.   
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Arguing against Culture as Tribal Property  
While many supported the notion of the tribe claiming the Boulton recordings as its 
cultural property, some disagreed.  This is because vesting ownership and control of “culture” in 
a federally recognized Tribe, to the exclusion of all other individuals or entities, requires making 
several important intermediary assumptions.  First, it assumes that the Hopi Tribe, as a settler-
imposed government—one that in some ways competes with (or at the very least is impartial to) 
Hopi ceremonial authority—is a legitimate holder of this kind of knowledge.  Second, it also 
presumes that Hopi political leaders have acquired the practices (wiimi) and the diverse kinds of 
knowledge (navoti) necessary to make decisions about the circulation of ritual songs and the 
knowledge they contain.  Third, it presumes that “property” is an appropriate framework 
whereby these forms of ritual creativity, knowledge, and expression can be controlled.  As I 
came to see, several elders at our meeting refused to accept these assumptions, advocating 
instead for following long-established Hopi ownership frameworks governing the circulation of 
taatawi and the kinds knowledge these songs contain. 
 Some elders were clearly unwilling to accept that the Tribe could own ceremonial 
knowledge.  One elder explained that giving the Tribe possession over ceremonial song 
recordings would be fine as long as “it stays on the pile all the time” and wouldn’t be made 
available to the Tribal Council for their use. “We don’t deal with the Council.  Because, I would 
say, none of these Council members down there are required to get in part with of the different 
ideas of what these clans, songs and stuff like that belongs to.  None of them are members of 
societies or anything.”  As he pointed out, the Tribal Council is not a ceremonial society or a 
village—it has no knowledge or legitimate authority from which it can make decisions in the 
area of Hopi ritual life.  Conceived by its settler drafters as a limited, representational democracy 
	141 
 
under the procedures Congress set forward in the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, the Tribe 
was voted into existence in a convention where well over a majority of eligible Hopis refused to 
participate as a protest against the encroachments it represented to traditional governance 
(Richland 2011; see Chapter 3).  As a result, some still question its legitimacy as a democratic 
governing entity.    
 The second assumption these ceremonial leaders rejected is that a federally recognized 
Tribal government has the power to own and control things like taatawi. One feature of Tribal 
governments is that they have the authority, in the eyes of the settler-state, to declare their own 
laws and enforce them.  However, when a tribal government uses settler-imposed power 
structures to regulate culture, such a power structure often directly competes with the existing 
socio-political apparatus, which is based on networks of relations and the legitimate ownership 
of navoti and use of wiimi   As Justin Richland (2011) has explained in the context of the Hopi 
Tribal Courts, the Hopi Tribe’s articulation of its boundaries of governance—what is called 
jurisdiction in Euro-American legal discourse—can be inconsistent with village, clan, and 
ceremonial society authority over the same subject matters.  As he explains, Hopi jurisdiction is 
more aptly located in the way people embody and strategically circulate navoti (and meewanpi), 
rather than through overt declarations of power contained in constitutions and statutes.    The 
Tribe’s claiming of ceremonial song knowledge as its property essentially sidesteps the existing 
governance structures for these kinds of materials, potentially impacting the nature of Hopi 
sovereignty.    
The Problem of Taatawi as Property  
 The third assumption, one that was only indirectly discussed, was that recorded taatawi 
could be treated as intellectual or cultural “property” without posing a risk of harm to the Hopi 
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community.  While most of the conversation between the ceremonial leaders at the December 
2010 meeting was about who would own the songs going forward, many of the concerns 
expressed by those who were against tribal ownership had to do with how these materials would 
be owned and used.   
As a gloss, “property” often means a thing that is owned or possessed.  But the potency 
of the word is made possible in large part because of its special place in settler law: property is a 
kind of ownership of a thing—tangible or intangible—that can be enforced against others 
through some coercive means.186  As several scholars have recently observed, intellectual 
property carries with it an ontological specificity that may or may not fit comfortably within 
indigenous modes of owning or circulating music and sound.187  First, intellectual property 
operates as a device of exclusion, which may be contrary to the ways sound is circulated within 
indigenous networks of exchange.  And second, the application of copyright and other 
intellectual property forms to songs, ritual expressions, or other forms of the indigenous voice 
(i.e. to create “intellectual property”) requires certain transformations to occur in order for these 
rights to be claimed under the authority of the state.  This kind of ontological transformation 
significantly alters the structures through which taatawi and other forms of Hopi knowledge are 
held and transferred, with important implications for Hopi creativity and sovereignty. 
First, the circulation of sound in Hopi society operates under different economic 
assumptions from that of Euro-American intellectual property principles, which have become the 
foundation for global regimes that govern the circulation of many types of cultural expression. 
                                                
186. See, e.g., Cal Civ. Code § 654 (“The ownership of a thing is the right of one or more persons to possess and use 
it to the exclusion of others.  In this Code, the thing of which there may be ownership is called property.” 
187. See, e.g., Elizabeth Burns Coleman, Rosemary J. Coombe, and Fiona MacArailt, A broken Record: Subjecting 




See Figure 1: Comparison of Hopi and Euro-American Creative Models.  Copyright, at least in 
the United States, has historically operated under the assumption that creativity is best stimulated 
by giving individual creators a monopoly on the ability to use the works they create.  Under this 
model, [1] as individuals exert their labor to create new works, [2] they are likely to produce 
original material that may benefit society.  Therefore, copyright law rewards the laborer who 
produces original work with [3] the right to prevent others from being able to use that work 
without the creator’s permission.  Essentially, the owner of a music or sound recording copyright 
can draw on the coercive power of the state (i.e., courts, police, customs agents, etc.) to control 
the circulation (albeit in a limited way) of the work’s sound.  The creators can then [4] grant 
permission for specific uses of the work to others in exchange for capital. As the creator 
accumulates capital from the work, he or she is incentivized to develop new markets for the 
work, to continue to develop new works, and to further refine his or her capacities in light of 
shifts in market demand. 
Taatawi ideally circulate under different economic assumptions.  Members of Hopi 
society are supported not only by our own work to accumulate resources for ourselves, but 
through our relationships to members of our clan, related clans, members of our villages, and the 
ceremonial societies to which we belong.  If you were to map all the relationships each person in 
a village has to others, you would see a densely packed web of reciprocity, where no one is 
supposed to go hungry or lack necessary resources because each person’s welfare becomes the 
responsibility of others.188 While accumulating personal capital to benefit one’s family is 
important for our modern lives, this strong desire to share with others continues to be a 
fundamental aspect of being Hopi.  
                                                
188. For a more detailed review of the literature on Hopi kinship structures, see Peter Whiteley, RETHINKING HOPI 





















































Yeewa, the compositional process for taatawi, plays an important role within this 
economic model because it is a catalyst for bringing networks of people, environmental actors, 
and other entities into productive relations in ways that benefit the whole.  As discussed in 
Chapter 1, as a yeewa raises plants in his or her field, he or she encourages the plants to grow by 
metaphorically “feeding” them with his or her voice, and they respond to him or her by their 
movements and growth, thus helping the yeewa to generate the right “feeling” for the song.  The 
sensitivity required in this exchange is such that some people won’t be able to create songs: one 
shouldn’t create if you are easily angered, for example.189 Through the dialogue between the 
farmer and his or her plants, the songs become a fusion of human and non-human lavayi (speech) 
and tawvö (melody).  The farmer will craft his songs in response to his or her plants, and the 
resulting taatawi resonate within both human and non-human aesthetic domains. 
Once a yeewa has [1] created a good tawi, one that is full of meaning and produces 
positive effects on his or her plants, the yeewa will share his or her good songs with others in the 
village without compensation in the weeks leading up to a ceremonial performance.  These 
shared songs, when feelingfully performed in ceremony will [2] bring humans, weather systems, 
plants, animals and other actors into productive relations.  In the process of learning and 
performing the songs, [3] the composer gives ownership of his or her songs to members of the 
village who hear them, which not only brings the composer prestige as members of the 
composer’s village or kiva come to depend on him or her to increase the welfare of the 
community; the composer benefits directly when good songs are sung by the village, because [4] 
the village as a whole, including the composer, experiences greater prosperity as good songs 
sung with a good heart tend to produce rain, good crops, and happiness (natwani). As a result, 
the composer is incentivized to continue to produce more songs and to share them without need 
                                                
189. I thank Stewart B. Koyiymptewa for this observation. 
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of personal remuneration.  Others in the village are sometimes motivated to “out-do” him or her 
by composing their own songs.190   
The sharing of taatawi within the Hopi creative economy follows a principle of obligated 
reciprocity on the part of the listener.  Some have described this as nasimokyaata, “to borrow” or 
“to adorn oneself,” though in some Hopi villages this term is not used with intangible things.  
Some suggest the term no’i’yta, or “to share” or “give the right to use.”  Finally, some have 
suggested the phrase tuuwat akw mongvistoti (to benefit when complete), which explains how 
taatawi will become beneficial to those that use them or listen to them when they are wholly 
realized through sincere, complete ceremonial performance. While villages seem to differ in the 
words they use for the principle, several composers I interviewed from a cross section of villages 
essentially described the same principle whereby a listener acquires the ability to use a song from 
one’s village—sometimes even without asking—as long as the user gives benefit to the 
community or the world (and not him or herself), and/or the user provides some reciprocal 
benefit to the owner(s) of the song.   
In the process of transferring ownership from a yeewa to the village (or a ceremonial 
society, if the song is meewanpi), the village (or the ceremonial society) becomes the owner of 
the song, and the yeewa will often “forget” the song.191  The yeewa knows as he or she composes 
in his or her field that the song ultimately will not be his or her own.  In fact, as several older 
composers have told me, in the moment the composer shares his or her songs, he or she detaches 
them from him or herself, so that they can be used freely by other members of the village without 
                                                
190. As Shaul (2002:190-91) explains it, “There are several successive contexts in which a songpoem may exist.  
First of all, there is the composer’s mind.  Second of all, there is the rehearsal-editing context of the kiva.  Thirdly, 
there are one or more public performances; and finally a songpoem may stick in anyone’s mind for future use and 
savoring.” 
191. This is not always the case, though, particularly for younger composers.  One composer I spoke with was quick 
to point out his songs that had been sung in a tiikive the week prior to our interview.  
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his or her permission. While this may sound a lot like copyright law’s “fair use” doctrine, there 
are subtle differences.  Unlike the fair use of copyrighted works, the circulation of shared taatawi 
implicitly carries an obligation of reciprocity coinciding with the song’s original purposes: either 
to be returned with a reciprocal gift or to be remembered and performed for the good of the 
world. This principle of obligated-ownership can be instructively contrasted with another Hopi 
term, sokopta, or “to steal with intent to take advantage of,” a term whose most salient 
definitions include the clandestine taking of Hopi sacred ceremony for selfish purposes, adultery, 
and rape.192 
In comparing both of these ownership frameworks, it becomes clear that ownership of 
Hopi songs is not necessarily based on a logic of exclusion. Under copyright, a copyright owner 
is allowed to stop others from using his or her songs so as to leverage benefits for the individual. 
Instead, the circulation of taatawi has historically operated under a logic of inclusion, where 
these songs are protected against “selfish” uses, to accumulate benefits to entire networks of 
actors.  Therefore, when indigenous communities adopt copyright and other property-based 
frameworks as the basis for ownership and circulation of songs and other forms of knowledge 
and cultural expression, they run the risk of espousing “capitalism’s commodifying logic” in the 
name of cultural protection, which may make upholding indigenous economic principles more 
complex (Brown 2003:287; see Chapter 6). 
Second, intellectual property law—particularly copyright—requires certain kinds of 
transformations to indigenous voices before they can be eligible for protection against 
unauthorized uses.  Copyright establishes as prerequisites to ownership both a physical and a 
conceptual separation of indigenous voices from the networks of relations that generate them.  
                                                
192. See “Sokopta,” HOPI DICTIONARY 517 (1998). 
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Through this separation, the voice is transformed into an alienable object rather than remaining a 
node of social relations between bodies.  Indeed, intellectual property law has been engineered to 
purify193 sonic creativity of its rich networks of social relations, transforming it into an abstract 
“work”—what is presumed to be the product of an individual or corporate mind.194  These 
transformations allow voices to be transacted efficiently within the marketplace, thereby 
permitting ownership and control over them regardless of the end-user’s relationship to the 
networks that created them and benefit from them.   
Copyright’s law’s requirement that works be disembodied to receive copyright protection 
has most recently been codified in the 1976 Copyright Revision Act’s “fixation” requirement. 
The United States Copyright Act requires that all works, including “musical works,” be “fixed in 
any tangible medium of expression”195 for copyright protection to attach.  Copyright law’s 
insistence that the voice be embedded in lifeless media rather than in the body—a vibrant, 
agentive entity—effectively subjugates the voice, making it vulnerable to external control.  
When contained by physical media, the voice is preserved in form, but also becomes easily 
removed from the domain of the social—it is transformed into an aesthetic object that can be 
pinned down in time and space.   The logic behind this requirement appears to be that works 
                                                
193 Here I draw upon the terminology of Bruno Latour describing the processes of purifying works of their social 
attachments in Modernity.  See Bruno Latour, WE HAVE NEVER BEEN MODERN (Catherine Porter, trans. 1993).   
194. See Jane Anderson, Anxieties of Authorship in the Colonial Archive In MEDIA AUTHORSHIP (Cynthia Chris & 
David A. Gerstner, eds. 2012).  As Anderson argues, authorship is the root of authority within archives, and is a 
fundamental component of contemporary copyright law. “Defining the category of the ‘author’ was the means for 
establishing the legitimacy of property in a ‘work.’” (6).  As Anderson explains, the formation of the author as “men 
with letters” who write the circumstances and knowledge of others, thereby receiving a property right in those 
writings or “works,” was part of a broader project to “legally and socially reduce and exclude other cultural forms of 
articulation, expression and association with cultural knowledge products.” (7) This construction of the “author” has 
allowed archives to “maintain[] very specific exclusions and relations of power” over knowledge, thereby 
“maintaining hierarchies of knowledge production by reducing Indigenous and non-European subjectivity and 
legitimating the (ongoing) appropriation of Indigenous cultural material by non-indigneous authors.” (1). 
195. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) 
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which have not been embedded in an object outside the body cannot be fully transacted from one 
individual owner to another because they do not have verifiable boundaries and endpoints.196   
In addition to requiring the physical disembodiment of voices as a prerequisite for 
copyright protection, the Copyright Act also imposes a conceptual separation of the voice from 
its material reality.  Even though copyright law requires “works” to be physically fixed in a 
tangible medium, the works themselves are presumed to have no material existence; they are 
different from “copies,” which are “material objects . . . in which a work is fixed.”197  Through 
this conceptual separation, the paper and ink of a letter, for example, are considered a property 
that can be transacted separately from the abstract work of literature one reads in the words on 
the page.198 To secure its protection for our ancestors’ voices, copyright law would require the 
reification of a tawi’s internal relations (protecting only the sound of the voice), while 
conceptually purifying it of its material networks (the relations that connect the sound of the 
voice to people and other actors within the territory)—taatawi can no longer exist with their own 
presence in the world; they must be hollowed out; they are protected only insomuch as they are 
formulas or calculations that describe the relations between internal sonic points, not as nodes 
within networks of relations of which they are a vital part.199   
                                                
196. It is important to note that there have been some legal innovations that have attempted to counteract these 
problems.  For example, unrecorded music performances may be protected from unauthorized recording, 
reproduction, and distribution under the anti-bootlegging statute contained in the Copyright Act.  See 17 U.S.C. § 
1101.  
197. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining “copies”). 
198. See Baker v. Libbie, 97 M.E. 109 (1912) (holding that transferring ownership of a written letter does not 
transfer the copyright to the underlying literary work).  In Baker, the court described Baker’s right to her work as 
“an interest in the intangible and impalpable thought and the particular verbal garments in which it has been 
clothed.” Id. at 112. 
199 For some, including many jurists, the disembodiment, abstraction, and separation of created works from their 
material reality and their networks of relations is a major philosophical stretch: as Justice Story once said, “patents 
and copyrights approach, nearer than any other class of cases belonging to forensic discussions, to what may be 
called the metaphysics of the law, where the distinctions are, or at least may be, very subtile and refined, and, 
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The disembodiment and conceptual abstraction of song and sound from their material 
relations in order to receive copyright protection is a fundamental part of settler intellectual 
property frameworks and, on a broader scale, the project of settler-colonialism.  As such, these 
transformations continue to be a pre-requisite for obtaining the protections afforded to 
intellectual property under settler law. 200  But, by imposing settler philosophies of intellectual 
property on our ancestors’ voices, we may be required to sacrifice what matters most: the 
material connection between vibrant, sonic knowledge and the embodied networks within which 
this knowledge is generated and is meant to circulate.  It is true that a copyright holder can 
lawfully control certain acts that convert a reified, abstracted, disembodied “work” back into 
material—its reproduction, distribution, public performance or display, and the creation of 
                                                                                                                                                       
sometimes, almost evanescent.” Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F.Cas. 342, 344 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841). 
200 The philosophical underpinnings for the desocialization and abstraction of sound from embodied social relations 
are deeply rooted in Enlightenment thought, which often used indigenous peoples as its foil. As James Leach (2007) 
has explained, the detachment of copyrightable expression from the body was a pivotal move in the development of 
intellectual property law and of enlightenment notions of personhood:   
The relation that defines the self as a person is a subjective intervention within the world, 
which makes a difference to that world.  This recreates the self in the same movement by 
which it objectifies something beyond the self.  One knows one’s capacity and one’s 
‘self’ through what one sees of oneself in the world.   Each time a novel object is 
realized, as an element externalized from the person, the distinction between the self and 
the world is recreated.  It is the very materiality of the expression that recreates the 
person as a locus of intelligence and agency. (Leach 2007:108) 
Under the labor theory of property attributed to John Locke, one comes to own property by appropriating 
common material and adding one’s labor to it to create something of value.  The acquisition of personal property by 
labor is, for Locke, a natural right, existing for both “wild Indians of north America” and in civil society. See John 
Locke, SECOND TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT (1690) at § 26.  In doing so, the laborer mixes his or her labor with 
objects existing in a state of nature, theoretically annexing those objects to the person in such a way “that excludes 
the common right of other men.” Id. at § 27.  Locke gives as a fundamental principle that a person has property in 
his or her own body.  But what about property in creativity or innovations? 
As Leach argues, the Lockean frameworks has been applied to intellectual property by making some 
important leaps.  When one adds his or her creative labor to existing knowledge or cultural material, the resulting 
thoughts and expressions become property—but only if there is a way to “annex” something to those thoughts or 
expressions that could both differentiate them from “nature” and exclude others from their use.  Requiring 
disembodiment and abstraction accomplishes both of these.  Because material can be possessed by an individual, the 
fusion of idea and physical material provides a means for ideas to be transacted as property.  By requiring 
abstraction of ideas from the material reality of the creation, the intellectual labor of the creator becomes 
distinguishable from that which exists in the “state of nature.”  
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derivative works.  However, as is made clear in copyright’s “first sale doctrine,” the copyright 
holder can’t control the new relations that develop around a hollowed-out voice after it is 
embedded in new material objects and sold.201   At that point, our ancestors voices can be 
transacted, possessed, experienced, consumed, shared, or discarded completely outside the 
control of the copyright holder.  
Still, asserting property rights may be a powerful move within a colonial structure that, as 
of right now, is unlikely to recognize indigenous ownership systems as superior to its own 
system of property rights outside of reservation boundaries. In an era of globalization, there is a 
strong impulse for tribes and other marginalized groups to use culture as what George Yudice 
(2003) has called an “expedient,” a resource to be managed, developed, and converted into 
property so that the group has the exclusive ability to perform its differences in ways that 
empower the group under frameworks salient to a colonizing nation-state or the international 
capital economy. Yudice argues that as growing world economies increasingly turn to the 
production of easily circulating, immaterial goods like digital music, movies, or software, 
minority groups are leveraging their “cultural resources” in like manner as they fight for greater 
political autonomy. Negotiations over cultural “rights” between indigenous groups and settler-
states (and now, cultural institutions) create economic, political, and social fields of force, which 
act to secure and traditionalize culture while at the same time restricting or privileging certain 
forms of its circulation for the sake of meeting these groups’ political needs.  In other words, by 
reclaiming Hopi voices as property, the Tribe may be able to assert its authority much more 
                                                
201. See 17 U.S.C. § 109.  Note, however, that in the case of works of visual art in the United States, Congress has 
granted a limited form of moral rights (droit moral) by which an author controls certain rights of attribution of his or 
her identity to a work he or she created, and also has limited control over the integrity of the work, including 
“intentional distortion, mutilation, or other modification of that work which would be prejudicial to his or her honor 
or reputation” or the “destruction of a work of recognized stature,” including by intentional or gross negligence. 17 
U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(A), (B).   
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deeply and powerfully into the infrastructure of the settler-state, which may send a strong 
message to both the music industry, holding institutions, and to leaders within the global 
information economy, that indigenous rights must be respected. 
 But converting taatawi into a property resource to assert or reinforce political sovereignty 
may have some negative implications. When tribes assert restitutionist claims to what they deem 
cultural property (Handler 1991), they may be re-deploying the settler-state’s logics (70–71). As 
political moves, these claims may reverse the tide of colonial power in a language power 
understands (ibid.).  However, dependence on property logics as a basis for reclaiming ancestral 
voices may reinforce the legitimacy of the settler-state (70).  As James Leach has warned, 
treating ritual songs as property may enact a modern conceptual colonialism over Indigenous 
groups, requiring them to rely on Enlightenment divisions of what is “natural” and inanimate, 
and what is “cultural” or agentive in the world, in order to assert their rights, while ignoring the 
diverse kinds of actors, landscapes, and networks that contributed to their creation and 
development (Leach 2007:99). 
 
Harms from Anonymous Care  
 Finally, preservation of indigenous voices outside of indigenous modes of care may 
prove harmful, and potentially toxic, to indigenous communities.  As I explore in this section, 
when Hopi voices are converted into disembodied archival objects, they become subject to a 
kind of biopolitics that preserves them for the purpose of perpetually serving the needs the 
settler-state rather than having the kind of lifespan and care which are accorded to voices in our 
communities.  
The Right to Let Culture Die 
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 In the summer of 2016, my dad by clan was in the final stages of prostate cancer and 
kidney failure when he told me about his decision not to pass along a portion of his ceremonial 
knowledge. He was the last fully initiated man from our village, the last person authorized to 
carry out certain vital ceremonies.  Over the last few years of his life, he had told me stories of 
several leaders from across the Hopi reservation visiting him, asking him questions, and seeking 
knowledge that would allow these important aspects of our community to continue. However, he 
also told me that the decision to pass along ceremonial knowledge and authority was not his 
alone to make.  In effect, by not passing along this knowledge, the ceremonies would die with 
him.  
 My dad’s choice follows in the footsteps of other leaders of my village who have each 
faced the decision of whether or not to silence aspects of our village ceremonial culture. These 
decisions often had to be made during periods of coerced cultural forgetting, ranging from 
harshly enforced prohibitions on Hopi ceremonial performances (which in some cases were 
perpetuated secretly202),  the kidnapping and relocation of Hopi children to boarding schools, and 
the imposition of non-Hopi ways of living on Hopi lands.203 Given the rapid pace of change, 
many Hopis have told me that our culture is “dying out”—that modernization, globalization, and 
acculturation have displaced people’s attachments to Hopi lands, our language, and the 
                                                
202. As Leigh Kuwanwisiwma explains about the role of memory in the Spanish occupation of Hopi lands, “So 
inasmuch as the [Hopi] ceremonies were now publicly forbidden to be performed [by the Spanish], some of the 
people talk about how the knowledge was still being rehearsed and then also passed on to coming generations so that 
at least the knowledge would survive and then the physical end of it, meaning perhaps the altars and the types of 
ritual objects, would also be re-created and subsequently used if they ever had an opportunity to come back with 
their ceremonies.” (Sheridan, et al. 2015:173).  As Elgean Joshevama recounts, Hopis took great risks to remember 
ceremonies—particularly songs.  They “had to steal themselves away in secrecy . . . there were times when, when 
somebody might, individual, one individual might maybe get away from the village to go somewhere, maybe to go 
hunting or maybe go to the field, and they might, by accident, find a group of men, Hopi men, somewhere.  Maybe 
in a circle singing songs, probably rehearsing these ceremonial songs that they didn’t want to forget” (238). 
203. See Chapter 2. 
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ceremonial performances that should happen there. Thus, the world is progressing rapidly toward 
its prophesied end.   
 Many anthropologists, folklorists, ethnomusicologists, tourists, and missionaries from 
1540 to the present also believed Hopi and other indigenous cultures were dying.204 Their 
writings and later, field recordings, collected under that pretext fill archives around the world. 
However, some of these recordings contain aspects of ceremonies which have or will soon be 
extinguished, setting up an uncomfortable conflict between the institutional impetus to preserve, 
and the decisions of indigenous authorities, like my dad, to let parts of our culture die. 
Anonymous Care and the Archive 
 In her recent book Life Beside Itself, Lisa Stevenson (2014) explores the disjuncture 
between Inuit modes of care and the serialized, “anonymous” way of caring espoused by the 
Canadian bureaucracy.  From governmental health programs that took great care to number and 
organize Inuit people sick with tuberculosis before disappearing them into distant sanatoria, to 
suicide prevention hotlines that instruct their volunteers to listen with curiosity to Inuit people’s 
grim suicide plans but not develop personal relationships with them, Stevenson reveals the irony 
of Canada’s efforts to impersonally “care” about Inuit as an exercise in population management. 
As she points out, Canada cares only to the extent that it can maintain its power over indigenous 
lives: “[w]hen life becomes an indifferent value it no longer matters who you are, only that you 
cooperate in the project of staying alive” (82). In other words, Canadian care for ‘its’ First 
                                                
204. Spanish priests demonstrated their belief that Hopi culture would die through violent disciplinization aimed at 
saving Hopis from their “slavery” to “idolatry,” making them worthy of Heaven (Sheridan, et al 2015:132, 238). 
Many early American anthropologists corroborated the fatalistic intentions of colonization through their work, 
claiming that Hopi and other indigenous cultural practices needed documentation and preservation because they 
were inevitably dying out (Brady 1999:75-80; Sterne 2003:331-32).  And, ethnomusicologists from only a 
generation ago were proclaiming the death of Hopi culture (List 1962; Boulton 1968), though more recently some 
anthropologists are finding that anthropology is what is actually dying out due to lack of diversity, lack of action, 
and irrelevance to the real world (Whiteley 1993:148). 
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Nations is a manifestation of a biopolitics that determines who is made to live and who it lets 
die.205 In stark contrast, Stephenson compares a number of Inuit modes of care, including 
traditional Inuit name transfer practices, which allow members of the community to care for and 
be comforted by one another, including those lost to illness and suicide. 
 Archives of fieldwork materials are notoriously sites of anonymous care, sites where 
perpetual preservation of indigenous voices in particular forms is privileged over the 
temporalities and forms of the voice established by the communities who generated them. 
Jonathan Sterne (2003) explains that the desire to preserve the indigenous voice which drove 
early fieldwork was not necessarily to give indigenous voices immortality, but was instead an 
outgrowth of settler desires to preserve the functionality of the indigenous body despite its 
(anticipated) death.  He writes, “sound recording preserved the exteriority of the voice while 
completely transforming its interiority, its insides” (Stern 2003:298).  Sterne frames field 
recording as an illusion of liveness, at best the preservation of what the recordist wanted to hear 
(323-24). At its worst, as Erika Brady reveals, recordings of indigenous peoples were a 
mechanical means for “bronzing” or “freezing” indigenous voices into discrete, aesthetic facts 
that could substitute for indigenous peoples themselves (1999:59-60). Once accessioned to an 
archive, the priority for recorded indigenous voices continues to be their logical organization to 
support the anticipated ear of the researcher and his or her funders, and the perpetual prevention 
of decay, destruction, or non-transferability to newer media.  As Aaron Fox (2017) has pointed 
out, rather than looking to indigenous communities for direction on the appropriate lives of 
archived indigenous voices, decisions about care of indigenous recordings all too easily hinged 
                                                
205. “[Biopolitics] is, in a word, a matter of taking control of life and the biological processes of man-as-species and 
of ensuring that they are not disciplined, but regularized. . . . Sovereignty took life and let live. And now we have the 
emergence of a power that I would call the power of regularization, and it, in contrast, consists in making live and 
letting die.” (Foucault 1976:246-47) 
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(and still hinge) on the needs of institutions to demonstrate their power and legitimacy by 
amassing more and more sonic facts.  As with the sanatoria and suicide prevention centers of 
Canada, biopolitics is at work in the archival care of indigenous voices, collecting them, 
organizing them, and deciding which voices are made to live (and made to speak/represent) and 
which it will let die (edited out, discarded or allowed to decay), irrespective of indigenous modes 
of care.206  
 My argument here is that the care of indigenous voices should be guided by more than a 
desire to permanently “save the lore” (Harrington of the U.S. Bureau of American Ethnology in 
Sterne 2003:314). Instead, those who work with recorded indigenous voices should look to 
indigenous temporalities and modes of care for the appropriate lives and after-lives of indigenous 
archival materials. More specifically to the case at hand, I want to argue that making Hopi voices 
live in a preserved state runs counter to the kind of agentive existences voices have in our 
community. 
The Lives of Hopi Voices 
 In the Hopi context, for example, death doesn’t necessarily mark one’s existence from a 
present to a past temporality.   As Mary Black (1984) has written, Hopi conceptions of life and 
death are often analogized to the growth and decay of corn plants.  After ears of corn are 
harvested, the corn stalk eventually dies—it is qatungwu (lifeless) and without soona (substance 
                                                
206. Intellectual property and critical museum studies scholar Jane Anderson (2013) has critiqued the ways archival 
practices and intellectual property laws continue to make indigenous peoples the “subjects” of archival materials, 
while displacing them from positions of care and ownership over them.  “[Archival] material comes encoded with 
relations of power and specific entitlements, and continues to position Indigenous peoples, cultures, lifestyles and 
practices within a Eurocentric locus of enunciation” (232). The mere fact that archives house so many indigenous 
voices in one place and without any kind of obligation or reciprocation to indigenous communities clearly bespeaks 
a Euro-American centered ontology of the voice rather than indigenous ones. And this repurposing of the indigenous 
voice likewise resonates with Stoler’s view that colonial archives are not so much about care for the histories of the 
colonized, but about “factual production” or the narration of “factual stories” in which “the colonial state affirmed 
its fictions to itself” (Stoler 2002:98). 
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or “that which makes life viable”).  For humans, the substance of life is the breath, or hikwsi, and 
in death, our hikwsi continues; it is aniwti, or “becoming perfected.”  While seeds contained in 
the mature ear will go on to generate new plants in different times and places, the corn stalks 
remain in the ground; they are laid down and allowed to decay. But even their decay has a 
purpose: they are not uprooted or plowed under, but they collectively become a guide for where 
to plant the next year and they serve as the mulch that keeps the water and nutrients in the 
ground for years into the future.207  In comparison to human lives, the bodies of the dead are 
traditionally not preserved but are allowed to decay, and we generally burn our dead’s 
belongings; we don’t speak their names after a certain period of time; other members of the clan 
take on the titles and obligations of the deceased (so’o, kwa’a; kya’a, taha); and we free them 
from their bindings to this world so that they can continue their work in other times and places; 
we are supposed to let them go. 
 Remembered Hopi songs occupy a unique, in-between place between qatungwu and 
soona. Hopi taatawi, are not simply entertainment, art or cultural texts, but actively encourage 
clouds, people, animals, crops, and other entities to come into meaningful relation.  As discussed, 
taatawi are then shared and refined collectively with other members of our villages, worked 
incrementally into the memories of those in the community, and then selected for performance in 
subsequent years depending on a variety of factors.  As Stewart B. Koyiymptewa explains, 
remembering and forgetting the relationships between people and songs is a natural part of the 
way generations grow and assume their leadership role and then decay—some taatawi continue 
                                                
207. The notion of previous lives as slowly decaying guideposts is vital in the perpetuation of agentive indigenous 
cultures.  As Lauren Amsterdam (2013) has written about heritage in Native hip-hop, “Examining performances of 
(ab)originality in terms of heritage does not presupposed the perfection of enactment, but rather accentuates the 
slippages that emerge as one realizes their agency within a web of larger commitments”  She goes on to quote 
Tlingit hip-hop artist D-Script, who explains, “It is necessary first of all to know and to know how to reaffirm what 




to link contemporary generations with the people and places who helped create them, while 
others begin to fall out of people’s memory (Colwell & Koyiymptewa 2011:68-69). 
 The act of recording, then, does something more than extend memory. When recorded, 
Hopi songs exist as a physical manifestation of the singer—who may no longer exist here—and 
the transmission of the song—the substantive connection of the composer, his or her plants, and 
others entities within the composer’s creative network, with those who perform the song, hear it, 
and remember, which produces the desired effects.  In this way, Hopi song recordings exist in at 
least two temporalities—one in the past and one perpetually in the present.  This was pointed out 
to me by DJ DawaTiyo, a Hopi elder who runs a morning traditional music show on KUYI Hopi 
Radio.  DawaTiyo regularly airs about 25 of Laura Boulton’s 1933 and 1940 recordings of Hopi 
performers which the Hopi Cultural Preservation Office and I have been working to return to the 
Hopi community. (There are also a number of repatriated songs he doesn’t air because “they are 
traditional cultural songs” that he doesn’t feel comfortable circulating.)  After one broadcast, I 
asked DawaTiyo whether or not he thought people would actually be interested in these “old 
songs.”  He explained to me, “you know, some people might say these are just old songs.  But 
that’s not really how they are for us; they are always present.” When old recordings are played, 
he said, they may have someone’s voice from the past on them—and that might make them 
interesting historically—but to listeners, the songs themselves continue do what they are meant 
to do.  DawaTiyo’s work to reanimate them by careful selection and recontextualization helps 
them fulfill the community-building and encouraging functions for which these songs exist. 
When Songs Should Be Forgotten 
 While there are times when Hopi ceremonial songs should be remembered and may be 
recorded, there are also times when Hopi songs are supposed to be forgotten, and perhaps even 
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destroyed.  Sometimes this is the result of selective filtering—as just discussed, sometimes songs 
simply didn’t resonate with the current generation or the local environment or are too complex 
and they are soon forgotten.  Songs can also be forgotten as an act of transferring ownership and 
demonstrating humility.  For example, several older composers told me that when they give their 
songs to fellow village members for ceremonial performances, they forget the song in the 
process.  And, as discussed earlier, some songs are harmful if performed by anyone but the 
initiated, and are best forgotten by those who happen to hear them.  
 But it is also important to keep in mind that intentional forgetting can also take much 
more destructive forms.  After the Pueblo Revolt of 1680, when Hopis executed Catholic priests 
who had abused them for more than 50 years and leveled their churches to the ground, some 
clans in the Hopi village of Awa’ovi began practicing Catholicism again.  As Elgean Joshevama 
explains it, they “started to reconstruct the remains of their church and tried to reconstruct their 
power there as well” (Sheridan, et al. 2015:241).  It was not so much that the Fanciscans were 
gaining a foothold in local politics again; rather Hopis recognized the resurgence of a power in 
the practice of Catholicism, a knowledge coupled with force (Foucault 1977:27), with the 
efficacy of ritual, that was threatening to take control over Hopi bodies again and to determine 
Hopi lives. 208 Joshevama continues, “[T]hat destruction, when you think about it, a Hopi village 
to be destroyed by Hopi people, that Hopi lives would be taken, when you think about it, how 
many of our people would be willing to make that kind of a decision today? . . . I think that 
demonstrates to us today how strongly the Hopi people felt about saving this Hopi way of life . .  
                                                
208.  Foucault’s description of disciplinary power in Discipline and Punish is an apt description for the kind of 
power Hopis in 1700 were concerned about. “What was then being formed was a policy of coercions that act upon 
the body, a calculated manipulation of its elements, its gestures, its behavior.  The human body was entering a 
machinery of power that explores it, breaks it down and rearranges it.  A ‘political anatomy’, which was also a 
‘mechanics of power’, was being born; it defined how one may have a hold over others’ bodies, not only so that they 
may do what one wishes, but so that they may operate as one wishes, with the techniques, the speed and the 
efficiency that one determines” Michel Foucault, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 138 (1977). 
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. That they just didn’t want any other way of life, especially the kind that had been imposed on 
us by, by the Spaniards” (Sheridan, et al. 2015:241-42). 
 The erasure of the logics and rituals of Catholicism from Hopi memory, though practiced 
and adopted by many Hopis in the seventeenth century, was permanent and intentional.  So too 
have been other acts of erasure, including the erasure of certain Hopi rituals over time.  Peter 
Whiteley (1998) recounts one such episode in his book Rethinking Hopi Ethnography that 
happened at Hotevilla back in 1927.  K.T. Johnson, a Hopi priest turned Mennonite convert was 
one of the last members of the Bow Clan from the Hopi Village of Hotevilla. As one of the most 
powerful clans at Hopi, the Bow Clan held ownership over some of the most important 
ceremonies in our village, and Johnson’s position within the clan made him an heir to the village 
leadership. But with dwindling numbers, and Johnson’s conversion, the Clan had not performed 
its ceremonies for a number of years. At one point the Bow Clan alter and other ceremonial 
objects were stolen by two of Johnson’s rivals who were intent on revitalizing the ceremony 
without him. In fact, had they been successful, it would have demonstrated their legitimacy as 
village leaders, and our village’s history might have taken a much different course. 
 But in 1927, Johnson’s aunt—the last matriarchal authority of his clan—died.  As 
Johnson describes it, “the fire of our clan [was] extinguished” (Whiteley 1998: 134).  Not long 
thereafter, and with a Menonite missionary in tow, he approached the rival leaders, who were in 
the process of conducting a ceremony, and requested the return of the sacred objects so that he 
could burn them.  Suspicious of the missionary’s influence over Johnson, the rivals initially 
resisted, but later relented, recognizing Johnson’s legitimacy as the one rightfully authorized to 
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control the ceremonies and the ritual objects.  Once in possession of them, Johnson piled them 
up, poured gas on the pile, and asked a local young man to light a match.209 
  How is an archivist, activist, or community ally to understand these historical moments?  
Do we look at them as historical precedents that might authorize us in deciding the future of 
Hopi archival materials? When is destructive forgetting permitted and even necessary, and when 
do we risk and even take lives for the sake of preserving and remembering?  I could attempt to 
weave a concise theoretical thread through these powerful examples of forgetting, and attempt to 
connect my dad’s decision to let more of our ceremonies die out, but that is not my place nor is it 
my purpose in writing this chapter.  What’s relevant here for those of us who care for indigenous 
voices is that the lives of these voices and the networks of which they are a part are often 
purposefully and profoundly finite in relation to our present world, as these examples make 
abundantly clear, and that the refusal to extend those voices in time or space or theory are in 
themselves generative acts of indigenous authority (Simpson 2014:113). The refusal to permit 
Catholic knowledge and power to exist in Hopi society meant we were never subjugated again 
by the Spanish, and I hope, through our memory of that forgetting, by anyone else.  And, while it 
is true that Johnson’s act of forgetting meant that some ceremonies are no longer performed at 
Hotevilla, I have witnessed how bits of these ceremonies—words, melodic phrases, affects—
have now become references in newer ritual songs, which are remembered, circulated, and 
                                                
209. While Johnson was a convert to the Mennonite faith, Whiteley (1998) suggests that he was actually intent on 
fulfilling Hopi prophecies about the development of Hopi culture along a pre-determined progression, which 
necessarily included the death of certain rituals so that others could develop and new leadership paradigms 
established. The rival leaders themselves recognized this at the time Johnson requested the alter, saying “in tones of 
deepest feeling, ‘Alas! It has come, but so must it be.  By destroying these things you will have DESTROYED the 
very foundation of our ceremonies.  The conflagration must spread.  Take these and do as you have said” (140).  
While this language is clearly a flowery gloss by the Mennonite missionary of the actual statements made, one can 




through repetition become profoundly meaningful as they lose their particular temporalities and 
yet retain their effects.  Indeed, though our present generation may lose direct access to the 
entirety of forgotten ceremonies and their associated songs, the voices that sing them continue on 
in other times and places.  In this way, forgotten song knowledge remains whole, resisting 
becoming distorted or altered outside of the necessary authority.  
Conclusion 
 Determining when taatawi should be forgotten, or in the case of archival materials, 
deaccessioned or destroyed, can be a deeply disturbing question in an era where seemingly 
everything can or should be remembered and preserved.  As Viktor Mayer-Schonberger (2009) 
writes, 
“[i]f we had to worry that any information about us would be remembered 
for longer than we live, would we still express our views on matters of 
trivial gossip, share personal experiences, make various political comments, 
or would we self-sensor? The chilling effect of perfect memory alters our 
behavior” (2009:5). 
 
As knowledge about the past accumulates through public records and digital means, some have 
found it hopelessly intoxicating.  Misplaced words, “fake news,” evidence of soured 
relationships continue to inhabit the lifeworlds of people’s virtual and actual lives as 
corporations generate massive archives filled with “big data’s” (toxic) assets. Governments, 
particularly in Europe, have started generating policies to ensure forgetfulness and erasure of 
memory (Grax, Ausloos, & Valcke 2012).  Legal doctrines like expungement of criminal 
histories, the right to oblivion, and now the right to be forgotten, are all examples of ways law 
has been marshalled to force various kinds of archives to let go of the past so that certain publics 
can re-invent themselves in the present and future. 
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 As my dad’s decision exemplifies, indigenous voices may need to decay or be forgotten 
for the sake of allowing indigenous communities to fully live. As in the example of Hopi 
cornstalks, some archived ceremonial materials might provide beneficial guidance and direction 
for future creative efforts, but may lack the substance in their preserved form to generate 
meaning in today’s complex indigenous worlds.  Close, personal collaborations with, and 
deference to, indigenous communities in the care of their voices, rather than anonymous 
safeguarding of their culture, will no doubt help us to better recognize the agentive existences of 




Three Proposals to Advance Sonic Sovereignty 
 
There is no doubt that sound is a key dimension of indigenous sovereignty in the twenty-first 
century.  Not only is sound one of the core means through which knowledge has been and 
continues to be transmitted, it is also a primary means whereby boundaries are imposed, 
contested, transgressed or erased.  One need only look at the ways indigenous sound has been 
mobilized in the Idle No More movement, #NoDAPL, and many other sites of indigenous 
activism in the last decade—filling shopping malls with songs, challenging government 
institutions and political leaders through symbolic (sonic) action, and raising the visibility, 
struggles, and strength of indigenous presences in concert venues, art museums, film screenings, 
mass and social media.210  At the same time, sound is actively being used as a mechanism for 
colonization, including through the use of sonic weapons against indigenous peoples,211 
unrelenting settler commodifications of indigenous culture,212 and the refusal by settler-states 
and their institutions to abide by indigenous laws and protocols governing sound.  And yet, 
indigenous people continue to generate sound that has real effects in the world.  The generative 
social, environmental, and political work of these indigenous networks of sound-based relations 
is what I have been calling sonic sovereignty, with Hopi taatawi creation, production and 
circulation marking out a small but vibrant source of this sovereignty. 
                                                
210. See Victoria Levine & Dylan Robinson, eds. MUSIC AND MODERNITY AMONG FIRST PEOPLES OF NORTH 
AMERICA (forthcoming 2018). 
211. See several uses of sound throughout #NoDAPL, https://www.nodaplarchive.com/sept-daily.html 
212. See Kristen A. Carpenter & Angela K. Riley, Owning Red: A Theory of Indian Cultural Appropriation, 94 Tex. 
L. Rev. 859 (2016). 
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Given the actual and potential harms to sonic sovereignty I have witnessed and addressed in 
these chapters, I believe immediate action is necessary.  In the concluding sections below, I 
begin to etch out three proposals for legal change in the United States that I believe are within 
our reach.  They are modest, because in reality, the only appropriate solution lies in the return of 
all indigenous lands that were coercively, deceptively, or unlawfully taken from indigenous 
peoples without their prior, informed consent and an agreement of reciprocal benefit or other 
form of compensation to the community.   
In the first proposal, I argue that current federal copyright laws should be amended to 
recognize indigenous sovereignty over sound created on the lands of indigenous peoples. The 
second proposal advocates for the development of indigenized licensing regimes to govern 
indigenous sound, drawing from successful examples already being used within the open source 
community.  Third, I argue that indigenous peoples should have a “right to forget” through 
which they can require institutions holding their ancestors’ voices to deaccession all physical and 
digital copies of these materials, and relinquish all rights to control them, so that indigenous 
communities can care for these voices on their own terms. 
 
Proposal 1: Amending the Copyright Act 
As the case study presented in Chapter 3 suggests, there are significant gaps and 
ambiguities in the law surrounding the protection of indigenous creativity, particularly for works 
created on the lands of indigenous peoples.  None of the three potential bodies of law that could 
potentially protect recordings of indigenous voices is a clear win for indigenous groups seeking 
to reclaim them from resistant holding institutions. And, one of these bodies of law appears to be 
in jeopardy of being preempted by proposed federal legislation, as I discuss below. 
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In 2009, Congress commissioned the Copyright Office to weigh the potential risks and 
benefits of bringing all sound recordings under federal copyright protection213, including those 
made prior to 1972.  In its report to Congress, the Copyright Office generally supported the 
move, citing the inconsistency of state statutes and common law governing these recordings, the 
economic and legal benefits of uniform coverage, and the potential for more works to eventually 
enter the public domain, thereby benefiting the American populace.214  In 2017, and again in 
2018, members of the House and Senate introduced the CLASSICS Act (Compensating Legacy 
Artists for their Songs, Service, & Important Contributions to Society Act), which proposed to 
eliminate some aspects of common-law copyrights for pre-1972 sound recordings.  But while the 
Copyright Office funded reports analyzing the consequences of migrating works from state 
common-law and statutory structures to federal copyright, no studies were commissioned on 
the potential impacts for sonic works created on the aboriginal lands of Native American 
Tribes, Alaska Native Corporations and Villages, and Native Hawaiian Organizations.  Did 
Congress and the United States Copyright Office assume that none of the “Legacy Artists” who 
made “Important Contributions to Society” did so within the borders of federally recognized 
Indian tribes?     
There is an urgent need for research and legislation that takes into account the actual 
needs of indigenous communities as they seek to protect and promote creativity and innovation 
on their lands.  Even at a conceptual level, tribes’ interests in protecting sound recordings may be 
altogether distinct from those interests protected by the Copyright Act.  The classes of protection 
needed by tribes for recordings of ritual songs, ceremonial performances, and oral histories, for 
                                                
213.  COPYRIGHT OFFICE, FEDERAL COPYRIGHT PROTECTION FOR PRE-1972 SOUND RECORDINGS (2011). 
214.  Id. at 120-39. 
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example, may be quite distinct from those reflected in the Copyright Act.  I argue that such a 
conflict of interests over ownership and circulation of indigenous voices necessitates retooling 
our present copyright structure.  As I discuss later in this section, these divergent interests are 
due in large part to ontological differences in the ways some forms of indigenous creative work 
function as compared to “musical works,” “audiovisual works,” or other forms of copyrightable 
expression currently protected under the Act.  Ontologically distinct works can find adequate 
protection within the federal copyright scheme only if tribal laws governing their ownership and 
use are recognized and enforced by federal law.  An “indigenous works” amendment to the 
Copyright Act may allow tribes to determine what kinds of sound generated on tribal lands 
should flow within global intellectual property regimes, and which should be subject to 
indigenous communities’ own protocols and ownership structures. 
Numerous scholars have noted the problems Native American creators may face as they 
attempt to protect their works under the provisions of the Copyright Act.215  Many indigenous 
creative works fall outside the scope of copyright and other kinds of intellectual or cultural 
property protections due to:  (1) the nature of their creation, which may not be strictly human in 
origin, (2) differing concepts of “fixation,” where a work need not be embodied in a material 
object for it to be considered “fixed” for a given indigenous community,216 (3) the finiteness of 
the terms of these protections, especially for some Native American communities where the 
                                                
215.  Two significant bibliographic resources compiling commentary on the uncomfortable fit between indigenous 
cultural expressions and copyright or other forms of intellectual property protection include Rosemary J. Coombe, 
The Expanding Purview of Cultural Properties and Their Politics, 5 ANNU. REV. L. SOC. SCI. 393 (2009); Robert C. 
Lancefield, On the repatriation of recorded sound from ethnomusicological archives:  A survey of some of the issues 
pertaining to people’s access to documentation of the musical heritage (1993) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
Wesleyan University). 
216.  C.f. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining “fixed”). 
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oldest creative works merit more protection than newer ones,217 and (4) the difficulties 
indigenous communities face as they seek to prove ownership over materials using settler law 
and evidentiary doctrines.  Further, as discussed in the previous chapters, many indigenous 
groups’ interests in their ancestors’ voices are not aligned with the kinds of economic and 
intellectual progress desired by generations of non-indigenous settlers on their lands who 
adopted and developed our present copyright regimes.  Indeed, many indigenous groups are 
currently advocating for copyright protection for their creative works solely to prevent further 
colonization, which, while still occurring through the taking of land, is also happening through 
the misappropriation of their cultural knowledge and their modes of expression.218   
 One of the central challenges facing tribes and legislators interested in protecting indigenous 
voices through copyright law is that these voices are often not simply artistic or expressive 
materials, but are actually active components of indigenous networks of relations.  The challenge 
of determining ownership interests in these materials is an ontological problem—the question of 
what a recorded indigenous voice does in the world and how it relates to other entities and not 
necessarily how “original” it is or whether its transfer from one person to another can be 
proved.219  This problem of ontological difference has been one that has plagued settler society 
                                                
217.  See Richard A. Guest, Intellectual Property Rights and Native American Tribes, 20 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 
111 (1995). 
218.  See U.N. DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, G.A. Res. 61/295, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/295, 
art. 11 § 1, art. 31 § 1 (Sept. 13, 2007), 
http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/eftab720irnaturaldocuments/DRIPS_en.pdf.  For specific examples related to 
the case study, see David Howes, Combating Cultural Appropriation in the American Southwest: Lessons from the 
Hopi Experience Concerning the Uses of Law, 10 CANADIAN J. OF L. & SOC’Y (1995). 
219. BRUNO LATOUR, AN INQUIRY INTO MODES OF EXISTENCE 48-49 (2013) (arguing that in developing analytical 
methods to deal with phenomena that move across modern intellectual domains (e.g. music and speech, which exist 
simultaneously in domains as diverse as law, science, politics, and religion), the problem is rarely an empirical one, 
but one of selecting the appropriate categories for analysis).  The failure to strike the appropriate balance between 
creative monopoly and public access to culture in the application of copyright law in Native American contexts is 
not necessarily a factual problem—trying to determine who contributed certain pitches, rhythms, lyrics and chords 
only reinforces what are often Eurocentric categories.  Rather, the categories of analysis to be used in determining 
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and settler law for generations.  It is clear that, in the United States, Congress and the courts 
believe indigenous groups are entitled to control their lands, culture, and membership by means 
of sovereign governments operating under distinct ontological frameworks,220 but they are also 
uncomfortable with enforcing indigenous entitlements that arise from these ontological 
formations that cannot be justified through the logics of American jurisprudence.221 
Determining ownership interest in the indigenous voice requires taking into account these 
ontological differences.  Tribal laws (including statutes, common law, and customary law), not 
the Copyright Act, should be the default body of law applied to questions of creativity, 
authorship, and ownership interests in sound recordings and other creative works made on the 
lands of indigenous peoples, particularly when a work in question is one that was never meant to 
be circulated beyond the control of the tribe or its members.222  Therefore, the Copyright Act 
                                                                                                                                                       
the copyrightability and ownership of Native American works, and the appropriate relationships between those 
categories, are incompletely addressed under the copyright law at this juncture.  The constitutional categories of 
copyright, including “Writings,” “Sciences and the Useful Arts,” “Progress,” and “Authors” each have developed 
with virtually no consideration of indigenous peoples’ fundamental categories of creativity.  As discussed in Chapter 
1, “Authors” of Hopi ceremonial songs—those who create and exercise dominion and control over the songs—
include non-human actors.  Could authorship and ownership rights of these sorts of actors be appropriately protected 
under current federal copyright regimes? See Naruto v. Slater, No. 15-cv-04324, 2016 WL 362231 *3-4 (N.D. Cal. 
Jan. 28, 2016) (denying standing to sue for copyright infringement of a photograph taken by a crested macaque, 
relying in part on the Copyright Office’s statement that “to qualify as a work of ‘authorship’ a work must be created 
by a human being.”). 
220. See Montana v. United States, 540 U.S. 544, 566 (1981). 
221.  See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 210-11 (1978).  At issue was the ability of tribes to try 
nonmembers in tribal court, but the case has been relied upon in the civil context as setting forward the limits of 
tribes to regulate nonmembers’ conduct on tribal lands generally.  Perpetuating the racialized frameworks of 
nineteenth jurisprudence exemplified in Ex Parte Crow Dog, 591 U.S. 556, 571 (1878), the Oliphant court found it 
“an intrusion[] on [U.S. Citizens’] personal liberty” that a tribal court could assert jurisdiction “‘over the members of 
a community separated by race [and] tradition, . . . It tries them, not by their peers, nor by the customs of their 
people, nor the law of their land, but by . . . a different race, according to the law of a social state of which they have 
an imperfect conception . . . These considerations . . . speak equally strongly against the validity of respondents’ 
contention that Indian tribes, although fully subordinated to the sovereignty of the United States, retain the power to 
try non-Indians according to their own customs and procedure.” 
222. .See Angela R. Riley, “Straight Stealing”:  Towards an Indigenous System of Cultural Property Protection, 80 
WASH. L. REV. 69, 74 (2005) (“Because it is suited to indigenous groups’ particular cultures and normative 
frameworks, tribal law is inimitably capable of capturing and accommodating the unique features of the tribal 
community.  Tribal cultures are not all alike; tribal laws reflect a tribe’s economic system, cultural beliefs, and 
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should be amended to exempt works created on aboriginal lands of federally recognized Indian 
tribes, Alaska Native Corporations, and Native Hawaiian Organizations, and other indigenous 
communities, if conflicting tribal laws exist.  In other words, tribal laws governing the ownership 
and circulation of the indigenous voice should supersede any property interests (or limitations on 
those interests) imposed by the Copyright Act (or other similar federal and state laws). In this 
way, tribal communities whose interests align with the Copyright Act’s provisions and purposes 
are in no danger of losing the protections the Copyright Act affords—indigenous communities 
need not pass any new laws to receive general copyright protection, while tribes like the Hopi 
Tribe whose interests diverge significantly can take action through their own laws to prevent 
undesired exploitation of their members’ works. 
Some might argue that many works made on Tribal lands should be protected by 
copyright because they were created with the intention that they would circulate in local, 
national, or international creative markets, and would flow more efficiently through the global 
economy and be potentially eligible for multilateral treaty protection if subject to copyright law 
rather than tribal ownership structures.  For example, artists in popular music genres or 
indigenous enterprises that want to create material for commercial consumption shouldn’t be at a 
disadvantage simply because they reside on a reservation.  While this may be true, indigenous 
communities—not settler states—should be the ones to sort out which forms of creativity should 
be governed by copyright and which should not; and, as I hope has become clear in this 
dissertation, indigenous communities are very much capable of having these debates and making 
these distinctions.    
                                                                                                                                                       
sensitive sacred knowledge in nuanced ways that top-down national and international regimes simply cannot.”). 
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Some might also argue that tribes shouldn’t have their own, enforceable copyright laws 
because artists, cultural producers, or even research and development entities (members of a tribe 
or not), might take advantage of tribally created loopholes or safeharbors by creating their works 
on Indian reservations, thereby circumventing federal laws and disrupting the efficiencies of the 
information economy.  But, such a scenario may actually be desirable under current public policy 
that emphasizes tribal self-determination and economic growth.  In any case, indigenous 
communities should have the ability to develop their own ownership structures for creativity and 
innovation, irrespective of the desires or economic policies of colonizing states.223  And, should 
an indigenous community desire to forgo ownership structures of its own creation and adopt 
global copyright regimes, they should have the ability to do so—in whole or in part—and not be 
limited to the constraints set up by those who chose to colonize their lands.  
At a minimum, Congress should ensure that copyright laws not preempt tribal protections 
governing works that are ontologically distinct from the kinds of works copyright was meant to 
protect.224 If a work has little or no ontological difference from the kind of work the Copyright 
Act was meant to protect, I believe most tribes would find that it would make little sense to 
exempt such a work from copyright law. But, where a work—a voice performing taatawi for 
example—functions not as music but as a mode of intervention or relation between people and 
environmental actors, such a work should be considered ontologically distinct from 
copyrightable subject matter, and aboriginal ownership interests, protocols and protections 
governing its circulation should supersede any other claims.   
                                                
223. See UNDRIP art. 11 and 31. 
224. This follows jurisprudence on the second fair use factor, which finds that the nature of a copyrighted work 
should play a role in whether a member of the public can use it without the copyright holder’s permission under the 
doctrine of fair use. See 17 U.S.C. § 107(2).  Importantly, at least some courts have found that the key question for 
determining how this factor weighs in determining whether a use is fair (or if not fair, copyright infringement), is 
whether the work in question is “the kind of work which copyright was meant to protect.” See DK v. Archive 
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The necessity of specialized judicial expertise in determining ontological difference is clear: it 
would seem unlikely that juries or federal judges without substantial training in indigenous 
modes of relation would have the kinds of knowledge and skill—or the kinds of obligations to 
indigenous communities, their territories, and the networks that reside within them—sufficient to 
distinguish between a work that should be governed by the Copyright Act and one that should be 
protected by indigenous protocols. Fortunately, tribal courts and other indigenous adjudicatory 
mechanisms weigh these kinds of ontological differences on a regular basis as they apply tribal 
laws, codes, protocols, and practices alongside the imposed constraints of settler legal systems.225  
Unfortunately, in the United States, tribal courts’ ability to perform such a specialized function 
has been sharply curtailed through judicial activism.  Following the Supreme Court’s 2001 
decision in Nevada v. Hicks penned by the late Justice Antonin Scalia, tribal courts are no longer 
recognized as courts of general jurisdiction.226  In a recent action for declaratory judgment in a 
trademark case under the Lanham Act, the Ninth Circuit rejected tribal court jurisdiction over the 
dispute, basing its decision in part on Hicks, finding the subject matter to have exceeded the 
scope of the tribe’s legislative, and, consequentially, its adjudicative power.227  Under current 
precedents, it is not clear that a federally recognized Indian tribe could, under its inherent 
sovereignty alone, assert jurisdiction in a copyright ownership dispute arising under federal 
copyright laws.228  Therefore, in order for tribal courts and other indigenous adjudicatory 
mechanisms to be empowered to make judgments regarding ownership interests in indigenous 
                                                
225.  See generally Tribal Law and Policy Institute, TRIBAL COURT CLEARING HOUSE (last visited Nov. 8, 2016), 
https://perma.cc/5EJF-TP97 (discussing the complex issues involved in reconciling indigenous modes of 
adjudication with adversarial legal environments). 
226.  Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 374 (2001). 
227.  Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. King Mountain Tobacco Co., Inc., 569 F.3d 932, 938 (9th Cir. 2009). 
228.   See Hicks, 533 U.S. at 366-69. 
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creativity and innovation, an amendment to the Copyright Act must also expressly recognize the 
inherent jurisdiction of indigenous communities to adjudicate copyright cases arising on tribal 
lands.   
The above proposals are not without their support from other scholars who have explored 
these issues in far greater depth and made similar recommendations. Angela R. Riley and Kristen 
A. Carpenter have argued for nearly two decades that tribal courts should play a central role in 
resolving questions about indigenous intellectual properties that require a careful balancing of 
tribal and federal interests.229  James Nason has argued that federal courts should be asked to 
enforce tribal court decisions involving intangible cultural properties like songs and sound 
recordings through principles of comity.230  Rebecca Tsosie has advocated for a tribal “right to 
culture”—a judicial concept she has developed for protecting tribal intellectual properties—that 
likewise relies on tribal jurisprudence to solve questions of ownership.231  Her proposed 
framework is based on Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
which declares that ethnic minorities “shall not be denied the right . . . to enjoy their own 
culture.”232  Under her proposed framework, tribes are permitted to set limits on uses of tribal 
culture so as to allow them to flourish locally, and are also empowered, presumably under 
                                                
229.  See generally Kristen A. Carpenter, Sonia K. Katyal, and Angela R. Riley, Clarifying Cultural Property, 17 
INT’L J. CULTURAL PROP. 581, 587 (2010); Angela R. Riley, “Straight Stealing”: Towards an Indigenous 
System of Cultural Property Protection, 80 WASH. L. REV. 69 (2005); Angela R. Riley, Recovering Collectivity: 
Group Rights to Intellectual Property in Indigenous Communities, 18 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 175 (2000). 
230.  See James D. Nason, Traditional Property and Modern Laws: The Need for Native American Community 
Intellectual Property Rights Legislation, 12 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 255 (2001). 
231.  Rebecca Tsosie, Reclaiming Native Stories:  An Essay on Cultural Appropriation and Cultural Rights, 34 
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 299, 334-38, 357 (2002). 
232.  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), Art. 27, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/2200(XXI) (Jan. 1, 1967). 
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federal law, to prevent harmful appropriations of them, thereby striking a balance between tribal 
interests and freedom of expression concerns.233 
Current public policy toward indigenous peoples (NAGPRA, UNDRIP) would also tend to 
support such a proposal.  These policies reflect the public’s desire to remedy past takings and 
suppressions of indigenous culture by recognizing ownership rights and returning control of 
these materials to those who can most appropriately use them.  In doing so, the United Nations, 
Congress, and many other have explicitly recognized existing tribal laws, protocols, oral 
histories, etc. as the basis for establishing ownership in these materials, allowing such ownership 
claims to supersede those of government agencies, museums, and other federally funded 
organizations unless proof of voluntary transfer has been given.234  Additionally, concerns over 
social equity and judicial economy weigh heavily toward recognizing the place of tribal law in 
our nation’s copyright system.  Given the potential harm to tribal interests that could result from 
deferring all questions of ownership of the indigenous voice to the Copyright Act and other 
bodies of settler law, (and the likelihood that federal intellectual property laws’ applicability on 
tribal lands will continue to be a litigated issue as tribes acquire more and more intellectual 
property),235 an indigenous works amendment to the Copyright Act must (1) allow tribes to 
continue to define ownership interests in forms of creativity and innovation generated within 
                                                
233. See Tsosie, supra note 172. (explaining that it is not certain whether federal or tribal courts would adjudicate a 
“right to culture”). 
234.  See 25 U.S.C. §§ 3001(13), 3005(c) (1990). 
235. Several tribes already own significant IP portfolios.  Two prominent examples include the Florida Seminole 
Tribe’s purchase of the Hard Rock Café trademark.  See Katy Byron, “Hard Rock Café sold to Native Americans.” 
CNN MONEY (Dec. 7, 2006).  And the St. Regis Mohawk Tribe’s expansion of its IP holdings to include 
pharmaceutical patents.  See Meg Tirrell, “Mohawk tribe sues Microsoft, Amazon for patent infringement.” CNBC 
(Oct. 18, 2017) (“The [St. Regis Mohawk Tribe] says its patent partnerships are part of its efforts to economically 
diversify, noting gaming revenue from a casino it operates has leveled off in recent years, and that it has significant 
health and ecnomic challenges in its community.  In the Allergan partnership, the pharmaceutical company paid the 
tribe $13.75 million after transferring the patent rights and then licensing them back exclusively.”). 
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their territories and (2) require courts to look to tribal law and judicial expertise when called 
upon to determine copyright ownership in creative materials produced on tribal lands. 
 
Proposal 2: Indigenized Licensing 
 As the discussion above illustrates, copyright and other intellectual property laws are not 
the perfect answer to indigenous people’s demands that their creative works be protected 
according to their own interests and protocols.236 As of the writing of this dissertation, copyright 
and other federal intellectual property laws do not recognize tribes’ authority to determine when 
and how indigenous interests apply to creative work generated on tribal lands, how indigenous 
protocols governing creative work will be enforced when they conflict with settler laws, or how 
indigenous ownership interests might affect those who are not members of federally recognized 
Indian tribes.  And, given current politics, the possibility of such a change in these laws seems 
somewhat remote. Even if tribal laws governing copyrightable materials were enforceable by 
state and/or federal courts, there may very well be indigenous voices or other creative materials 
that presently exist in the “public domain” or which otherwise cannot be legally reclaimed by 
indigenous groups, but which tribes would still be anxious to care for and control.   This leads us 
to ask whether another body of law that typically governs archival materials—contract law—
might provide additional solutions for indigenous communities seeking to reclaim and control 
uses of their ancestors’ voices.  
 Kathy Bowrey (2006) suggests that protocols governing ownership and circulation of 
Aboriginal Australian cultural materials, while not readily enforceable through existing 
intellectual property laws, might nonetheless be enforceable through private agreements between 
                                                
236. See Howes, David, Combating Cultural Appropriation in the American Southwest: Lessons Form the Hopi 
Experience Concerning the Uses of Law, 10 Canadian J. L. & Soc’y 129 (1995). 
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indigenous groups and holding institutions.  She explains that in a number of communities—
particularly the software development community—contract law has for decades been used as a 
means of creating alternative ownership and circulation regimes.  These communities have 
generated specially tailored licensing frameworks that create pockets of industry custom through 
private law that are difficult to disturb.237 Over time, indigenous protocols for ownership and 
circulation embedded in contracts with holding institutions could potentially receive recognition 
in copyright law in the same ways open source (and to some degree CopyLeft) paradigms of 
ownership and circulation have.  At the very least, as the open source software movement has 
shown, the risk of litigation and the potential for community sanctions and shaming may be 
enough of a deterrent that regimes established through these kinds of licenses will be widely 
adhered to. 
History and Function of Open Source Licenses 
 Open Source licensing had its origins in the early 1980s as a form of “ethical rebellion” 
by software programmers who were opposed to the proprietary model of software development 
espoused by the software giants of the day.  Under the proprietary model, the use of source code 
had been restricted under copyright law to copyright holders (typically a software manufacturer) 
and its licensees (paying customers), thereby limiting the possibility for collaboration within the 
industry.238 To remedy the situation, the open source movement sought to move away from 
exclusion as the device used to manage the circulation of software, replacing it with a set of 
universal software licenses that actually did the opposite: open source licenses effectively 
                                                
237. Kathy Bowrey, Alternative Intellectual Property?: Indigenous Protocols, Copyleft and New Juridifications of 
Customary Practices 6 Macquarie Law Journal 65, 90 (2006). 
238. Vikrant Narayan Vasudeva, Open Source Software and Intellectual Property Rights (2014) 
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prevented anyone who possessed open source software from restricting its flow.239 The first open 
source license was generated for the GNU (later Linux) operating system—an open source 
alternative to the commercial UNIX operating system.240  As Vasudeva (2014) reports, the GNU 
license “gives subsequent users of the copyrighted code the ability to pass along restrictions that 
embody open source tenets”—in other words, it exercises a copyright owner’s right to determine 
who reproduces or distributes software in a way that forces all subsequent users to keep the 
circulation of the software open without extracting royalties or placing other conditions on its 
use.241 
 The GNU GPL open source license contains a number of provisions that carry out the 
ideals of the open source movement despite its reliance on traditional copyright law to enforce 
the license.  On a broad scale, the GNU license affirms the copyright rights that apply to the 
software it covers (“This License explicitly affirms your unlimited permission to run the 
unmodified Program” and “This License acknowledges your rights of fair use or other 
equivalent, as provided by copyright law.”).242  Nothing in the license suggests that copyright 
law does not apply or is not enforceable.  To the contrary, unless some kind of limitation on 
circulation or access (including copyright rights like reproduction, distribution, or the creation of 
derivative works) could be exerted by the licensor, the terms of the GNU open source license 
probably would be unenforceable.  To achieve the open source movement’s objectives, the GNU 
license partially negates the exclusivity of some of the copyright holder’s rights in a way that 
                                                
239. Id. at 34 
240. Id. at 18. 
241. Id. at 34. 




defeats copyright’s underlying premise (i.e., that owners of copyrights should have the right to 
exclude others from the work they create in order to advance their [or their firm’s] own financial 
interests).  But in order to obtain the negation of the copyright holder’s exclusive ownership and 
circulation of the software, the Licensor imposes rules on circulation and ownership that those in 
the open source community must theoretically agree to to be able to use it—i.e., conditions that 
arguably advance collaborative innovation by allowing all potential users the ability to access 
and use the original software and any newly created work derived from it as long as they also 
give open access to others on the same, generally accepted terms. 
 At a more granular level, the GNU 3 License propagates open source ideology through its 
conditional granting clause, which allows those who receive the work to use it and distribute it, 
but (1) only upon the recipient’s compliance with the terms of the GNU 3 open source license, 
and (2) only on condition that any re-grant of the work by the recipient follows essentially the 
same terms of the original grant along with a copyright notice providing the “rules of the game.”  
For example, the GNU GPL 3 granting clause contains the following language: 
“You may convey verbatim copies of the Program’s source code as 
you receive it, in any medium, provided that you conspicuously 
and appropriately publish on each copy an appropriate copyright 
notice; keep intact all notices stating that this License [and any 
additional terms permitted under the GNU 3 license] apply . . .; 
and give all recipients a copy of this License243 . . . .”  
“You may convey a work based on the Program . . . provided that 
you also meet all of these conditions:  
a) The work must carry prominent notices stating that you 
modified it . . . 
b) The work must carry prominent notices stating that it is released 
under this license . . .  
c) You must license the entire work, as a whole, under this License 
to anyone who comes into possession of a copy.  This License will 
therefore apply, [along with additional terms added by the 
licensee], to the whole of the work, and all its parts, regardless of 
                                                
243. GNU 3 License at § 4, ¶ 1. 
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how they are packaged.  This License gives no permission to 
license the work in any other way, but it does not invalidate such 
permission if you have separately received it.”244 
 
Under the GNU GPL 3’s granting clause the licensee acts essentially as the agent of the licensor. 
The licensee is required to offer a license to subsequent users to use the work, but only on the 
conditions specified by the open source license.  Importantly, the licensor does not explicitly 
grant the licensee the right to sublicense the work;245 rather, when the licensee provides the work 
to another person, the initial licensee is simply facilitating the grant of a license from the original 
licensor to the new user (“Each time [the licensee] convey[s] a covered work, the recipient 
automatically receives a license from the original licensors, to run, modify and propagate that 
work, subject to this License.”)246  So, there is no chain of title that can be broken or altered—all 
users of the work are required to be linked to the owner of the work via contract. 
 As mentioned above, the GNU GPL 3 license also contains a “whip” of sorts to ensure 
compliance with its provisions.  The License contains an automatic termination provision, where 
“[a]ny attempt otherwise to propagate or modify [the GNU license] is void, and will 
automatically terminate your rights under this License.”247 In practice, this means that if a 
software developer uses a piece of GNU-protected source code in her commercial software, but 
attempts to add additional exclusions to the license, her license ends and she could be sued for 
copyright infringement if she were to sell the software. But even if her license is terminated, the 
GNU GPL ensures that anyone who uses her software remains a licensee of the original licensor, 
                                                
244. GNU 3 License at § 5. 
245. See GNU 3 License at §2, ¶3. (“Sublicensing is not allowed”) 
246. GNU 3 License at § 10, ¶1. 
247. GNU 3 License at §8, ¶1. 
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bound only to the conditions of the GNU GPL.  Because the license is granted anew from the 
owners of the work each time the original software passes from one person to another (rather 
than being sublicensed in a chain of licensees) any termination of a licensee’s rights “does not 
terminate the licenses of parties who have received copies or rights from [a licensee] under this 
License.”248 The terminated licensee’s unauthorized additions to the GNU GPL, if any, fall out, 
and the License continues on, unchanged. 
Application of the GNU Open Source License Model to Indigenous Voices 
 The GNU open source license, then, is a means of leveraging copyright (or other rights to 
limit access to a work) in a way that superimposes a specific economic structure and mode of 
relations within a particular community—backed up by the coercive power of the state.  My 
argument here is that this same structure could be utilized to achieve the goals of indigenous 
groups who are seeking to negotiate agreements with museums, archives, and even private 
collectors over the ownership of their ancestors’ voices.  
 Using Licenses to Recognize Tribal Interests in Indigenous Media 
 First, as discussed above, the GNU GPL 3 License uses copyright law as a means of 
compelling compliance with its ideology and economic structure.  It effectively limits the scope 
of copyright rights, but on condition that the work be used in ways that coincide with open 
source principles.  As discussed above, the GNU license would not function unless at least some 
rights were held solely by the Licensor.  If a work distributed by the GNU license were somehow 
owned by another entity or in the public domain (and physically or digitally available for the 
general public to make copies from), there would be no need for the public to abide by the 
conditions of the GNU GPL. 
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In situations where an indigenous legal entity (individual, federally or state recognized 
tribe, corporation or unincorporated association of indigenous community members, etc.) clearly 
owns reproduction and/or distribution rights to indigenous media housed in an archive, or, if the 
media is not subject to copyright but the tribe or other indigenous entity has secured the right to 
control public access to media from the institution, the stage is set for the indigenous owners to 
control the circulation of the media under a contingent licensing framework like the GNU 
GPL.249    It is imperative, then, that tribes first secure agreements with holding institutions that 
bind the parties to an understanding of how copyrights and other exclusive intellectual property 
rights pertaining to indigenous media are owned, as well as an agreement to abide by any 
exclusive rights arising under tribal, international, or federal laws.  And if tribes do not hold 
these rights, they should seek to reclaim them either by an institutional grant back to the tribe or 
some other kind of repatriation mechanisms (see Chapter 3). In cases where the holding 
institution might not otherwise be within the jurisdiction of the tribe or bound by the protocols 
established by the tribal entity,250 it is also important that these licensing agreements contain 
choice of law provisions that recognize tribal laws governing these materials.   
                                                
249. In the rare instances where museums or archives hold valid intellectual property interests in indigenous media, 
a clause transferring all right, title and interest from the holding institution to the Tribe or an authorized tribal 
authority may permit the tribe to exercise control over these items in a manner consistent with tribal ownership and 
circulation protocols. But, as discussed above, neither museums and archives nor tribes typically hold complete, 
unencumbered or uncontested intellectual property rights to indigenous media contained in museum or archival 
collections. In fact, museums and archives may claim that many indigenous media materials are in the public 
domain and free to use by anyone. 
250. The Supreme Court has set limits to tribal civil jurisdiction over nonmembers in both Merrion v. Jicarilla 
Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982), and Montana v. United States, 540 U.S. 544 (1981), and in subsequent cases. 
Under Montana, an entity can become subject to tribal laws when that entity (1) enters into contractual relationships 
with the tribe or its members in such a way that the activity has a nexus with tribal interests, or (2) when the entity’s 
activities on an Indian reservation “threaten or ha[ve] some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic 
security, or the health or welfare of the tribe.” 540 U.S. at 566.  Given how vitally important control over these 
archival materials may be both to tribal interests and the political integrity and the welfare of the tribe, an archive or 
museum could potentially come under tribal legislative jurisdiction under either of Montana’s provisions. 
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Some specific terms that may allow for indigenous rights in these materials to be 
recognized may include: 
• An agreement that that Tribes or tribal members are the rightful owners of some or all of 
the intellectual property rights, including copyrights, contained in the media. 
• An agreement that the Tribe or tribal members possess ownership interests in the media 
arising out of tribal law, and that the Archive consents to being subject to tribal laws 
governing those interests; and, if the Archive is a federal or state agency, waives any 
sovereign immunity from suit for actions brought in federal, state or tribal courts to assert 
or defend those interests. 
• An agreement that the media in question is considered by both parties to be a sacred 
object or an object of cultural patrimony within the meaning of the Native American 
Graves Protection and Repatriation Act; that the Museum or Archive has no evidence that 
the media was obtained with the voluntary consent of an individual or group that had 
authority of alienation; and therefore, the media, and any intellectual property rights 
appertaining to it, is owned solely by the Tribe and subject to expeditious repatriation by 
the Museum or Archive. 
• As between the parties, the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples, articles 11 and 31 (which require the return of indigenous intellectual property, 
cultural heritage and traditional knowledge and the enforcement of indigenous laws 
governing them), shall determine the ownership interests pertaining to the media in 
question, and shall provide any remedies applicable to the unauthorized use of the media. 
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• Any dispute as to ownership or circulation of the media between the parties shall be 
adjudicated in a court of the Tribe, or through an alternative adjudicatory mechanism 
approved by the Tribe.  
Using Licenses to Require Compliance with Indigenous Protocols in the Circulation of 
Indigenous Media 
 As discussed earlier in this section, transferring copyrights from a museum or archive to a 
federally recognized Indian tribe or other indigenous community entity is not always possible, 
nor is it a foolproof way of ensuring that indigenous media is circulated within indigenous 
cultural protocols.  The GNU GPL 3 license also provides a potential mechanism indigenous 
communities might use to require archives and potential follow-on users of their materials to 
circulate those materials according to tribal customs or protocols or only with permission of 
specific tribal or cultural authorities.  Indigenous groups, upon securing exclusive control over 
archival materials through tribal, federal, state, or international law as discussed above, could 
grant a conditional license to archives and other users of their work, requiring that (1) the 
holding institution music comply with indigenous protocols governing the use of the materials, 
and (2) that the archive must license the work, on behalf of the tribe, to anyone who obtains 
possession of a copy of the work in any form, using a license approved by the Tribe or 
incorporating tribal laws, policies, or protocols pertaining to cultural materials.  A sample 
granting clause, based on the GNU GPL 3 discussed above, might read: 
“The Tribe hereby grants a nonexclusive license to the Archive to reproduce, 
distribute, perform, or convey the Media or any materials derived from the Media to 
Users provided that the Archive also meet all of the following conditions:  
1. (1) Every copy of the Media must carry a prominent 
notice stating how the Media is owned and who may 
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authorize its use including but not limited to the name and 
contact information of the owner(s) of any copyrights or 
other intellectual property rights in the Media and/or tribal 
or aboriginal rights pertaining to the Media, and a warning 
that by using the Media, the User will enter into a License 
Agreement with the Tribe (directly affecting tribal 
interests) under the same terms as that of the Archive, and 
that any violation of the License Agreement may be subject 
to remedies available under tribal law and enforcement in 
tribal court. 
2. (2) The Media must carry a prominent notice plainly 
visible to all Users of the Media, that access to the Media is 
conditioned on compliance with the protocols, customs, or 
other conditions annexed to this License Agreement, which 
the Archive shall make available in full [at a specific 
location / on the organization’s website / upon request to 
the Archive], unless permission to use the Media has been 
otherwise expressly granted by [the Tribe or a specific 
tribal or cultural authority] to the User under separate terms 
and conditions. 
3. (3) The Archive must license the Media described in 
this License Agreement to anyone who comes into 
possession of a copy of the Media.  This License will apply 
to the Media, in whole or in parts, regardless of how it is 
packaged.  This License gives no permission to license the 
Media in any other way without the express written consent 
of [the Tribe or a specific tribal or cultural authority].” 
4. (4) Any attempt otherwise to propagate or modify this 
License Agreement is void, and will automatically 
terminate the Archive’s rights under this License.  
However, the termination of the License Agreement does 
not terminate the licenses of Users who have received 
copies of the Media or any rights to access or use the Media 
under this License. 
 
While it might seem counter-intuitive, the goal of this granting clause is to compel the archive to 
license the conditional right to use the media it holds to each and every person who obtains the 
media, whether in person, via streaming from an online database, etc.  But even though end-users 
technically receive the right to use the work, that right is made continent on their abiding by the 
indigenous community’s laws and protocols or obtaining approval from indigenous authorities.  
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By making both the archive’s and the end-user’s license from the indigenous entity conditional 
on the their fulfillment of these obligations, any violation of indigenous protocols contained or 
referenced in the agreement would not only constitute a breach of contract, but, if the material is 
under copyright, any § 106 use of the material once the license is breached could also constitute 
copyright infringement.251  Further, the Archive could be subject to tribal laws and remedies for 
the violation of its tribal or aboriginal rights.  In effect, the archive would be required to ensure 
that the material is circulated and protected under the terms set forward by the indigenous 
community.  
 In sum, licensing agreements that contain provisions like these may allow indigenous 
communities to assert and exercise control over these materials on their own terms, including the 
application of tribal laws, protocols, or authorities established in or referenced by the agreement, 
to questions of ownership and circulation involving indigenous media. 
 
Proposal 3: Indigenous Care of our Ancestors’ Voices 
The final proposal I want to make concerns what to do about indigenous voices currently 
held outside of the care of indigenous communities.  As I argued in Chapter 4, erasure and 
forgetting are necessary aspects of indigenous sonic sovereignty.  When indigenous voices are 
made to live under the anonymous care of the settler state, indigenous sovereignty is diminished. 
Therefore, the care of indigenous voices should be, in the first instance, in the hands of 
indigenous peoples and not settler institutions.  Importantly, this care may include the right of 
indigenous communities to determine how these voices should live, or whether these voices 
should die, disintegrate, or be forgotten.   In many ways, the right of indigenous peoples to care 
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for their voices parallels current debates in Europe regarding the right of individuals to have their 
data be erased or “forgotten” by big data corporations like Google, Facebook, Apple and 
Amazon. For indigenous peoples to retain their sonic sovereignty, they must have the power to 
create culture, but also to let their culture die. 
The Right to Forget 
 Governments, particularly in Europe, have started generating policies to ensure 
forgetfulness and erasure of memory (Grax, Ausloos, & Valcke 2012).  For example, in May 
2016, the European Union adopted major revisions to its 1995 Data Protection Directive that 
includes an individual “right to be forgotten.”  The European Parliament found that each 
European citizen “should have the right to have his or her personal data erased” under certain 
conditions, including the following: 
• where the personal data are no longer necessary in relation to the purposes for which they 
are collected or otherwise processed,252 or 
• where [the citizen] has withdrawn his or her consent or he or she objects to the processing 
of personal data concerning him or her,253 or 
• where personal data have been unlawfully processed.254 
The EU was particularly concerned about situations where individuals, particularly children, 
were “not fully aware of the risks involved.”255  At the same time, the EU also faced 
considerable pressure from social media corporations, journalists, and historians, among others, 
to weigh carefully the potential impact of the right to forget on freedom of expression and 
                                                
252. Reg. 2016/679, European Parliament and Council, art. 17(1)(a) (Apr. 27, 2016). 
253. Reg. 2016/679, European Parliament and Council, art. 17(1)(b) (Apr. 27, 2016). 
254. Reg. 2016/679, European Parliament and Council, art. 17(1)(d) (Apr. 27, 2016). 
255. Reg. 2016/679, European Parliament and Council, Preamble ¶65 (Apr. 27, 2016). 
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information. In fact, the EU took particular care to preserve an exception to the right to forget for 
“archiving purposes in the public interest, scientific or historical research purposes or statistical 
purposes” among other apparently self-evident “publicly beneficial” interests.256  But even in 
providing an exemption for archival institutions from the “right to forget” for these “publicly 
beneficial” purposes, the EU stipulates that holding data against an individual’s wishes can only 
occur when it is “likely to render impossible or seriously impair the achievement of the [publicly 
beneficial] objectives of that processing.”257  As the Regulation later instructs, archival 
institutions holding data from individuals for these purposes “shall be subject to appropriate 
safeguards” protecting individual privacy (specifically “pseudonymization” and measures to 
prevent identification of data subjects).  However, nothing in the EU’s “right to forget” provision 
requires that these holding institutions, EU member states, or the EU take into account group 
rights or indigenous rights258 as described in the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples.259 
 In the United States, several legal scholars have mocked European efforts to implement a 
right to forget, taking particular interest in a 2014 Court of Justice of the European Union ruling 
requiring Google Spain to delete search results containing an archived article with “irrelevant 
                                                
256. Reg. 2016/679, European Parliament and Council, art. 17(3)(a),(d) (Apr. 27, 2016). 
257. Reg. 2016/679, European Parliament and Council, art. 17(3)(d) (Apr. 27, 2016). 
258. Reg. 2016/679, European Parliament and Council, art. 89(1) (Apr. 27, 2016). 
259. The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, while not necessarily binding on 
signatories (“a standard of achievement to be pursued in a spirit of partnership and mutual respect), does provide 
norms for data gathered from indigenous groups.  See Resolution adopted by the General Assembly 61/295, (2007) 
(“States shall provide redress . . . developed in conjunction with indigenous peoples, with respect to their cultural, 
intellectual, religious and spiritual property taken without their free, prior and informed consent or in violation of 
their laws, traditions and customs”); see also art. 31 (“Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain, control, protect 
and develop their cultural heritage, traditional knowledge and traditional cultural expressions . . . They also have the 
right to maintain, control, protect and develop their intellectual property over such cultural heritage, traditional 
knowledge, and traditional cultural expressions.”) 
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and excessive” information after a Spanish citizen requested that it be taken down and de-
listed.260  At least one of these scholars considered the “right to forget” to be “the biggest threat 
to free speech on the Internet in the coming decade.”261   Certainly EU and American notions of 
freedom of speech have fundamental differences: contributors to American First Amendment 
thinking have advocated for an “uninhibited, robust, and wide-open” debate on public issues,262 
which for some legal theorists, requires citizens to have uninhibited access to information for the 
purpose of self-government.263 And yet, doctrines like expungement of criminal histories and 
various forms of evidentiary privilege show that American law can be marshaled to force various 
kinds of archives to either let go of (or refrain from circulating) knowledge acquired in the past 
so that certain publics can move forward unconstrained in the present and future.   
 My argument here is that one of indigenous sovereignty’s core attributes must be the 
ability to care for and maintain connections to our land through the voices of our people, past and 
present.  This may include (but is certainly not limited to) the ability of indigenous communities 
to determine appropriate preservation techniques, possibilities of circulation, and/or the right to 
demand the destruction of archived ancestral voices, and it may require archives to deaccession 
them and transfer complete ownership of the physical media and intellectual or cultural property 
rights to indigenous communities.  There are important counterarguments as to why First 
                                                
260. Some commentators considered the European court to be out of their minds.  See The Right to Be Forgotten: 
The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, The Digital Citizen (July/Aug. 2015), available at 
http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=7131393 
261. Jeffrey Rosen, The Right to be Forgotten, 64 Stan. L. Rev. Online 88 (Feb. 13, 2012), available at 
https://www.stanfordlawreview.org/online/privacy-paradox-the-right-to-be-forgotten/ 
262. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). 
263. See Alexander Meiklejohn, Free Speech and Its Relation to Self-Government 24-25 (1948) (“The welfare of the 
community requires that those who decide issues shall understand them.  They must know what they are voting 
about.  And this in turn, requires that so far as time allows, all facts and interests relevant to the problem shall be 
fully and fairly presented . . . What is essential is not that everyone shall speak, but that everything worth saying 
shall be said.”) 
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Amendment concerns over access to indigenous information are either irrelevant or, at best, 
sidestep the immense inequities in the way indigenous peoples are “known” as compared to 
settler populations in the United States.264  But perhaps the most compelling argument for 
recognizing indigenous peoples’ rights to care for their and their ancestors’ voices comes from 
the role these voices play in the networks of relations that constitute our contemporary 
indigenous communities: they are material manifestations of sonic sovereignty.    
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